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Introduction: Disharmonious Allies

In August 1952, delegates from Australia, New Zealand and the United
States met in Honolulu for the first formal round of discussions over
how the ANZUS Treaty—a defence alliance signed by these countries
in September 1951—would work in practice. The treaty required each
signatory to “respond to the common danger” in the Pacific, and these
powers indeed saw mutual dangers at the time. The Korean War had
been raging for over a year and showed no immediate signs of ending. A
Communist government in China appeared to have aggressive intentions.
Local revolutionaries in Indochina and Malaya had demanded sovereignty
from their colonial governments. Framed in this light, a closer strategic
relationship between the ANZUS powers should have been cooperative
and rather straightforward.
This was certainly not the case. In advance of Council meetings in
Hawaii, Percy Spender—architect of the ANZUS Treaty and then Australian
Ambassador in Washington—accused the Pentagon of purposely
“diminishing the importance” of the alliance to avoid serious consultation
with Australia. According to Spender, even Australia’s former enemies—
Germany, Italy and Japan—had “the opportunity of consultation on vital
matters in a manner which so far has been denied to Australia.”1 Without a
doubt, refusing to consult seriously with the Australians was an American
objective. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had advised Secretary of State
Dean Acheson that joint planning with Australia and New Zealand would
mean “serious and far-reaching disadvantages to the present and projected

1

Spender to Casey, 18 March 1952, Spender Papers, Box 1, National Library of Australia
(hereafter NLA).
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state of United States planning for a global war.”2 This position
aggravated the Australians, yet the New Zealanders did not share this
view, despite their similar geopolitical circumstances. As one adviser
told Head of the New Zealand External Affairs Department Alister
McIntosh, New Zealand “did not share the long-standing Australian
objective of infiltration into the world’s policy-making hierarchy” after
claiming that the Australian delegation almost demanded this outright
at Honolulu.3 McIntosh certainly sympathised with this opinion, and
even conceded later that New Zealand “never wanted the damn Pacific
Pact in the first place.”4
How did three allied powers—which shared a common language,
similar historical roots and democratic liberal institutions—leave Hawaii
with such competing views about the practicality of an alliance signed
less than one year earlier? To some extent, disagreements between the
ANZUS powers were symbolic of the challenging and divisive time in
which the treaty was conceived. While in broad terms these countries
shared similar political objectives in combating Soviet-led Communism
during the early stages of the Cold War, the underlying purpose of
this treaty was unique for each signatory and often created complex
diplomatic tensions in the trilateral relationship. Australia, undeniably
the most enthusiastic treaty member, viewed ANZUS as a means to
rebalance its traditional ties with Britain by fostering a closer strategic
relationship with the United States. The treaty limited the likelihood
of future existential threats such as those posed by Japan in late 1942,
and it provided an additional avenue for Canberra to voice its concerns
about world affairs.
Across the Tasman Sea, policymakers in New Zealand were more
reluctant to forge a closer political relationship with the United States
if it meant damaging relations with Britain. For Wellington, one of the
major benefits of ANZUS was that it simply allowed New Zealand to
continue its military commitments to the British cause in the Middle
East. After all, as Jatinder Mann pointed out about the post-war years,

2

Marshall to Acheson, 16 January 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States Series
(hereafter FRUS) 1951 Vol. VI, 141.

3

Memorandum for McIntosh, 25 July 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3/1 Part 8.

4

McIntosh to Corner, 3 October 1952, in Ian McGibbon ed., Unofficial Channels: Letters
Between Alister McIntosh and Foss Shanahan, George Laking and Frank Corner, 19461966 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1999), 106.
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New Zealand “very much identified itself as a British country and an
integral part of a wider British World, which had the UK at its heart.”5 In
contradistinction to Australian and New Zealand views on an alliance,
the United States refused to consider an ANZUS-style arrangement
until the outbreak of the Korean War necessitated trans-Tasman support
for a Japanese Peace Treaty. The United States did not want an explicit
military commitment to defend critical Australian and New Zealand
interests. US eyes were primarily fixated on the situations in Europe
and Asia, and did not give much serious thought to strategic issues in
the South Pacific. That said, the State Department did recognise the
growing importance of the US alliance with Australia and New Zealand
as the Cold War began to take shape, especially because they shared
similar ways of life and political ideologies.6
Looking more broadly, the development of this trilateral
relationship from the end of World War II to the 1956 Suez Crisis—two
monumental historical events that bookend a period of great change
for these countries—provides an interesting and unique case study
in alliance diplomacy. Much like the conclusion of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949 which formalised the collective
defence of Western Europe against the Soviet bloc, the ANZUS powers
faced significant disunity when responding to mutual defence issues
despite similar geopolitical interests in the Pacific. During these years,
close Australian and New Zealand ties to Britain caused significant
friction in their respective relationships with the United States. Despite
Australian and New Zealand policymakers accepting that their postwar security relied upon the United States due to the fleeting nature of
the British presence in the Asia-Pacific region, Canberra and Wellington
maintained close strategic ties with London. As a result, when British
decisions clashed with US policies, the Tasman countries were forced to
choose between aligning their policies with one or the other of its two
most important allies.

5

Jatinder Mann, “The End of the British World and the Redefinition of Citizenship
in Aotearoa New Zealand, 1950s–1970s”, National Identities (2017), 1, https://doi.org
/10.1080/14608944.2017.1369019

6

Thomas K. Robb and David James Gill, “The ANZUS Treaty during the Cold War:
A Reinterpretation of US Diplomacy in the Southwest Pacific”, Journal of Cold War
Studies 17, no. 4 (2015), 109-157, https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00599
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Even then, policymakers in Canberra and Wellington did not always
agree on how closely to align their respective policies with the United
States and Britain. This was due in some measure to mutual distrust,
but it also stemmed from trans-Tasman differences over Britain’s proper
role in the post-war Pacific and Middle East. Canberra continued to
cooperate and consult closely with London, yet a global power shift
in favour of the US caused Australian diplomats to pursue actively a
much closer relationship with the United States to meet their own
security requirements. New Zealand also recognised the need for US
protection but remained sceptical of American intentions and aimed,
wherever possible, to align their policies with Britain to counteract
US dominance. In short, while both countries maintained close British
ties, active Australian efforts to pursue closer US-Australian strategic
cooperation—often at the expense of cooperation within the British
Commonwealth—caused significant discord in the trans-Tasman
relationship.
Until at least the mid-1950s, the United States also proved
unwilling to consult seriously with Australia and New Zealand. This
lack of consultation created significant discord in the relationship.
In the early years of the Truman Administration, Washington gave
little consideration to Australia’s and New Zealand’s roles in the US
containment strategy. Only after the Cold War escalated in Asia during
the late 1940s and early 1950s did the United States give far more
attention to developments in Asia and the Pacific, and in so doing, began
to consider new ways in which to combat the spread of Communism
in this region. This in turn drew Washington’s gaze to Australian and
New Zealand shores. ANZUS became possible because of this shared
desire to respond to mutual security threats in the Pacific theatre, even
if the three powers disagreed over many strategic issues. As the 1950s
progressed, the alliance even offered Australia and New Zealand an
unprecedented—albeit still minor—role in global strategy.
Since ANZUS was forged at such a momentous time in world
history and subsequently played a significant role in the development
of Australian and New Zealand foreign policies, historians have
unsurprisingly devoted considerable attention to its conclusion. Early
studies were especially critical of the Australian relationship with the
United States. This was epitomised by Alan Renouf, former Head of
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the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, who characterised the
country’s general approach to foreign policy as childish because of its
marked inclination to stay with “mother” Britain and then the United
States.7 As more archival records became available, however, it became
clear that these views were simplistic and did not properly reflect that
the post-war period was one in which Australian foreign policy actually
“gained considerable maturity, and its capacity to act independently
grew with the professionalism of its diplomatic service.”8 Recent
scholarly developments on Australian foreign policy during the early
Cold War highlight this evolution, especially in analyses of individual
diplomats and of the complexities that bedevilled the formulation of
policy by the Department of External Affairs and the Department of
Defence.9
Another theme that presented itself was the ongoing struggle
Australia faced in managing its relationships with Britain and the
United States while simultaneously building its own independent role
in foreign affairs. Christine de Matos aptly described this challenge as
a “juggling act”, which became a common feature of the Australian
approach to international crises in the 1940s and 1950s amidst a growing
rift in Anglo-American relations.10 Given Britain’s complete inability to
protect Australian interests during World War II and afterwards, a postwar strategic shift toward the United States was logical and should have
been quite straightforward. Instead, Canberra still maintained a close

7

Alan Renouf, The Frightened Country (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1979), 3-14. See also
Joseph Camilleri, Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence (Melbourne:
Macmillan, 1980).

8

Joan Beaumont, “Making Australian Foreign Policy, 1941-1969”, in Joan Beaumont,
Christopher Waters, David Lowe, with Gary Woodard eds. Ministers, Mandarins
and Diplomats: Australian Foreign Policy Making 1941-1969 (Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press, 2003), 3.

9

Examples include Peter Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins (Sydney: Allen
& Unwin, 2006); David Lowe, Australia Between Empires: The Life of Percy Spender
(London: Pickering & Chatto, 2010); Cotton, James. “R.G. Casey and Australian
International Thought: Empire, Nation, Community”, The International History
Review 33, no. 1 (2011), 95-113, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2011.555380;
Arthur Tange, Defence Policy-Making: A Close-Up View, 1950-1980, Peter Edwards ed.
(Canberra: ANU Press, 2008), http://press.anu.edu.au?p=101541

10

Christine de Matos, “Diplomacy Interrupted? Macmahon Ball, Evatt and Labor’s
Policies in Occupied Japan”, Australian Journal of Politics and History 52, no. 2 (2006),
193, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2005.00414.x
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relationship with London, and, as a result, often had to walk a tightrope
in times of crisis by balancing its relationships with its two great and
powerful allies.
An unwillingness to abandon close ties to Britain, then, speaks
to something much deeper in the relationship. Australians still saw
themselves as inherently British-Australians, so much so that when
Prime Minister Ben Chifley visited London in 1948 to discuss a Western
Union against the Soviet threat in Europe, he argued that only the
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand “fully represented the
British tradition” despite British insistence on including Southeast
Asian countries as part of Commonwealth strategy in the Middle East.
This rather embarrassing suggestion, as Neville Meaney argued, points
out that being British “meant more to the Australian prime minister
than the British themselves.”11 These types of views still persisted
through the 1950s, especially as then Prime Minister Robert Menzies—
who had once described himself as British to the “bootheels”—strongly
supported British actions in the Suez Canal region despite widespread
international condemnation, including from the United States.12
Australia’s alliance with the US was indeed important and necessary,
yet inclinations to support the British line even after the conclusion of
ANZUS demonstrates the strength of pro-British sentiments in Australia
as well as the complexities that existed in these relationships.
New Zealand historians have similarly focused on Commonwealth
relations, but have also stressed the country’s small-power status as
a key feature of New Zealand’s increasingly the country’s growing
independent outlook. As W. David McIntyre claimed, “New Zealand
began to assert an independent voice in international affairs and not
simply in empire affairs” in the post-war years, despite the United
States acting as a “more aloof and unpredictable ally” than Britain.13 To

11

Neville Meaney, “Britishness and Australian Identity: The Problem of Nationalism
in Australian History and Historiography”, Australian Historical Studies 32, no. 116
(2001), 80-81, https://doi.org/10.1080/10314610108596148

12

Stuart Ward, “The ‘New Nationalism’ in Australia, Canada and New Zealand:
Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World”, in Joan Beaumont and Matthew
Jordan eds., Australia and the World: A Festschrift to Neville Meaney (Sydney: Sydney
University Press, 2013), 191.

13

W. David McIntyre, “From Dual Dependency to Nuclear Free”, in Geoffrey Rice,
W. H. Oliver and B. R. Williams eds., The Oxford History of New Zealand (Melbourne:
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be sure, however, Wellington’s view of its role in the post-war world
was fundamentally shaped by its place in the British Commonwealth.
This was because, in the words of Frank Corner, the New Zealand
Deputy High Commissioner in London, “New Zealand at heart [had]
always been content with a ‘colonial’ position and had readily accepted
the leadership of Britain.” Similarly, he suggested in 1954 that “if New
Zealand entered the American orbit […] this would be a great pity.”14
Wellington, in short, wanted US protection but was reluctant to align itself
too closely with Washington in case it damaged relations with London.
As Australian National University historian T. B. Millar first concluded
somewhat derisively in 1968, New Zealand was more inclined to “cling
closer than did Australia to the skirts of Mother England.” As part of
its clinging, “New Zealand have thus from the beginning looked at the
world through different eyes, from an increasingly different viewpoint
than Australians, and have seen an increasingly different world.”15
American historians have already extensively analysed almost all
aspects of US foreign policy under the first two post-war US Presidents,
Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. These studies focus on the
attribution of responsibility for the development of the Cold War,
the emergence and implementation of global containment strategies,
examinations of key individuals and their impact on policymaking
decisions, and explanations of the ways in which post-war US foreign
policy shaped the international system for the duration of the twentieth
century and beyond.16 This is well-trodden ground; this book’s focus
Oxford University Press, 1992), 520-527. Notable works on NZ foreign policy
during this period include: Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy:
New Zealand in the World Since 1935 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993);
Ann Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, 1945-1952: The Occupation and the Peace Treaty
(London: The Athlone Press, 1990); Malcolm Templeton, Ties of Blood and Empire:
New Zealand’s Involvement in Middle East Defence and the Suez Crisis, 1947-1957
(Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1994).
14

Frank Corner to Joseph Saville Garner, 27 July 1954, as quoted in James Waite,
“Contesting ‘the Right of Decision’: New Zealand, the Commonwealth,
and the New Look”, Diplomatic History 30, no. 5 (2006), 893, https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2006.00583.x

15

T.B. Millar, Australia’s Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1968), 182.

16

More recent examples include Wilson Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman:
Potsdam, Hiroshima and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2008); John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York: Penguin,
2011); William McClenahan, Eisenhower and the Cold War Economy (Baltimore: John
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lies instead with the roles Australia and New Zealand played in these
US strategic and policy decisions. Examinations of US relations with
small overlooked countries, such as the Pacific Dominions, offer a
new perspective on how Washington managed its alliances as part
of the broader East-West struggle. To this end, Tony Smith used the
term “pericentrism” to describe the role of junior members of Cold
War alliances who “tried to block, moderate, and end the epic contest”
but also “played a key role in expanding, intensifying, and prolonging
the struggle between East and West.”17 Fitting neatly within Smith’s
“pericentric” framework, Australia’s and New Zealand’s small but
not insignificant role in influencing US foreign policy during the early
Cold War provides a unique insight into such a significant period of
international history.
There were certainly many important dimensions to this early trilateral
relationship. Some key examples include the impact of these countries’
domestic policies on international affairs, increasing trade imports and
exports, establishing closer cross-cultural ties, and contrasting ways of
approaching the challenges presented by Communism and the post-war
international order. This book touches on some of these considerations
as they became relevant to the development of ANZUS, yet its principal
focus is on the key strategic and foreign policy issues that impacted
high-level diplomatic relations. As a secondary theme, it also explores
the roles of key individuals who shaped the nature of the relationship.
Notable among them are Australian External Affairs Ministers Herbert
Evatt, Percy Spender and Richard Casey; New Zealand’s Head of
External Affairs Alister McIntosh and Minister in the United States Carl
Berendsen; Chief US negotiator for ANZUS and US Secretary of State
during the Eisenhower Administration John Foster Dulles; and to a
lesser extent British prime ministers Winston Churchill and Anthony
Eden.
Hopkins University Press, 2011); Hannah Gurman, The Dissent Papers: The Voices of
Diplomats in the Cold War and Beyond (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
For a recent historiographical examination of these issues, see Frank Costigliola
and Michael Hogan eds. America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign
Relations since 1941, 2nd edn. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
17

Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the
Study of the Cold War”, Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 (2000), 567–591, https://doi.
org/10.1111/0145-2096.00237

Introduction: Disharmonious Allies



9

The book is split into two parts. Part One explores the post-war
origins of the ANZUS alliance between 1945 and 1951. In this section,
Chapters One and Two analyse mutual security issues such as defence
planning after the end of World War II, contestation over control of
key Pacific island bases, the Japanese occupation, and trans-Tasman
involvement in British defence strategies and nuclear development. By
early 1949, trilateral views on these issues left the three countries at odds
and with no solid foundation for closer cooperation through a regional
defence arrangement. Diplomatic developments during these years
also reveal that Australia and New Zealand were not yet prepared to
abandon their close political ties to Britain in the face of US dominance.
Despite a somewhat acrimonious start to the post-war relationship,
Chapter Three considers some of the international developments in the
late 1940s that made concluding a formal defence treaty more viable.
These include the outbreak of the Korean War, the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the election of new conservative
governments in Canberra and Wellington. Following on from these
developments, Chapter Four details negotiations over the ANZUS
Treaty and highlights the contrasting types of commitment Australia,
New Zealand and the United States were aiming to conclude with one
another as well as the underlying reasons for these choices. Again,
trans-Tasman ties to Britain surfaced as a key factor that complicated
closer relations with the United States, especially as policymakers
in London saw the conclusion of ANZUS as a significant blow to its
international prestige and sought to undermine the treaty’s practicality
and usefulness.
Part Two explores how ANZUS worked when it came into force
between 1952 and 1956. Chapter Five touches on a range of post-treaty
issues, including contrasting views surrounding the treaty’s actual
scope and machinery, dealing with the question of British membership,
the development of separate discussions for the joint defence of
Southeast Asia, and uncertainty surrounding future of ANZUS after
the election of Dwight Eisenhower in January 1953. These initial posttreaty developments provide no clear evidence of an alliance that was
practical or even useful for serious consultation or to respond to issues
of mutual concern in the Pacific theatre. Then, Chapters Six, Seven,
and Eight explore trilateral responses to three international crises: the

10
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1954 Dien Bien Phu Crisis in Indochina, the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu
Crisis in the Taiwan Straits, and the 1956 Suez Crisis. These case studies
provide snapshots of the ways ANZUS worked in practice, as well as
illuminating the difficulties that threatened the efforts of the ANZUS
powers to agree on a united response. These chapters also highlight that
the usefulness of ANZUS often hinged upon British participation when
responding to mutual dangers in the Pacific.
Each chapter seeks to answer several pertinent questions about the
nature of the early post-war relationship. How did US global leadership
impact its post-war relationships with Australia and New Zealand?
How and why did Britain complicate relations between the ANZUS
partners? Despite shared geopolitical interests, why did Australia and
New Zealand disagree so often on fundamental strategic and diplomatic
issues? Why did Australia, New Zealand and the United States have
different views toward ANZUS but still commit to its conclusion? Was
ANZUS ultimately useful in practice? How did the trilateral relationship
develop over the first decade of the Cold War period, and what were the
factors and who were the individual policymakers that shaped these
changes? By including the views, policies and interests of all three
countries in its pages, this book addresses these questions about the
ANZUS relationship during the early Cold War.

PART ONE: ORIGINS

1. Defence Problems in the Pacific

While the origins of the Australian-New Zealand-American relationship
can be traced as far back as the arrival of the US Great White Fleet in
Sydney and Auckland in 1908, the pragmatic foundations of ANZUS
lie in the aftermath of World War II. This war—which ended officially
in September 1945—was the deadliest the world had ever seen, and
the threat that the Japanese had posed to Australia and New Zealand
during this conflict prompted diplomats in these countries to reconsider
how they would safeguard their own security in the post-war world.
The Tasman countries were too small to protect themselves, and wartorn Britain was no longer able to provide adequate military support in
the Pacific. As Historian C. W. Braddick colourfully described, Britain’s
wartime experience “cruelly exposed its threadbare imperial clothes”,
subtly referencing Britain’s inability to safeguard Australian and New
Zealand interests while it fought against the Axis powers.1 The only
practical solution was pursuing a closer relationship with the United
States, the world’s most powerful nation that had defeated the Japanese
almost single-handedly.
Indeed, this reality was well known to Australians and New Zealanders
even before they entered the war against Japan. Soon after the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, Australian Prime Minister
John Curtin had already signalled the future of Australian diplomacy
and strategy. “Without any inhibitions of any kind”, he declared, “I make
it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our
1

C.W. Braddick, “Britain, the Commonwealth, and the Post-war Japanese Revival,
1945–70”, The Round Table 99, no. 409 (2010), 372, https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2
010.498975
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Figure 1. US General Douglas MacArthur signs as Supreme Allied Commander for the formal
surrender of Japan during WWII, September 1945. Photo by US Navy (1945), US National
Archives Catalog, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/520694, unrestricted use.

traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.”2 While not going
as far as suggesting a closer US relationship would come at the expense
of relations with Britain, New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser
made similar comments about the importance of the United States to
the future conduct of his country’s diplomacy. “New Zealand realises”,
he said, “that the security and future development of the Pacific can
only be satisfactorily achieved in cooperation with the United States.”3
In short, Britain’s self-ruling Dominions in the South Pacific had come
to the understanding that the United States had replaced Britain as the
predominant power in the Pacific, and US officials certainly agreed.
The Pearl Harbor attack had utterly discredited the pre-war isolationist
movement, and had set the United States on a path toward becoming a
global superpower. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Pacific,

2

David Day, “27th December 1941: Prime Minister Curtin’s New Year Message,
Australia Looks to America”, in Turning Points in Australian History, Martin Crotty
and David Andrew Roberts eds. (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press,
2009), 129-142.

3

Fraser Statement, 17 April 1944, in New Zealand Foreign Policy: Statements and
Documents, 1943-1957 (hereafter NZFP: SD) (Wellington: New Zealand Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 1972), 65-67.
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where the United States maintained an almost complete monopoly of
power. As US Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal put it in April 1945,
“all discussions of world peace” rested on the assumption that “the
United States [would] have the major responsibility for the Pacific.”4
To that end, the United States moved ahead swiftly with its postwar plans for the Pacific without any serious thought of cooperating
closely with Britain or any of the Commonwealth countries. Based on
US Joint War Committee plans drafted a year earlier, US Chief of Naval
Operations Chester Nimitz and Chief of the Army Dwight Eisenhower
agreed that the United States must set up a Pacific Command (stretching
from the main Japanese islands through to the Philippines) and a
Western Command (covering the “rest of the Pacific”) solely under the
leadership of American naval officers.5
At that time, the United States had no major strategic interest in
Australia or New Zealand. As the world’s most powerful nation,
initial US post-war foreign and defence policies were global in nature.
Moreover, all policies (including those in the Pacific) were considered
in relation to their impact on the Soviet Union and the global balance
of power. As part of these global post-war strategies, relations with
Australia and New Zealand were low on the list of US priorities. As
US Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy told Secretary of the Navy
James Forrestal in November 1945, the “post-war problems are global;
that is, the conditions of anarchy, unrest, malnutrition, unemployment
[…] the economic dislocations are profound and far-reaching.” For the
Departments of War and the Navy, the US had to devise and develop
broad defence policies to meet these challenges and prepare for war
against the most likely post-war enemy, the Soviet Union. The United
States had to respond to the “universal fear of the Russian colossus,
both in terms of the size of that country and the locust-like effect of their
occupation wherever they may be”, McCloy reasoned.6
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Reflecting McCloy’s global outlook, the US Joint Post-War Committee
concluded that in the Pacific, the United States must take a global
perspective. This meant the United States must consider Pacific strategy
and defence policy in relation to its effect on the Soviet Union and other
regions of primary US interest, such as Europe and the Middle East.
A report produced by the Committee in July 1945 outlined that in the
Pacific theatre, the United States should maintain an island barrier of
bases stretching from Japan’s northern islands down to the Philippines
and the Southwest Pacific. These defence plans aimed to safeguard US
territory from again being attacked from Asia, but also to prepare for
a global fight against the Soviet Union. Further reports for US global
defence policy were drawn up by the Committee in May 1946. These
plans were code-named “Pincher.” Based on the assumption of war
with the Soviet Union, the Pincher Series assessed defence capabilities
for the United States and its allies. The plans concluded that the United
States must prepare for potential war with Moscow.
In assessing Allied post-war defence capabilities, Australia and New
Zealand did not feature in US plans for a future war with the Soviet
Union. This was largely due to Australia and New Zealand’s respective
geographic isolation and limited military potential, but also because
Washington thought that their defence plans were largely shaped by
British defence priorities. In late 1945, US Envoy in Wellington Kenneth
Patton told US Secretary of State James Byrnes that New Zealand was
still “strongly inflicted with the Mother Country complex.”7 Similarly,
US Ambassador to Canberra Nelson Johnson asserted that “Washington
[dealt] with Australia as part of the Empire.” Before the war ended,
he even went as far as suggesting that post-war discussions between
Australia and the United States “would not be settled in Canberra but in
consultation at 10 Downing Street.”8
Unsurprisingly, Australia and New Zealand did look back towards
their traditional ally in Europe. The problem these diplomats faced
when visiting London, however, was the complete lack of any
meaningful Commonwealth regional defence system in the post-war
7
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world. During the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in May
1946, Frank Corner, the political affairs officer in the NZ Department
of External Affairs, described this dire situation to his colleagues back
in Wellington. “What do we do now?” Corner asked rhetorically in
a lengthy letter to New Zealand External Affairs Secretary Alister
McIntosh during the Conference; “the British stated quite frankly that
they are no longer able to defend the whole Commonwealth. Britain
is resigning her leadership in the Pacific out of weakness”, Corner
conceded, and the only “logical development of this trend was to push
Australia and New Zealand steadily towards the US.”9 Reporting
back from the Prime Ministers’ Conference, the Australians made
similar observations. In an address to the Australian Parliament on
19 June, Prime Minister Ben Chifley stressed that Australia’s post-war
relationship with the United States would now form “a cornerstone of
our foreign policy.”10

Figure 2. Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley (middle), Australian External Affairs
Minister Herbert Evatt (left) and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee (right) meet at the
1946 Commonwealth Conference. Photo by unknown (1946), Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/
photos/chifleyresearch/14483884882, CC BY 2.0.
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The Britons were indeed in dire straits. The Second World War had
financially crippled the British economy, so much so that London was
the world’s greatest debtor by the end of the war and had to borrow
over three billion dollars from the US to give it breathing space in which
to balance its overseas payments.11 Even before the war ended officially,
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden predicted that such severe
economic difficulties would limit the influence of its foreign policy
and force Whitehall to reassess which foreign strategic interests should
be prioritised. At the top of Britain’s list of strategic priorities was the
post-war reconstruction of Europe and the German occupation, while
it simultaneously looked to withdraw from any onerous commitments
in the Asia and the Middle East. For instance, British Prime Minister
Clement Attlee argued for a withdrawal of British forces in the Middle
East, granting independence to India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Pakistan,
and later approved plans for Australia to lead the Commonwealth on
the advisory Allied Council for Japan during the post-war occupation.
These actions all signalled a retreat of British influence in the Asia-Pacific
region. It was no longer a major world power, and had to abandon
any non-critical commitments lest it further damage its economy or
international prestige.
Unlike the United States or even Britain, neither Australia nor
New Zealand was a global power and did not possess a sizeable
military force or industrialised economy. Much to Australian External
Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt’s frustration, the United States did not
give “countries like Australia and New Zealand” the opportunity to
contribute meaningfully to the post-war defence of the Pacific.12 As far
as Australia’s defence capabilities were concerned, Australian military
personnel were still returning from overseas deployments throughout
late 1945. This delayed finalising more concrete objectives for Australian
post-war defence policy. As Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley
outlined in November 1945, early defence policy considerations were
also affected by:
The delay in establishing an effective world security organisation,
the international difficulties that have arisen in establishing
11
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cooperation in the immediate post-war world, [and because]
any present estimated strength of post-war forces would be very
provisional while demobilisation at present leaves a doubt as to
the ultimate strengths to which forces can be reduced.13
Once Australian personnel returned from overseas and better estimations
could be made about Australian military strength, defence policy was
first outlined publicly in November 1946. Its rationale revolved around
the concept of imperial cooperation. In an address to the Australian
Parliament on 2 November, Duke of Gloucester Prince Henry suggested
that Australian forces be used in three roles: for UN peace-keeping
forces, under old British Empire arrangements and in national defence.
It was also announced that Australia would make a larger contribution to
Commonwealth defence in the Pacific. This outline was then built upon
by Australian military planners in a 1946 proposal titled the “Nature and
Function of Post-War Defence Forces”, which suggested that the “basic
ingredient” of the defence of Australia was “Empire Cooperation.”14 In
short, despite the clear decline in British power in the Pacific over the
preceding decade, Australia was committed to retaining defence ties
with Britain due to personal networks and loyalty to empire.
Australian defence policy did not begin to take a clearer shape
until 1947. On 6 March, the Australian Council of Defence (consisting
of the Defence Minister, Defence Secretary the Chief of the Australian
Defence Forces and other service chiefs) summarised that the post-war
security of Australia rested on “cooperation with Empire Defence and
the development of regional security with the United States.” Australian
cooperation with larger powers was crucial, as the Australian Chiefs
of Staff concluded that Australia was “an isolated smaller power with
limited manpower and resources […] it is not able to defend itself.”15
Later that month, the Joint Intelligence Committee (a sub-organisation of
the Department of Defence) approved the Defence Council conclusions
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and planned for potential war scenarios that might involve Australian
troops. As the Committee could see no immediate threat to Australia “in
its own theatre”, the most likely threats to Australian security would be
in either the Middle East or the Far East. These areas were determined to
be the most likely to threaten vital British interests and result in Australia
becoming involved because of its ties with the United Kingdom.16 From
these initial reports, it appeared that Australian post-war defence policy
was to set to take a similar shape to previous wartime policies insofar
as it centred on British cooperation and fighting for Commonwealth
interests rather than depending completely on US policy.
Six months later, the Australian Defence Committee (a suborganisation that advised the Defence Minister on matters relating to
defence policy) agreed with these recommendations and produced the
“Strategic Position of Australia” report. In it, the Australian Chiefs of
Staff insisted on preparing Australian troops to be deployed in either
the Middle East or the Far East, depending on how desperately British
forces needed Australian support and whether such support would
serve Australian interests. In each scenario, it was suggested that
Australian defence preparations should be orchestrated in cooperation
with the British Commonwealth.17 Again, the Australians appeared to
prioritise British cooperation over and above potential cooperation with
the United States.
Across the Tasman, New Zealand post-war defence policy rested
on two pillars. Firstly, like Australia, New Zealand defence planners
recognised that the country was too small to defend itself and wherever
possible it would have to coordinate its defence policy with Britain and
the United States. The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff explained on 30
October 1945 that local defence would be linked to a system of forward
island bases in the Pacific. In short, the Chiefs concluded that the
United States would probably take responsibility for the island bases in
Northeast Asia, so New Zealand should contribute to the defence of the
Southwest Pacific through coordination with British-occupied bases in
the Solomon Islands, New Hebrides, and Fiji.18
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The major problem with adopting this strategy was that Wellington
had very little information regarding American post-war policies in the
Pacific. Without these plans, New Zealand could not properly coordinate
its own defence plans with the United States. As New Zealand Minister
in the United States Carl Berendsen told US Representative for the Allied
Commission on Japanese Reparations Isador Lubin on 15 October 1945,
New Zealand could not support US foreign policy in the Pacific unless
the New Zealand Government “knew what American policy was.”19 In
response to this lack of information exchange, US Envoy in Wellington
Kenneth Patton suggested that New Zealand should be informed of US
defence plans. Even while New Zealand generally followed the lead of
the United Kingdom, Patton’s interpretation of New Zealand’s defence
policy suggested that New Zealand objectives in the Pacific were “nearly
identical” to the United States and that Wellington would support US
plans “if they were communicated to the New Zealand Government.”20
At this stage, however, Washington was not seeking a closer
consultative arrangement with Wellington. That being the case, New
Zealand Chiefs of Staff concluded that while there was no immediate
threat to New Zealand in the Pacific theatre, the second pillar of New
Zealand’s initial post-war defence policy should be to assist in an
Allied victory in the event of war in the Middle East. Under this plan,
New Zealand was prepared to send its largest military contribution to
the Middle East so that its limited military potential would make the
greatest contribution to the outcome of a future war. However, as with
the Australians, New Zealand defence policy was tied to British defence
planning. It was on the advice of the British Chiefs of Staff that New
Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser and his Defence Chiefs agreed
that New Zealand should make its primary military contribution to the
defence of the Middle East. Such a contribution was outlined clearly
and with a specific time frame: an army expeditionary force would be
deployed within ninety days after the decision to do so was made, and
air squadrons within seventy days.21
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Control in the Pacific Islands
American dominance in the Pacific first became a problem for Australia
and New Zealand during the post-war settlement of the Pacific Islands.
For Australia, New Zealand and the United States, each island held
a different strategic value for each country and was considered for
different purposes. John Minter, the US chargé in Canberra, relayed
to the State Department early in January 1946 that Australian External
Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt was “directly interested in security and
welfare arrangements in the whole Pacific area” and that the “Australian
government [felt] that both countries should participate in any talks
which are held on this subject.”22
Evatt’s thoughts were based in part on the Canberra Pact, an
Australian-New Zealand agreement reached in January 1944 that
formally declared that the two countries have common interests in the
South Pacific and that they should have a voice in the settlement of
island bases. Evatt’s demands reflected his frustration at being left out
of the 1943 Cairo Conference (where Allied powers had determined the
post-war fate of territories that had been seized by the Japanese in case
of Allied victory). Evatt’s comments also reflected his determination
that Australia’s viewpoint should be considered more seriously in
Washington. In truth, Australia’s realistic Pacific ambitions lay in only
a select number of islands. Australia negotiated with Britain the postwar control of Nauru, the Cocos Islands, Christmas Island, the New
Hebrides and the British Solomons, all of which have been dealt with
extensively elsewhere.23
As far as the Australians were concerned, the key island was Manus,
the largest island in the Australian-mandated Admiralty Island group
just north of modern day Papua New Guinea. In early 1946, the State
Department approached Australia to enter discussions over joint-base
rights on Manus and the Admiralty Islands. As part of the US proposal,
Australia would remain the administering authority of the trust territory
and have full legislative control. The United States made it clear that it
wanted no obligations or military costs: in a draft agreement sent to the
22
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Australian Legation, it proposed that the US was “not hereby committed
to maintain military forces or facilities in the Admiralty Islands when it
judged that military forces or facilities are unnecessary.” The US only
wanted rights to be able to “import, station, store in or remove from
the Islands, personnel, material and supplies.”24 To Australian eyes, it
looked as though the United States wanted the right to do whatever it
wanted on Manus but without obligating itself to do anything.
Evatt took this approach to pursue his own goals: establish a regional
defence arrangement with the United States and strengthen Australia-US
defence relations. He was prepared to allow the US Navy to establish
a base on the island but in return wanted reciprocal base rights for
the Royal Australian Navy in American ports. He also demanded that
an agreement over Manus should be concluded as part of a broader
settlement over the Pacific Islands and that the US should “develop
a regional defence arrangement which would include New Zealand”
rather than “discuss individual bases such as the Admiralty Islands.”
Joint agreement on bases, at least as far as Evatt was concerned, could
be reached “more easily” if it was “developed within [a] framework [of]
an overall arrangement for the defence of Australia and New Zealand as
well as the United States” and give strength in numbers to the defence
of the Pacific.25 US President Harry Truman, in fact, got word that
Evatt “refused” to consider a joint-base solution unless it was part of
an overall defence arrangement. Evatt was also “very keen”, according
to US Secretary of State James Byrnes, for an international conference
on the settlement of the Pacific Islands rather than pursuing these
negotiations privately.26
The United States strongly opposed Evatt’s counter-terms.
According to Byrnes, the only reason the United States was interested
in Manus was because they had spent 156 million US dollars on the
Manus Island base during the war and did not want to do “anything
more than is absolutely essential for defence purposes.” As Manus was
not a high US priority, Byrnes thought that it was better not to have a
24
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formal meeting because “it would only serve to create a lot of talk.” For
its part, New Zealand was likewise uninterested in partaking in Manus
Island discussions or a formal conference over the settlement of islands
in the South Pacific. “This question of bases has to be dealt with very
discreetly”, New Zealand Minister in the United States Carl Berendsen
told New Zealand External Affairs Secretary Alister McIntosh on 4 June
1946, “the worst possible thing we could do […] would be to embark on
a course of public polemics.”27
A formal conference also proved unnecessary because the
State Department rejected categorically Evatt’s suggestion that the
settlement of the Pacific Islands should be undertaken as part of
broader discussions toward a regional defence arrangement. On 25
April 1946, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson advised that any
regional defence arrangement was “premature” and “inadvisable.” The
US military agreed wholeheartedly with Acheson. Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations Robert Dennison thought that since the United States
was “not discussing the larger question of reciprocal use of bases”,
the “present negotiations have no relation whatsoever to a mutual
defence arrangement or a regional security pact. Such a plan would be
artificial and impossible under present conditions.”28 George Lincoln,
US Military Adviser to the Secretary of State, added that Evatt’s Pacific
plan was “strategically unsound and contrary to the accepted military
concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” to avoid binding military obligations
in the Pacific.29 Instead of pursuing a joint base on Manus further, the
US preferred ultimately to abandon the project and leave the island in
Australian hands. “At the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff”, US
Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett later advised President Truman,
the United States “has no further interest in having bases in territory
under Australian jurisdiction.”30
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The reality was that the United States had little interest in the entire
Southwest Pacific. While there was “undoubtedly some strategic
interest” in the Southwest Pacific for defensive purposes and civil
aviation, the United States only made serious claims for exclusive rights
to three islands: Canton, Christmas and Funafuti. The United States
staked a claim to twenty-five islands, but Washington was prepared
to abandon these claims if it could acquire exclusive rights over these
three islands.31 The US Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that “these islands
were somewhat more important from a purely strategic and military
standpoint than the others.” Outside of these islands, the United States
pursued joint rights for territory under the administrative authority of
other countries.
At the same time the United States approached Australia for jointbase rights to Manus, the State Department was in advanced negotiations
with New Zealand over a joint trusteeship for Western Samoa. These
negotiations progressed more smoothly than with the Australians over
Manus, but were not without their share of disagreement. Like Manus,
Western Samoa was a New Zealand mandate and the only New Zealand
territory to which the United States wanted rights. The United States had
built an airfield there during the war and spent several million dollars
on defence installations. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for joint
operating rights but wanted New Zealand to cover airfield operation at
its own expense and demanded that any defence installations fall under
a “strategic area trusteeship.”32
New Zealand did not respond favourably to this US proposal.
Prime Minister Peter Fraser was “not too happy” about the proposal
for Western Samoa to become a US “strategic area”, nor did External
Affairs Secretary Alister McIntosh agree that the settlement of a United
Nations Trusteeship Agreement should go ahead before negotiations
for military bases were settled. “While it was perfectly apparent that we
all wanted to achieve the same ends”, McIntosh told Deputy Director of
the Office of European Affairs John Hickerson, “[I] do not feel that we
were in agreement.” McIntosh suggested that a military base agreement
31
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should be settled before a trusteeship was put into effect in Western
Samoa because he was concerned about what might happen if the joint
US-NZ trusteeship failed to be approved by the UN.33 McIntosh, in other
words, was concerned that New Zealand’s views would be ignored.
After raising these concerns with Hickerson, McIntosh and Fraser
were eventually able to work out an acceptable solution and the UN
approved the New Zealand-Western Samoa Trusteeship Agreement
on 13 December 1946. The Australians, for their part, were “extremely
angry” with New Zealand for not reaching the Western Samoa
trusteeship solution jointly with their Manus Island problem.34 Before
the General Assembly, the Australian government cabled New Zealand
Prime Minister Peter Fraser on 26 August, stating that Australia was
“anxious to ensure mutual full support at the next General Assembly.”
The cablegram continued to stress that it was “desirable to [Australia]
to attempt to attempt to remove without delay any point of substantial
difference between us” over the settlement of trusteeships in the Pacific
Islands, and hoped for an “early expression of [New Zealand] views.”35
No reply from New Zealand was sent to Australia. Although this lack
of a response was unusual and difficult to explain, it is plausible that at
least part of New Zealand’s unwillingness to cooperate with Australia
in the UN was its recent frustration that Australia appeared only to
cooperate with New Zealand when it suited Australian interests. “I am
getting very fed up with Australia”, Minister in the United States Carl
Berendsen told McIntosh in April 1946 after supporting Australia’s bid
for a UN Security Council seat. “I don’t remember any single instance
where Australia has supported any action that I have taken […] I am
bound to say that [Australia-New Zealand consultation] appears to be
a validity [sic] only when it involves the support of Australian policy,
and I am getting a little tired of it.”36 Berendsen—who, incidentally, was
Australian by birth—recorded similar comments about this abrasive
and non-consultative style of Australian diplomacy in his memoirs.37
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McIntosh shared Berendsen’s frustrations with Australian
diplomacy toward settling the post-war control of South Pacific islands.
In this instance, New Zealand’s unwillingness to cooperate undercut
Evatt’s diplomatic efforts to work towards a broader regional defence
arrangement. It also highlighted that Australia and New Zealand were
not working together in the Southwest Pacific but at cross-purposes.
“I get more and more fed up with Australia”, McIntosh replied to
Berendsen later in May 1947 over Australian diplomacy in the UN and
the Pacific Islands, “you simply don’t know where they are except that
they will be following their own interests in every case.”38
Irrespective of differences between Australia and New Zealand, the
latter was eventually able to come to an agreement with the United
States over Western Samoa, even though many politicians in the Fraser
Cabinet were uneasy about US activity in the South Pacific. The New
Zealand government “strongly opposed” the transfer of sovereignty of
Canton, Christmas and Funafuti to the United States for exclusive rights,
believing that this was “unnecessary” for the strategic and civil aviation
reasons the State Department offered.39 In the end, there was clearly
no mutually acceptable solution to all Australian, New Zealand and
American ambitions in the Southwest Pacific. Each country’s primary
interests lay in different islands, and when these interests overlapped,
agreement was not easy to come by. Although Evatt tried desperately
to secure a broader American commitment through the settlement of
Manus, the island remained in Australian hands. New Zealand was
eventually able to conclude UN trusteeship agreement concerning
Western Samoa. The US ultimately secured access to the three islands
(Canton, Christmas and Funafuti) it considered to be most valuable for
strategic purposes through negotiations with Britain.
Even though control over these island bases had been largely
settled by 1946-1947, tensions simmered during negotiations between
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. This friction only
increased throughout the remainder of the 1940s. Occupation policies
in Japan and greater trans-Tasman involvement in British defence plans
were set to divide these powers further.
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2. Japan, ANZAM, and the Bomb

Outside of the South Pacific, Australia, New Zealand and the United States
also shared a keen interest in the post-war treatment and occupation of Japan.
The United States led the occupation and dominated the organisations put
in place to oversee the terms of Japanese surrender (which were the Allied
Council and the Far Eastern Commission). This American preeminence
caused considerable indignation in Australia and New Zealand. Once
the US abandoned its initial occupation policies and began planning for a
Japanese peace settlement in mid to late 1947, Australian and New Zealand
protestations grew louder. The treatment of Japan quickly became one of
the major divisive issues in the early Australian-New Zealand-American
post-war relationship.
The United States took charge of the post-war occupation of Japan in
part because they bore the overwhelming brunt of the war effort against
them during World War II. Australia and New Zealand did form part of
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force and were assigned their
own districts; however, the United States assumed what diplomat George
Kennan later termed a “totality of responsibility” in Japan.1 US Secretary
of State James Byrnes made it clear that unlike Germany, Japan would
be an American-led occupation and they retained the right to make final
decisions on post-war policy. As Assistant Secretary of State Charles Dunn
told Byrnes, under no circumstances would Washington allow a “control
Council in Japan” to diminish American influence.2
Initially, the United States pursued two basic objectives in the occupation
of Japan: demilitarisation and democratisation. These policies ensured
that “Japan [would] not again become a menace to the peace and security
1
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of the world.”3 As far as war reparations were concerned, President
Truman’s Personal Representative Edwin Pauley asserted in late 1945
that the United States would seek a complete industrial disarmament
of Japan and pass on much of Japanese industrial equipment and plants
to countries entitled to reparations. Japan, in turn, would be left only
with access to industries that were essential, such as food production.4
Australia and New Zealand had no objections to these plans. They
ensured that Japan was completely unable to threaten Australia and
New Zealand in the short-term future.
The major objections Australia and New Zealand raised during
the occupation’s early stages related to the Allied Council and the Far
Eastern Commission. The Council acted as an advisory body intended
to ensure that Japan’s surrender, occupation and control plans were met,
whereas the Commission was an organisation based in Washington that
oversaw the Council. Both Canberra and Wellington argued that their
voices were silenced by the Americans, who were unwilling to consult
seriously with their allies about occupation policy. Indeed, whilst it
appeared that these committees might offer the Allied powers a shared
voice in the Japanese occupation, the United States refused to consider
seriously any views that differed from or criticised US policy.
In Wellington, New Zealand policymakers were initially pleased
with their position on the Far Eastern Commission. A place on the
Commission offered New Zealand diplomats an opportunity to ensure
that Japan’s capacity for aggressive expansion would be completely
removed, and so to protect New Zealand from the possibility that Japan
would again come close to threatening its borders as it did in 1942. After
the first Commission meetings were held in early 1946, Counsellor in
the New Zealand Legation Guy Powles reported to Prime Minister
Peter Fraser that “there seemed to be a general feeling of pleasure”
that New Zealand was “able to do something” in regards to overseeing
the Japanese occupation.5 New Zealand’s position on the Commission
also offered its senior diplomat, Minister to the United States Carl
Berendsen, a unique opportunity to discuss New Zealand’s post-war
3
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security interests as they related to Japan with all the great powers.
Berendsen was even appointed Chairman of the Steering Committee,
an organisation that aimed to organise the Commission into various
sub-committees and make recommendations about each aspect of the
Occupation (including reparations, economic problems, legal reforms
and war criminals). At this early stage, policymakers in New Zealand
were likely unaware about the powerlessness of the Commission and
these sub-organisations.
The Australians, in contrast, were not satisfied with a position on
the Far Eastern Commission. Japanese attacks on Australian soil had
spurred a strong sense of hatred towards Japan and its people. As both
a punishment for wartime misdeeds and to prevent future Japanese
aggression, the Australian people urged their leaders to demand a
tough peace with Japan. Australian External Affairs Minister Herbert
Evatt stated that Australia could not address these issues if it was not
awarded a significant voice on Allied post-war policy towards Japan.
More specifically, Evatt believed that the British government was at fault
for not pressing upon the Americans that Canberra should be involved
more closely in occupation plans because of its primary strategic interest
in preventing a resurgence of Japanese militarism. Evatt simply did not
think Britain fully understood Australian concerns about Japan. “Japan
is an enemy who tried to destroy us”, Evatt told British Prime Minister
Clement Attlee and Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin bluntly in May 1946.6
Canberra did secure one concession from the great powers. It
was agreed in Moscow that a fourth member of the Allied Council
would jointly represent Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India.
Responding to Evatt’s claims to Attlee and Bevin, London conceded
that Australia should be this Commonwealth representative. The
Chifley Government appointed William Macmahon Ball as the British
Commonwealth member of the Allied Council of Japan in January
1946. With Ball’s appointment, Australia hoped it might influence
Japanese policy, establish its status as a Pacific power and strengthen
its claim to be “Britain’s representative” in the region. The Americans,
however, were unwilling to offer Australia (or any other power) a
chance to meaningfully influence the policymaking process for the
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Japanese occupation. In short, the United States was not pleased with
Ball’s appointment. Chairman of the Allied Council George Atcheson
even complained that Ball’s early criticisms of occupation policy were
“palpably designed to cause embarrassment” to the United States.7
Indeed, Ball had immense difficulty in getting Australian views—
and, by extension, Commonwealth views—considered seriously by
the Americans. When he proposed slight alterations to the policies in
mid-July, Ball noted with frustration that “during most of the time I
was talking Atcheson paid no attention but was turning over papers
and talking with his State Department assistant.” When Ball finished, he
complained to Evatt that Atcheson “looked up and said that he could not
understand my line of argument and expressed disappointment that ‘no
specific and concrete’ proposals had been made.” Ball concluded that the
US intended to “bog” the Council with a series of routine administrative
matters to limit its influence in shaping occupation policy.8
As the weeks progressed, Ball grew further frustrated at American
attempts to sideline the Allied Council. “I am sure there is a quiet and
effective campaign to minimise in Japanese eyes the influence and
prestige of all Allied Powers but the American”, Ball complained again
to Evatt on 23 July 1946. Because of this reality, Ball even recommended
that the Allied Council be abolished. “If [the Council] is to be exclusively
American”, Ball continued to Evatt, “I regard it advisable to remove the
pretence of an Allied Council.”9
Ball’s inability to get Commonwealth views considered in Japan
began to cause serious repercussions for Anglo-Australian relations. As
the Australian Government urged Britain to support Australian efforts
to find appropriate resolutions on the Allied Council, London stressed
that it simply had more pressing matters and needed US support
elsewhere. As British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Viscount
Addison told Canberra,
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Our collaboration with the Americans in other parts of the world (e.g. at
this juncture in the Middle East and the forthcoming meeting of Foreign
Ministers) is of such outstanding importance that we are not prepared to
be committed in advance to a general policy of mediation in Japan. This
might well fail to achieve its purpose in Japan and at the same time cause
friction with the United States Government.10

In other words, even though Australia was tasked with representing
British interests as well as Indian and New Zealand interests, Canberra
was unable to find any support from London for its views on the Council
in Japan. Annoyed that the Americans were ignoring every proposal
he made, in July 1947 Ball resigned as the British Commonwealth
Representative on the Allied Council. Even with Ball’s resignation,
however, there was no fundamental change in the main elements of
Australian foreign policy towards Japan.11
New Zealand came to share Australian concerns with the US
disinclination to consult its allies in Japan. “There is resistance to any
proposed course of action which will involve the slightest deviation
from the line that has been adopted” by the Supreme Commander of the
Allied Forces in Japan Douglas MacArthur, Berendsen told McIntosh
on 31 May. He added that “I cannot over-emphasise the degree of
exasperation and frustration which this attitude presents to New
Zealand and other members of the Far Eastern Commission.” Adding
to Berendsen’s frustration was the evidence that his efforts to change
this US dominance were unsuccessful. In late May, Berendsen candidly
told Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission Frank McCoy about his
“extreme dissatisfaction with the lack of progress” on the Commission
but doubted whether even sharing this view “served any useful
purpose.”12 As a result, Berendsen concluded that the Commission was
“nothing but a joke.” The Commission was not “allowed to decide on
any questions of policy at all”, Berendsen later told McIntosh, but rather

10

Addison to Department of External Affairs, 16 April 1946, NAA, A3317, 1/46 Part
2; Christopher Waters, The Empire Fractures: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s
(Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1995).

11

De Matos, “Diplomacy Interrupted?”, 196.

12

Berendsen to McIntosh, 31 May 1946, DNZER Vol. II, 409-412; Berendsen to
McIntosh, 2 April 1946, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 107; Berendsen to McIntosh, 4 June
1946, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 110-111.

34

ANZUS and the Early Cold War

it “follow[ed] behind [MacArthur] in every step, and merely applauded
him.”
Berendsen was equally annoyed that Australia did not support New
Zealand and instead opposed all its proposals. Even after speaking with
Evatt and agreeing that Australia and New Zealand had similar concerns
about the futility of the Commission, there was no subsequent transTasman cooperation on these issues. “On the Far Eastern Commission,
[the Australians] seem to go out of their way to oppose our views”, he
complained to McIntosh on 2 April 1946, citing protestations about the
timing of Japanese elections and the proposed wording of the Japanese
Constitution.13 Taking these concerns one step further, McIntosh
thought that Australia aimed to be the Commonwealth representative
for all matters relating to the American occupation and the Japanese
peace settlement.

Revising Policies in Japan
By 1947, growing Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union and fears over
the global threat of Communism forced Washington to reconsider its
policies in Japan. The United States abandoned its twin demilitarisation
and democratisation objectives and instead planned to rebuild Japan’s
economy so that it might become a powerful American ally in Northeast
Asia. In August 1947, the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) expert on Asian
affairs John Davies told Kennan that they should propose to the National
Security Council that the US encourage a “stable Japan, integrated into
the Pacific economy, friendly to the US, and in case of need, a ready
and dependable ally of the US.”14 As a result, the US began an intensive
economic recovery program in Japan to revive the war-ravaged nation
as a powerful American ally and ultimately push the balance of power
further in America’s favour.
Among other US allies and partners, Australia was concerned by
the US revision of Japanese occupation policies. As the future of Japan
was vital to Australian security interests, any movement towards an
economic recovery could put Australia at risk. At least as far as the
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Australian military were concerned, its own interests were best served
by a continued American presence in Japan. Therefore, they believed
the occupation should continue under the existing conditions. As the
Australian Defence Committee concluded in June 1947, the “most
important single strategic question affecting Australia’s security in the
Pacific is the continuance of the present favourable balance of power
in the Pacific brought about by the United States participation in the
occupation of Japan.” The Australian military believed that US should
continue the Allied occupation of Japan “until such time as Japan
is considered unlikely to endanger the peaceful aims of the United
Nations.” As part of this hope for a continued Allied occupation, it was
also concluded that there should also be a continued “destruction of
Japanese war potential.”15
In the External Affairs Department, Australian policymakers
argued similarly that a change of policy afforded Tokyo the possibility
of returning to its imperialistic ways and threatened the security of
Australia. Even after his position somewhat softened after visiting Japan
in late 1947, Evatt reported that
The first principle of our policy has always been the safety and security
of the Pacific, including our own country […] Australia has called for the
disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan, destruction of its capacity to
wage war, and a sufficient degree of supervision under the peace treaty
to prevent the regrowth of war-making capacity. The second principle
has been the encouragement of democracy in Japan, which involves the
gradual growth of the social, political and economic system.16

In other words, Evatt’s public position appeared to match closely
America’s original post-war Japanese policy insofar as it urged complete
disarmament and demilitarisation, but was reluctant to accept any
immediate change to policies for Japan.
On top of Evatt’s outline of Australian policy for Japan, the Chifley
Government also demanded that Japan award reparations to Canberra
for its war waged against Australia during World War II. These demands
became especially urgent considering potential revisions to US policy in
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Japan that focused on economic development, as Australian diplomats
feared that any delay might mean that Australia would not get fairly
compensated. “The Australian Government feels that [the] total amount
and distribution of reparations from Japan should be settled urgently”, a
Department memorandum to New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser
specified. The message warned that “it is possible that the United States
may go ahead now and issue an interim directive on reparations” which
might entail that there would be “no reparations at all from Japan.”17
Australian pronouncements against an immediate revision to
Japanese economic and reparation policies were causing considerable
headaches for the United States. While the US began redrafting its
Japanese occupation plans, US Political Adviser in Japan George
Atcheson Jr. complained on 5 July 1947 to US Secretary of State George
Marshall that Australia’s “distorted pronouncements and unwarranted
criticisms have been so violent and so widely publicised” that they
threatened US prestige in Japan and throughout the Far East. He also
warned Marshall that “any appeasement of [the] Australians will
without question seriously undermine American prestige in this part
of the world.”18
Complicating problems further was Evatt himself, whose abrasive
and demanding personality grated on the Americans. Under Secretary
of State Robert Lovett was particularly scathing of Evatt, telling Truman
in October about
[Evatt’s] aggressive, egocentric manner […] He has been accused
of self-seeking, and it is not always clear whether he is motivated by
true patriotism or simply by egotism. He has great self-confidence and
determination, is anxious to have a finger in every pie, is slow in giving
his confidence, and insists on receiving full credit for his achievements.19

While Lovett was indeed concerned by the way in which Evatt acted,
there remained hope in the State Department that his egocentrism could
benefit the United States if properly cultivated. This was especially true
in relation to Evatt’s efforts to purposely champion the voices of smaller
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powers in the United Nations rather than always support US policies.
In the instances when Evatt’s views and American views aligned, the
State Department later concluded that “Evatt’s egotism [should] be
turned into constructive channels […] When we are satisfied that the
Australians will follow our line of thinking he, as Australia’s spokesman,
should be encouraged to take the initiative.”20
New Zealand had similar problems with Evatt, who all too often
spoke on New Zealand’s behalf or ignored their point of view entirely.
“If [Evatt] ever stops to think”, McIntosh once told one of his External
Affairs Officers Frank Corner, he would sometimes “go out of his way to
consider New Zealand’s viewpoints.” The problem was that Evatt’s list
of concerns were “so large that he sometimes forgets our irons amongst
the others he has in the fire”, McIntosh added, mixing his metaphors.21
So far as the revision of Japanese policies was concerned, the Americans
found New Zealand diplomats much easier to deal with than Evatt and
the Australians. Although Wellington also feared that a soft peace treaty
and an economic revival might reignite Japanese aggression, New
Zealand policymakers realised that Evatt’s antics were doing little to
advance their cause with the Americans. It would be better, so far as
Wellington were concerned, to keep quiet on the issue.
At the time, there were few Australians with enough expertise
in international affairs to mitigate the detrimental effect Evatt’s
diplomatic style appeared to have on Australia’s allies. John Beasley
and Norman Makin, Australian High Commissioner in London and
Australian Ambassador in Washington respectively, were two notable
exceptions and they helped to decrease the tensions that arose when
Australia’s allies grew increasingly frustrated with Evatt, at least in part.
The former, Beasley, was a rather softly-spoken and shy person who
arrived in London in August 1946. He did, however, argue assertively
for Australia’s right to be consulted on international issues and took
a strongly anti-Communist stance on most matters pertaining to
the Soviet Union, a position that neatly aligned with British Foreign
Secretary Ernest Bevin’s views on the global communist threat. At times
when the British Foreign Office saw Evatt’s behaviour as “sinister” and
20
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“nonsensical”, Beasley was often able to smooth over these differences
and provided a channel for continued discussions about critical matters
affecting Anglo-American relations such as Commonwealth policy in
Japan and later discussions about joint defence arrangements.22 He could
not offset every clash Evatt had with Bevin and other policymakers in
London, nor could he always consistently articulate Australian views
relating to the United Nations or post-war international order due to
Evatt’s predisposition for ad hoc and non-consultative policymaking.
That said, Beasley navigated his position quite well during a difficult
period in world affairs, in which individuals such as Evatt complicated
the efficacy of Anglo-Australian relations in dealing with matters of
mutual strategic interest.
Across the Atlantic, Makin was another simple but more direct
type of diplomat. Historian Frank Bongiorno described the BritishAustralian as a “small, bespectacled and tidy man that was a Labor-type
more common in Britain than in Australia […] an earnest, abstaining,
self-improving Methodist layman.”23 Before moving to Washington,
Makin earned his diplomatic stripes through representing Australia
in London at the UN General Assembly and the first meeting of the
UN Security Council in 1946. While some historians and politicians
have suggested Makin did not make the most of his opportunity to
improve Australian-American relations in the late 1940s and early
1950s (Makin, for instance, abstained from drinking alcohol and found
social gatherings with diplomats in Washington a rather frivolous and
tiresome affair), he earned praise from his colleagues by providing a
much friendlier and more courteous face to US policymakers than Evatt
did. Paul Hasluck, the Australian counsellor in charge of the Australian
mission to the UN and acting representative on the Atomic Energy
Commission, described Makin as someone with “unfailing courtesy
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and dignity.”24 These character traits were precious commodities in the
Department of External Affairs while Evatt was still serving as Minister.
By most accounts, Makin was well-liked in Washington despite having
to try to defuse tense situations between the United States and Australia
on policy issues such as the Japanese occupation.
Despite their knack for mitigating some of the difficulties that
Evatt created in Australia’s external relations, neither Beasley nor
Makin could exercise enough influence in their respective posts to
convince policymakers in Washington and London of the necessity for
a continued hard-line policy on Japan. Reaching a common position
about this became urgent after the United States issued invitations to the
eleven countries on the Far Eastern Commission to attend preliminary
talks for the Japanese settlement in July 1947. In an effort to find some
degree of policy agreement between Australia, New Zealand and other
Commonwealth countries in the face of revised US Japanese occupation
policies, a Commonwealth Conference was held in Canberra from 26
August to 2 September 1947. Although Australian policymakers had
been very vocal in their support for long-term demilitarisation and
democratisation policies in Japan, it was agreed that a peace treaty
could be finalised so long as Japan remained demilitarised. It was also
agreed that there should be strict controls over Japanese imports and
exports and that there should be some form of supervisory commission
established to implement the terms of the treaty.25 In other words, the
Commonwealth delegates hoped for a virtual continuation of strict
early occupation-era controls.
Overall, the communiqué that was issued after the Conference
urged support for an early yet hard-line demilitarised peace treaty for
Japan. In Wellington, the agreements reached at the Conference were
“commended” by the New Zealand External Affairs Department.
A report by the External Affairs Committee on the Japanese Peace
Settlement concluded that as far as a potential peace treaty was
concerned, Japan “must be completely disarmed and demilitarised
for an indefinite period.” The report also concluded that “post-treaty
24
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Figure 3. Delegates to the British Commonwealth Conference on the Japanese Peace
Treaty in Canberra, August 1947. Back row, left to right: R.T. Pollard (Australia), Sir
Raghanath Paranjpye (India), U. Shwe Baw, Thakin Lun Baw (Burma); Middle row, left
to right: J.J. Dedman (Australia), J.G. Barclay (NZ), Hector McNeill (UK), E.J. Williams
(UK), Sir B. Rama Rau (India), M.M. Rafi (Pakistan), K.A. Greene (Canada); Front row, left
to right: Peter Fraser (NZ), Lord Addison (UK), J.B. Chifley, H.V. Evatt (Australia), Brooke
Claxton (Canada), H.G. Lawrence (South Africa). Photo by unknown (1947), Flickr,
https://www.flickr.com/photos/archivesnz/28950147372, CC BY 2.0.

economic controls will be required” so that a peace conference could
be held at an early date.26 In other words, if an early peace settlement
was reached, New Zealand made it clear that it favoured a hard-line
settlement with Japan.
This sentiment was shared in Australia. As Evatt said to US Secretary
of State George Marshall after the Conference, if the Commonwealth
was to support a peace treaty, special provisions must be made to
ensure that Japan could not access “certain industries with obvious
war potential” such as steel and iron ore.27 External Affairs Advisor to
the Australian Delegation at the Commonwealth Conference Frederic
26

Report by the External Affairs Committee on the Japanese Peace Settlement, 20
November 1947, DNZER Vol. III, 195-107.

27

Evatt to Marshall, 2 September 1947, NAA, A1838, 538/1 Part II.

2. Japan, ANZAM, and the Bomb



41

Eggleston went one step further, arguing that the Conference did
not properly demonstrate how important it was for Australia that
Japan remained demilitarised if it was to agree to any Japanese peace
settlement. “Conferences of this kind do not approach the crucial
issues”, he told Assistant Secretary of External Affairs Alan Watt in
September, “to agree on negatives is a waste of time.”28
Eggleston warned Evatt directly against reaching a speedy settlement
in Japan and doubted the possibility of the country becoming truly
democratic. “I feel somewhat disturbed at the views which appeared to
predominate at the British Commonwealth Conference”, he told Evatt,
adding that “there seems to be a feeling that nothing could be done
except to demilitarise [Japan] and that the democratisation of Japan was
desirable, but the Allies could not impose it and it was futile to try.”
According to Eggleston,
If these views prevail, a position of instability will develop in the Pacific
which will be very disappointing to the Australian people. Japan will
be free to resume her superiority in East Asia and will then be available
to move with all her economic and strategic power into the orbit of the
highest bidder […] under these circumstances, I strongly urge that we
ask for a prolonged occupation or control of Japan.29

Evatt had no serious problems with Eggleston’s claims about the
risks associated with a militarised Japan. The crucial issue, especially
in Australia, was Japanese remilitarisation. At the time, Australia and
the Commonwealth was only open to a peace settlement if Japan’s
war potential was completely denied or strictly controlled. Evatt,
assuming that no movement had yet been made towards remilitarising
Japan, told US Secretary of State George Marshall and MacArthur that
the Commonwealth agreed with US policy in Japan and supported
movement towards a peace settlement. However, the State Department
was in the middle of reconsidering the idea of a demilitarised Japan.
In September 1947, the Policy Planning Staff drafted a top-secret paper
titled “US Policy Toward a Peace Settlement with Japan” which outlined
that “a major shift in US policy toward Japan [was] being talked about
under cover.” The paper suggested that the “idea of eliminating Japan
28
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as a military power for all time [was] changing” and that a peace treaty
“would have to allow for this changed attitude.”30 This drastic alteration
in US policy would have serious ramifications for the movement
towards a peace settlement, as Australia and New Zealand vehemently
opposed the idea of post-occupied Japan having its own military power
without assurances from the United States that their countries would
be protected. This critical issue between Australia, New Zealand and
the United States subsequently formed one basis for future treaty
negotiations.
Under these policy changes, Australia would still not be afforded
the opportunity to influence the decision-making process. The United
States, in short, remained intent on dominating the Japanese occupation
without seriously consulting with its allies in the Pacific. Even while it
was highly desirable to procure Australian support for its policies in
Japan, the State Department advised that the United States should do
little more than explain the reasons for these new policies to its allies
rather than involve them in the decision-making process. “Whenever
possible”, the State Department suggested on 18 August 1948,
“announcements of new policy decisions should be preceded by [a]
frank explanation of our motives to the Australians both here and in
Canberra” in order to avoid any measures being “misunderstood by
the Australian Government.” Since the Australian public took a “lively
interest” in Japan, the Department advised that “every effort should be
made to brief Australian correspondents both [in Washington] and in
Japan on reasons for SCAP policies.”31
Similarly, the State Department recognised that efforts should also
be made to explain American policies to New Zealand diplomats and
journalists. As a State Department policy statement claimed on 24
September 1948, “New Zealand shares Australia’s certain dissatisfaction
with present relations between the Far Eastern Commission and SCAP
and has been critical of many of General MacArthur’s policies.” The
United States, in turn, should “be careful to prepare the ground through
diplomatic channels before new measures are adopted in Japan” and
“unheralded interim directives by SCAP should be avoided wherever
30
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possible.”32 Again, these conclusions concisely demonstrated US
disinclination to consult with Australia and New Zealand in Japan. US
policymakers aimed to explain American policies as clearly as possible
to Australian and New Zealand policymakers after decisions were
made in Washington and Tokyo, yet these diplomats would not be
accommodated a place in the decision-making process.

ANZAM and the Bomb
As discussions over the Japanese occupation and a potential peace
treaty progressed, Australia hoped to secure a regional defence pact
with the United States to safeguard against the possibility that it
might be attacked by Japan or elsewhere. “What [Australia] needs is
an appropriate regional instrumentality in Southeast Asia and the
Western Pacific”, Evatt announced in Parliament on 26 February 1947
as part of his endeavours to conclude a regional pact with the United
States over the settlement of Manus Island. He also suggested Australia
needed access to US military planning so that it might better prepare
for its own defence in the event of another world war. “The proposed
regional instrumentality”, Evatt announced, “will at least facilitate
the free and rapid exchange of basic information […] and plans for
regional cooperation.”33 The United States, however, was unwilling
to consider a formal pact during negotiations over Manus Island and
refused to share military information. As a result, Australia’s attention
turned to coordinating defence planning more closely with Britain. This
manifested itself in two ways: the formation of ANZAM and the AngloAustralian Joint Rocket Project.34
Britain’s dire post-war economic situation forced London to look
for allied assistance in regions that were not in its primary interests.
Against this backdrop, it became wholly practical for Britain to work
more closely with Australia and New Zealand in the defence of bases in
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Southeast Asia. In the Pacific, Britain’s major post-war concerns centred
on Hong Kong, Singapore and security issues resulting from Communist
insurgencies in Malaya. The Foreign Office and British Chiefs of Staff
realised that in the event of a global war the defence of the Far East and
Southeast Asia would be a low priority. That being the case, London
was open to the possibility of coordinating strategic planning more
closely with Australia and New Zealand. As Communistt activity in
Southeast Asia became one of the most immediate post-war threats to
Australia and New Zealand, both Canberra and Wellington welcomed
closer strategic coordination with Britain. Australian, New Zealand and
British security interests in Southeast Asia coincided and the informal
agreement known as ANZAM was established.
On 1 April 1947, the Australian Defence Committee considered
reports from the Joint Planning Committee about plans for cooperation
with Britain for Commonwealth Defence in Southeast Asia. These reports
were based on discussions about a Joint Australian-New Zealand-British
Liaison Staff to deal with mutual defence problems, which took place
during the Prime Ministers’ Conference in May 1946. The Australian
Defence Committee report suggested that the Australian government
should undertake greater responsibility in strategic planning relating to
regional security matters in the Pacific. Such planning would have to be
derived, the Committee concluded, from a broader worldwide strategic
plan in which the British Commonwealth would participate.35 One
month later, a memorandum on “Commonwealth Defence Cooperation”
was produced on 23 May that outlined the larger contribution Australia
was prepared to make to Commonwealth defence in the Pacific in
coordination with Britain. The report advised that a Joint Defence
Committee with British and New Zealand representatives would be
established to achieve this goal.36 This Committee also formed the basis
for trilateral discussions relating to the activities of Commonwealth
forces stationed in Occupied Japan.
Five days later, Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley sent a letter to
British Prime Minister Clement Attlee that explained his government’s
plans for this Committee. At a meeting chaired by Attlee in June, the
35
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British agreed to appoint three lower-rank representatives of their
Chiefs of Staff to attend Australian Defence Committee meetings.
Attlee then replied formally to Chifley’s offer on 17 August, welcoming
Australia’s willingness to chair defence council meetings and take
primary responsibility for strategic planning in Malaya.37
After Britain indicated it was agreeable to the Australian proposal,
Chifley contacted Wellington in October to enquire whether New
Zealand would also accept its joint strategic plan. New Zealand
Prime Minister Peter Fraser responded on 13 November, saying
that his government was also agreeable to Australia’s proposals for
cooperation in British Commonwealth Defence. “I have no doubt that
the arrangements will prove satisfactory”, Fraser noted after he told
Chifley that New Zealand was appointing Chief of Staff Colonel Duff
as the NZ Joint Service Representative.38 With Britain and New Zealand
accepting Australian plans, the revised system of defence cooperation
for Malaya and Southeast Asia (which was later termed the ANZAM
area) began on 1 January 1948.
Once joint planning began in 1948, the Australians raised the
perennial question of the relationship between Commonwealth planning
and American planning. Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley argued
that Australia needed concrete information from the British Chiefs of
Staff about US plans in the Pacific. Australia would need to know, as a
minimum, about American plans for the Pacific in relation to Australian
security, the southern boundaries of the US zone of responsibility and
the extent to which any assistance might be required from Australia
in the Pacific. The British joint planners appreciated Australian
concerns, but also realised that sharing American information involved
confidentiality issues.
British reluctance to share American military information stemmed
from issues arising during the Anglo-Australian Rocket Project, in
which Australia hosted and assisted British efforts to acquire its own
nuclear arsenal. Australia was eager to take part in a British-led nuclear
weapons project. As an Australian Defence Appreciation Report
37
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concluded, “the advent of the atomic bomb […] may revolutionise
the organisation, equipment and employment of armed forces.”39
With these benefits in mind, Chifley accepted the British plan for a
joint rocket project and began working on the project in mid-1947.
The Australian Defence Committee even began contemplating a
proposal for an Australian atomic stockpile. Defence officials argued
that Australia should develop “atomic energy from the viewpoint
of Defence.” Australian atomic energy development would also
have advantages for “industrialisation, scientific and technological
development.”40
While New Zealand tended to be an ardent supporter of British
foreign and defence policy, New Zealand External Affairs Department
officials were particularly apprehensive about the joint rocket project
and the proliferation of atomic weapons. At the same time Chifley and
Evatt were negotiating with Britain over this possible joint project,
New Zealand Ambassador in Washington Carl Berendsen expressed
to New Zealand External Affairs Secretary McIntosh that he “heartily
dislike[d] the look of the world” which was especially grim because
of America’s recent discovery of the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb’s
“completely destructive power”, Berendsen said, “just completes my
cup of doom.” “[The bomb] will certainly be discovered very quickly
by others” including Britain, Berendsen added, and he “did not see
anything to be gained, and perhaps a good deal to be lost, by such a
course.” McIntosh shared Berendsen’s concerns and was fearful of
Attlee’s determined pursuit of the bomb. “This damned atomic bomb is
certainly the worst thing that has ever happened”, he wrote in reply to
Berendsen, suggesting almost jokingly that Attlee’s talks with Truman
and the Australians were about “nice and friendly […] ways and means
of devising bigger and better slaughters by atomic methods in the
future.”41
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The State Department and Pentagon were also anxious about closer
Anglo-Australian defence relations, especially when they involved the
production of atomic weapons outside of American control. Recent US
relations with Australia were chilly, not least because of Evatt’s abrasive
diplomatic style and his demands for closer US-Australian cooperation
and exchange of military information. Relations with respect to the joint
rocket project took a further hit once the Australian media found out
about present and planned military projects through a series of leaks to
the press. Australian Defence Minister John Dedman was particularly
fearful as to what these leaks would mean for Australia’s relations with
the United States and Britain. The leaks will “increase the distrust in the
safeguarding of secret information in Australia, and may have a serious
effect on the readiness of the United Kingdom and the United States
to furnish information to Australia”, Dedman told a fellow minister.42
His fear soon materialised after the US, which became convinced these
leaks confirmed Australia could not be trusted with its own military
secrets, banned Australia from receiving classified information from the
United States. Although its motives were not entirely clear, the Central
Intelligence Agency concluded that there was an “unsatisfactory
security situation” in Australia and demoted the country to a “Category
E” recipient of US military information. This was the lowest category
among all nations with diplomatic representation in Washington.
The US ban on classified information to Australia was an
embarrassment for the Chifley government, which had argued both
publicly and privately in Washington that Australia and the United
States shared a lot of common ground and that both countries should
work together in tackling mutual threats in the Asia-Pacific region.
Australian Ambassador to the United States Norman Makin speculated
that it “placed [Australia] on a basis little better than the USSR.”
Although Makin was briefed on 3 July 1948 that the ban was temporary,
he was concerned that there was no certainty when the United States
might reverse this decision. “In [the] United States”, Makin told Chifley
apprehensively, “‘temporary’ arrangements frequently extend over an
indefinite period.” In any case, Makin was certain that the ban would
42

Peter Morton, Fire across the Desert: Woomera and the Anglo-Australian Joint Project,
1946-1980 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989), 104.

48

ANZUS and the Early Cold War

“seriously hinder” the joint rocket project and Australia’s relationship
with the United States.43
Determined to upgrade Australia’s reliability in the eyes of the
Americans, Chifley realised that although Australia wanted to play a
greater role in world affairs, it could not do so effectively unless this
ban was reversed. “Australia should assume a large share of defence
responsibilities”, according to Chifley, especially because Australia’s
defence expenditures were large in comparison to its small population.
His Defence Secretary, Frederick Shedden, reiterated this point later to
the State Department, pointing to the difficulties that occurred during
the launch of the joint UK-Australian rocket projects because of a ban
on classified information. “In addition to the difficulties in connection
with the rocket range project, defence planning in the Pacific was being
hampered by the lack of exchange of information”, Shedden remarked.
So far as he was concerned, all Australia needed to fix these difficulties
was “information which would enable her to shape her plans for
Australia’s role in Pacific defence” that the State Department and US
Department of Defense was refusing to pass over.44
The US position on the exchange of military information with
Australia highlighted its overall reluctance to treat Australia as an equal
and trustworthy partner. Australia did not even receive information on
US atomic projects first hand. Evatt, after telling the State Department
in February 1949 that it was his “understanding that information on
rocket projects at the present time passed through a third country”
(presumably Britain), argued that this arrangement was unsatisfactory
and hoped that the “mutually beneficial cooperation between the
two countries which had obtained during the recent war might be
continued.”45 Even after these protestations, State Department officials
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did little to re-evaluate US security ties with Australia, preferring
instead to pass information through other countries which was then
relayed to Canberra. The United States simply did not trust Australia
with classified military information.
By early 1949, there was little agreement between Australia, New
Zealand and the United States on mutual post-war security issues.
Australia and New Zealand bitterly opposed efforts to soften Japanese
occupation policies. These countries also pursued closer strategic
cooperation with Britain in Southeast Asia, an effort that undercut US
primacy in the region. Further distrust between the three countries
manifested during the Anglo-Australian rocket project. New Zealand
was seriously concerned by potential Anglo-Australian access to
nuclear weapons and the United States simply refused to share military
information with Australia once secrets about the project was leaked in
the Australian media. How, then, did these countries manage to agree
on forming an alliance less than two years after Washington demoted
Canberra to the lowest category recipient of US military information?
The following chapter explores the unique international and domestic
circumstances that facilitated speedy movement toward the ANZUS
Treaty.

3. Movement Toward an Alliance

The early years of the post-war Australian-New Zealand-American
relationship were often frostier than cordial. Yet, after several rapid
international changes during 1949 and 1950—such as the Soviet Blockade
of Berlin and its first successful test of an atomic bomb; Mao’s Zedong
Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War; and the outbreak of the Korean
War—Australian, New Zealand and American interests began to coincide
more closely. Against this backdrop the United States began seriously
to consider the idea of a defence pact with Australia and New Zealand,
an idea first proposed by Australian diplomats. Under a new Australian
External Affairs Minister, Percy Spender, Canberra pushed for a binding
commitment with the United States. Spender’s New Zealand counterpart
Frederick Doidge initially thought along similar lines, although this was
a minority view in Wellington. Most other New Zealand diplomats and
military officers did not want a formal commitment with the United
States. Across the Pacific, policymakers in Washington refused to consider
the idea of a Pacific Pact until the outbreak of the Korean War, which
made obtaining Australian and New Zealand support for a speedy peace
settlement in Japan highly valuable, and the State Department reasoned
that concluding a defence pact with the Australia and New Zealand was a
practical trade-off.
Under the Ben Chifley Government (1945-1949), one of Australia’s
primary foreign policy objectives was to secure a formal defence pact
with the United States. This plan was spearheaded by Australian External
Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt. A regional defence scheme had always been
Evatt’s “pet plan”, as John Minter, the US Chargé in Canberra, commented
as far back as 1946. He wanted to “keep the United States and Australia
in the closest association”, Minter noted, adding that Evatt proposed a
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regional pact not once but “many times.”1 Across the Tasman, New
Zealand policymakers did not share Evatt’s views on a formal defence
arrangement with the United States. On 6 July 1948, New Zealand
Prime Minister Peter Fraser thought that a regional pact would only
“effectively contribute to our security” if Britain was a member. A
pact would only develop “if the need arose” for New Zealand, Fraser
announced in January 1949. In his view, that need “had not yet arisen.”2
In any case, the State Department was unconvinced by Australian
arguments for any kind of regional defence scheme. In a bid both to
reassure Western Europe that the US remained committed to NATO
and to deter unwanted pressure for a pact in the Asia-Pacific region,
Secretary of State Dean Acheson dismissed a NATO-type pact in the
Pacific. “While [NATO] does not mean any lessening of our interest in the
security of other areas”, Acheson announced at a press conference on 18
May 1949, “the United States is not currently considering participation
in any further special collective defence arrangements.” In his view,
NATO was the product of a “solid foundation” of defence collaboration
with Western Europe, whereas no such foundation existed in Asia and
the Pacific. Yet beyond any foundation for a defence partnership in the
region, Acheson feared that if the United States committed to a defence
treaty in Asia and the Pacific it might overextend US forces into areas
that were not primary interests (such as the long-simmering conflicts in
Indochina, Malaya and Indonesia). “A Pacific Pact could not take shape
until present internal conflicts in Asia were resolved”, Acheson said. He
simply thought that “the time was not ripe for a pact.”3
The time for a regional defence arrangement with Australia and New
Zealand might not have seemed “ripe” for Acheson in May, but by late
1949 to mid-1950, several events drastically changed the situation for the
three countries in Asia and the Pacific. The declarations of Indonesian
and Vietnamese independence from Dutch and French colonial control
presented two uncertain security challenges to Australia, New Zealand
and the United States in Southeast Asia. However, the most concerning
development in Asia was the establishment of a Communist government
1
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in Beijing. After a protracted civil war between the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), PRC Chairman Mao
Zedong announced the establishment of the People’s Republic of China
on 1 October 1949. The defeated Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek,
fled to the island of Taiwan (also known as Formosa). As Cold War
tensions continued to rise between the United States and the Soviet
Union, the emergence of a major Communist government in Northeast
Asia was an uncertain and disruptive situation that challenged the West.
Mao’s victory especially provoked extensive debate in Australia, New
Zealand and the United States over whether to continue supporting
Chiang’s government, or instead recognise the PRC by opening
diplomatic relations in Beijing and supporting its claim to hold China’s
seat in the United Nations. On the one hand, the ROC appeared fragile
and corrupt, and struggled to justify its claim to represent all of China
while its government only controlled the island of Taiwan. On the other
hand, Western governments feared that awarding recognition to the
PRC would strengthen the Soviet bloc and encourage further aggression
from mainland China.

Figure 4. Chairman Mao Zedong proclaiming the founding of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), 1 October 1949. Photo by Hou Bo (1949), Wikimedia,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PRCFounding.jpg, public domain.
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For the United States, peaceful co-existence with the PRC and eventual
formal recognition of its status as China’s governing party remained a
possibility due to a lingering hope that Mao might avoid aligning China
with the Soviet Union. However, in the immediate aftermath of Mao’s
announcement, the State Department shaped its policies toward the
PRC on the premise that mainland China was entrenched firmly in the
Soviet bloc and should not yet be awarded recognition. In an address
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 12 October, Secretary of
State Dean Acheson stated that the “Chinese Government is really a
tool of Russian Imperialism in China. That gives us our fundamental
starting point in regards to our relations with China.”4
Australia and New Zealand held their own bilateral talks over whether
to recognise the PRC in November 1949. During these discussions, New
Zealand Secretary of External Affairs McIntosh noted with frustration
that the trans-Tasman talks appeared aimed only to increase Australia’s
international prestige and to encourage New Zealand to support
Australian views on China. “It was a typical Australian show”, McIntosh
wrote to Berendsen on 18 November, “the object was publicity for Evatt,
External Affairs and Australia in that order.” According to McIntosh,
Australian Secretary of External Affairs John Burton organised the talks
as a “publicity stunt.” Burton, convinced recognition was “necessary
and inevitable”, continually pressed McIntosh and the New Zealanders
about supporting the Australian position.5
Indeed, the Australians appeared entirely ready and willing to
abandon the Nationalists and instead recognise Mao’s government on
mainland China. Even before the Australian-New Zealand talks began
in November, Canberra recalled its diplomatic mission in Nanking.
Some of the Australian staff returned to Canberra, while other staff
members established a temporary post in Hong Kong that could be
quickly moved to Beijing once recognition was granted. “Personally”,
Australian External Affairs Minister Evatt wrote to British Foreign
Minister Ernest Bevin only three days after Mao’s announcement, “I
do not see why [mainland China] should not be recognised.” In Evatt’s
view, Australia and the rest of the Commonwealth could take the lead
4
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in recognising Beijing. He told Bevin that Mao’s government could be
recognised as the legitimate government of mainland China, whereas
the Nationalists could similarly retain recognition of their government
in Taiwan.6 For New Zealand, McIntosh did not think that the Tasman
countries should take the lead in recognising the PRC. He did, however,
think that there might be substantial benefits of recognition. He thought
that doing so would prevent the PRC from acting aggressively and
counter Russian influence in China. Moreover, if for no other reason,
McIntosh concluded that on legal grounds the PRC should be awarded
recognition because it already controlled mainland China.
Irrespective of these early views, Australia, New Zealand and the
United States all opposed recognising the PRC even after Britain did
so in early 1950. In both Australia and New Zealand, responding to the
threat of Communism in China and elsewhere was a hotly debated topic
and became a pertinent election issue. In New Zealand, after fourteen
years in power, the Labour government was defeated at the polls in
November 1949. Sidney Holland led the newly-formed conservative
National government, with Frederick Doidge as his External Affairs
Minister. Holland turned out to “dominate the NZ Cabinet”, as “one
man or two men” often do, Berendsen complained. Yet, in contrast to
his predecessor Peter Fraser, Holland had “almost no interest in foreign
affairs.”7 Revealingly he took the Finance rather than the External
Affairs portfolio in addition to the prime ministership, and when he did
intervene in foreign affairs, he “frequently made gaffes.”
The new External Affairs Minister, Frederick Doidge, was better
equipped to handle New Zealand’s foreign relations than was Holland.
In contrast to the long-standing convictions of many in New Zealand that
a US guarantee for New Zealand’s security was undesirable, Doidge, at
least in the early stages of his time as External Affairs Minister, was
one of the strongest advocates for a Pacific Pact with the United States.
Doidge was “very pact-minded” and was convinced that the United
States had to be a signatory to any regional arrangement. In January
1950 Doidge raised the idea of a pact at the Colombo Conference,
an international meeting held in Sri Lanka to discuss how the living
6
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Figure 5. New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland (1949-1957), 1951. Photo taken by
Crown Studies of Wellington (1951), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Sidney_George_Holland_(1951).jpg, public domain.

standards of people in the Asia-Pacific region could be improved. At
the conference, he suggested that a pact would be useless without the
inclusion of the United States, Canada and India. According to Doidge,
the security of Australia and New Zealand could not be ensured without
the United States to “wall in the tide of Communism.”8
In Australia, the Liberal Country Coalition led by Robert Menzies
won the 1949 election. Menzies’s victory ended Evatt’s term as External
Affairs Minister. He was replaced by Percy Spender, a move that
signalled a new era of Australia’s external relations with the United
States. The new Menzies Government recognised that Australian
security interests in the region rested squarely with the US, and as part
8
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of this assessment, External Affairs Minister Percy Spender continued
Australia’s push for a formal defence pact. US policymakers certainly
recognised early on that Spender was determined to secure a closer
relationship. After “differences of opinion rising from dissimilar views
of the Japanese occupation policy […] and by the difficult personality
of Evatt”, the State Department concluded, “Spender is desirous of
establishing the closest and most cooperative relations with the United
States and has in effect made this a cardinal point in his foreign policy.”9

Figure 6. Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies (1939-1941, 1949-1966), 1950. Photo by
unknown (1950), National Library of Australia, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3307904,
copyright expired.

The Holland Government clearly recognised that a close relationship
with the United States was important to New Zealand, yet policymakers
in Wellington still described the relationship as less fundamental to its
security interests in the Pacific compared to their Australian counterparts.
While the American-Australian relationship was described as a “cardinal
point” of Australian foreign policy by the State Department, Counselor
of the New Zealand Embassy in Washington George Laking told US
9
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Assistant Secretary of State William Butterworth that it was simply
“very sensible” for New Zealand to have a “close association between
the United States [and] New Zealand.”10
As for Spender, New Zealand responses to his appointment and
its impact on trans-Tasman relations were mixed. Berendsen was
concerned that Spender might be a mere successor to Australia’s
“irresponsible” and “hoodlum” behaviour in international affairs that
he witnessed with Evatt. When it came to Spender, he was afraid that,
like most Australians, either by nature or by upbringing, they seemed to
him to be “impossible people.”11 McIntosh and Doidge were even less
complimentary about Australia’s new External Affairs Minister, fearing
that he would be just as difficult as Evatt. Spender was an “absolute little
tick”, McIntosh told Berendsen, complaining that he was just as “great
an exhibitionist as Evatt” and that “Doidge took an instant dislike to
him.” Spender and Doidge’s relationship—and, consequently, Australia
and New Zealand’s relationship—did not improve in the immediate
future. Less than four months later, McIntosh noted that not only do
Spender and Doidge “not get on”, but that there is “no common link”
between the Australian and New Zealand Cabinet.
This lack of a common link between the Australian and New
Zealand Cabinets stemmed in part from Spender’s relentless pursuit
of a regional defence arrangement with the United States as well as
his ambitious Colombo Plan (a multinational initiative to assist in the
economic recovery of South and Southeast Asia), which he introduced
at the Colombo Conference in January 1950. He might not have been
the ideal man to improve Australian-New Zealand relations, yet as far
as the pursuit of Australia’s foreign policy objectives were concerned,
Spender was more than a capable replacement for Evatt. He was, as
Berendsen pointed out, a man of “intellectual gifts” and was blessed
with an “incomparably more attractive personality” than Evatt. On first
glance, he also seemed more likely to succeed where Evatt could not in
securing a US guarantee. He was headstrong, experienced, and more
than willing to stand up to Menzies—or anyone in Washington for that
10
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matter, should he think it was in Australia’s interest—to ensure that
Australia’s post-war protection was secured; namely, through a pact
with the United States. The “future peace of the whole Pacific rested,
almost entirely, upon the United States”, Spender had argued shortly
before his appointment.12
Spender also recognised that Communist insurgencies in Southeast
Asia presented just as clear a threat to Australia as did a potential
resurgence of Japanese imperialism and aggression. Upon being handed
the External Affairs portfolio, Spender’s primary task remained clear:
enlist the United States as a guarantor of Australian security to repel
these threats. His first job was to ensure that all his officers, diplomats
and staff members understood his vision for Australia’s relations with
the world as revolving around a closer relationship with the United
States. Because of their “common British heritage” and “greater technical
and industrial development”, Australia and the United States were the
“two countries which can, in cooperation one with the other, make the
greatest contribution to stability.” In Spender’s view, it was only by
“concerted action” that this was possible. Later, during a comprehensive
speech in the Australian House of Representatives, Spender made his
vision for Australia’s external relations clear to both the Parliament and
public. As part of Spender’s outlook, maintaining Australia’s peace and
security rested on four pillars: the Pacific, in Western Europe through
cooperation with the British Commonwealth, the United Nations, and
the United States. In outlining this last pillar, Spender said
I have emphasised how essential it is for Australia to maintain the closest
links with the United States for vital security reasons […] we propose
actively to maintain the official and personal contacts and interchanges
which resulted from the urgent needs of a common military effort.

To maintain these links at the highest level possible, Spender had a clear
idea in mind:
What I envisage is a defensive military arrangement having as its
basis a firm agreement between countries that have a vital interest in
the stability of Asia and the Pacific, and which are at the same time
capable of undertaking military commitments […] I fervently hope other
12
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Commonwealth countries might form a nucleus […] [but] I also have
in mind particularly the United States of America, whose participation
would give such a pact a substance that it would otherwise lack. Indeed,
it would be rather meaningless without her.13

On top of convincing the Americans, Spender had to persuade his own
Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, that Australia needed a formal pact
with the United States. Such a task was perhaps surprising, as during
Menzies’s first term as Prime Minister (1939-1941) he had hoped for
some form of US security guarantee and appealed to US President
Franklin Roosevelt for American aid during World War II. However,
Menzies believed that such a pact might compromise Australia’s close
relationship with the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth
and Australia simply “did not need a pact with America”, as Menzies
told his Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Fadden in August 1950, because
“they are already overwhelmingly friendly to us.”14 Menzies was
sceptical about the pact until it was nearly completed. At one stage,
while Spender was straining every effort to conclude the alliance,
Menzies remarked provocatively that “Percy is trying to build a castle
on a foundation of jelly”, much to the annoyance of Spender and his
wife Jean.15
New Zealand Minister to the United States Carl Berendsen shared
Menzies’s misgivings about the proposed pact. For Berendsen, a Pacific
Pact as it had been spoken about so far was “superficially attractive”
and “ambiguous, imprecise and completely impracticable.” He feared
the result might be Australia and New Zealand having to “defend the
indefensible” in areas outside of their primary strategic interests. The
New Zealand military was equally unconvinced. The Chiefs of Staff in
Wellington produced a defence report in April 1950 which outlined their
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strategic thinking from a purely military perspective. It concluded that
there were “no reasons on military grounds” to approach the United
States for a Pacific Pact because Washington would see no direct threat
to New Zealand. From a US perspective, any New Zealand deployment
would in fact be more useful in the Middle East than in the Pacific or Far
East. The United States, the Chiefs of Staff maintained, would certainly
“prefer to see a New Zealand Division and RNZAF (Royal New Zealand
Air Force) tactical forces employed in the Middle East rather than tied
down in the Far East in operations which would have no decisive effect
on the ultimate outcome of the war.”16
Berendsen, however, thought there was some merit to the narrow
arrangement that the New Zealand Defence Chiefs proposed. He
recognised, for instance, that Australia and New Zealand’s limited
defence capabilities and the grim realities of the world in the early 1950s
left these countries little choice other than to secure a formal guarantee
with the major sea power in the Pacific, the United States. Convinced
that society was moving toward a third world war that would be brought
about by the “thugs and gangsters” of the Soviet Union, Berendsen
thought that Asia was a “boiling cauldron” that was “vibrant with
resurgent nationalism.” In this cauldron, the situation seemed ideal for
Soviet “fishing in muddy waters.” Since the dangers were so great and a
world system of collective security so distant, he was “entirely ready” to
accept a regional system as the best compromise available. To this end,
Berendsen recognised that Spender and Doidge’s efforts to reach some
sort of pact with the United States were perhaps in Australia and New
Zealand’s best interests. “We are forced to look for something more
real, more actual, more practical”, Berendsen told Doidge. “From our
point of view”, he went on to suggest, “the logical conclusion which is
so simple and obvious that it is present in everybody’s mind, and has
been frequently advanced by Spender, is that what we essentially need
in our defence is the assistance of the United States.”17
To strike a compromise between his reservations about a complete
defence arrangement and his desire to meet New Zealand’s security
requirements, Berendsen proposed a limited pact. Under this pact, the
16
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United States would commit to the defence of Australia and New Zealand
in return for their support in defending Japan and the US position in
Northeast Asia. The response in Wellington was disappointing. Doidge
had not discussed the idea for over a month after Berendsen’s proposal
was sent. When Doidge finally replied, he said he would be “very happy
to consider it” because he regarded an American guarantee of New
Zealand’s security as “the richest prize of New Zealand diplomacy.”18
Doidge did not give much more consideration to this proposal.
Instead, he remained convinced that New Zealand needed a full
commitment from the United States. McIntosh informed Berendsen on
12 April that Doidge had not given his idea any deliberation, writing
that “[Doidge] had not thought the thing out, indeed none of them (the
Cabinet) will.”19 McIntosh himself was reluctant to pursue Berendsen’s
limited pact proposal. He was particularly dismayed by the prospect
that New Zealand would have to take part in a guarantee of Japanese
integrity so soon after fighting a major war against them.
In any event, up until mid-1950, there was no sign that the talk of
concluding a defence agreement with Australia and New Zealand,
either limited or full-scale, had been considered seriously in the United
States. As Second Secretary of the East Asia Section in the Australian
Department of External Affairs David Dexter noted, “between the end of
1947 and mid-1950 the Americans showed little inclination to be involved
in […] a Pacific pact.”20 In Far Eastern matters, the Japanese Peace Treaty
and its impact on the US-Soviet balance of power in East Asia had been
the major subject of deliberation between the State Department and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The former favoured moving toward a peace
treaty, whereas the latter wanted no diminution of its control in Japan.
Given the deadlock between restoring normal political and economic
relations with Japan and a continued occupation—neither of which
were “wholly desirable” for the United States—US Secretary of State
Dean Acheson appointed John Foster Dulles as a special advisor for
reaching a suitable peace settlement.
Dulles’s appointment was crucial for three reasons. Since he was
a Republican, Truman and Acheson could fend off criticism that the
18
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Democrats were failing in Asia and were unwilling to take a bipartisan
approach to meet their objectives. As a specialist in international
affairs—he was a legal counsel with the US delegation at the Versailles
Peace Conference in 1918, an adviser at the San Francisco Conference in
1945, and helped draft the preamble for the United Nations Charter—
Dulles brought considerable experience to the role and was able to
reach a settlement with Japan in little over a year. From a historian’s
vantage point, it is also possible to see that as a future US Secretary
of State from 1953 to 1959, his relationship with Australian and New
Zealand policymakers would be pivotal in shaping the contours of the
relationship for most of the decade. Dulles’s first task was to visit Tokyo
to discuss a Japanese peace settlement with SCAP Commander Douglas
MacArthur, as well as members of the Far Eastern Commission. His
second task was to get Australia and New Zealand, the two most
outspoken opponents of a soft peace treaty, to agree to a settlement
that was also acceptable to the United States. Although their support
was not essential, the State Department believed that Australian and
New Zealand support for American policy in Japan was still “highly
desirable.”21
Obtaining Australian and New Zealand support for the Japanese
Peace Treaty as quickly as possible became even more urgent after
mid-1950. In the early morning of 25 June, North Korean (DPRK)
forces crossed the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula and began a
full-scale invasion of South Korea with the support of the Soviet Union.
The United States, believing that the North Korean advance was Sovietinspired aggression, was quick to commit US ground forces which were
readily available in Japan. With an American need for an increased war
effort, Australia and New Zealand were uniquely placed to provide
much needed military support to the United States. It was the perfect
opportunity to demonstrate that Canberra and Wellington were
prepared to support the US bid for UN intervention in Korea, which was
approved shortly after the North Korean invasion (The Soviet Union
could not veto the resolution because at the time it was boycotting the
UN over the non-recognition of Communist China). Both Acheson
and MacArthur urged Canberra to supply material aid and battalions
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to Korea.22 Menzies was in London where he argued that Australian
troops should not be sent to Korea due to their small number and that
deploying these forces would prevent an Australian contribution to the
Commonwealth defence in the Middle East.

Figure 7. A Soviet-made North Korean T-34 tank knocked out during the UN led intervention
on the Korean Peninsula. Photo by Curtis A. Ulz (1950), Wikimedia, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:T-34_knocked_out_September_1950.jpg, public domain.

Spender, however, saw Korea as a blessing in disguise with respect to
his Pacific Pact ambitions and pushed for a speedy Australian response.
Spender cabled Menzies in early July, warning that the “heat may
be put on us for further aid” after UN Secretary General Trygve Lie
urged over fifty UN members to supply more ground forces in Korea.
Receiving no response and growing agitated, Spender wrote to Menzies
again on 17 July arguing that from “Australia’s long-term point of view,
any additional aid we can give to the US now, small though it may be,
will [be repaid] in the future one hundred fold.” Spender added that “if
we refrain from giving any further aid, we may lose an opportunity of
cementing friendship with the US which may not easily present itself
again.”23
Menzies, who was abroad at the time and unable to take direct part
in policy decisions, was unconvinced by Spender’s push for Australian
22
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support in Korea. After attending a British Cabinet meeting, he pointed
out that for Australia there was a “great danger in allowing the Korean
affair to disturb our strategic planning based on the importance of the
Middle East and on our national service scheme.”24 Menzies’s stance
on Korea became increasingly isolated, especially after the Australian
Embassy in Washington suggested “the Korea attack has given fresh
impetus to the consideration of Spender’s initiative and ideas.”
Embassy staff also suggested that “prior consultation between Australia
and the United States would have been helpful in meeting the sudden
crisis” and that “some machinery for automatic consultation would be
helpful in meeting future crises.” Determined not to let this opportunity
slide, Spender phoned Acting Prime Minister Arthur Fadden to issue
a statement that Australia had decided to send troops to Korea, who
agreed reluctantly. Even without their Prime Minister at home to object,
Spender was able to push for an Australian contribution to Korea in
the hope that it might encourage the State Department to better see the
benefits of a Pacific Pact with Australia. It was certainly an audacious
move by Spender, so much so that external affairs officer Arthur Tange
commented later that it left his colleagues “somewhat bewildered” that
he would push so quickly and without the support of the Australian
Prime Minister.25
Spender’s swiftness, however, made a strong mark on policymakers
in Washington. There was “genuine gratification at Australia’s prompt
response” in the United States, the Australian Embassy in Washington
cabled to Canberra. After observing US sentiments starting to shift on
Australia’s strategic value in the Asian region, Spender certainly felt
encouraged and motivated to keep pushing at home for a closer defence
relationship with the United States. More specifically, he stressed
again to Menzies that Australia should capitalise on this response
and seek a formal defence pact. “This immediate action by Australia
made a strong impression on official and unofficial American opinion
which has resulted in the closest of friendly relationships”, Spender
argued. He added that in order for Washington to realise the benefits
24
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of a pact, Australia should demonstrate to the United States that it was
wholeheartedly prepared to support US policy in the Pacific. Otherwise,
the “Australian attitude might be misunderstood and the genuine
warmth of [the] present relationship since the opening of the Korean
conflict may be diminished.”26 In this regard Spender’s persistence on
such an important matter is commendable, particularly given Menzies’
reluctance to accept that the United States had to replace Britain as the
new bulwark of Australian security.
Across the Tasman, New Zealand preempted the Australian
response by announcing first that it would support the US and UN
to repel the North Korean advance. On 1 July, Holland declared that
two warships, Pukaki and Tutira, would be sent to the Korea area.
He later committed a special combat unit to the fighting. In so doing,
Wellington demonstrated that New Zealand was likewise willing to
support the global fight against Communism and that it was a reliable
ally in the Pacific theatre. Carl Berendsen, New Zealand Ambassador in
Washington, was particularly happy with this quick response: “we have
got kudos and widespread appreciation [in the United States] for this
immediate indication that we are one of those who do not confine our
support of the principles of freedom to words alone.”27
Yet over and above any benefit this move had in Washington, New
Zealand’s hasty response was primarily due to British consultation and
consideration of London’s attitudes. Wellington’s decision to make a
naval deployment into Korean waters and its subsequent land-force
contributions were made because New Zealand was “unprepared to
undertake a military, and through it a political commitment which
required it to act independently of a familiar and secure Britishled Commonwealth.”28 After incessant pressing by the Australian
Government, the New Zealand military response was likewise not part
of a combined ANZAC Brigade. “That is the very thing we do not want
to do”, McIntosh told Berendsen on 7 August, “we can supply artillery,
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[and] we would feel safer in having this particular type of unit and my
own view is that we should stick to it.” Berendsen agreed and thought
such a plan would be “disastrous.” If New Zealand cooperated with
Australia militarily in Korea, “there [was] no doubt at all about it that
the Australians would shove us right into the background and we will
get no credit whatsoever for this force which will be represented as,
and certainly accepted as, Australian.”29 Despite these concerns both
Australia and New Zealand later contributed soldiers to the creation
of the 1st Commonwealth Division, a unit that formed part of the
British military presence in Korea. This division was made up primarily
of British and Canadian forces, but also included troops from India
and South Korea. At least with this type of multinational military
arrangement, McIntosh and Berendsen could be assured that it would
be quite difficult for Australia to claim credit for any contributions made
by New Zealand.
As for China, American-Australian-New Zealand views against
recognition hardened considerably after the PRC intervened in Korea in
November 1950. US President Harry Truman responded by completely
rejecting any possibility of recognition and instead approved a National
Security Council (NSC) recommendation to impose strict political and
economic sanctions on the PRC. In addition, the Truman Administration
threw its support behind Chiang Kai-shek as the legitimate head of the
government of China. Fighting alongside American forces in Korea,
respective Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers Robert Menzies
and Sidney Holland enforced similar sanctions and publicly declared
their support for Chiang’s embattled regime.
The possibility of recognising Beijing in the short-term future was
dismissed. In Australia, Spender feared that recognising the PRC after
its intervention in Korea would encourage Beijing to act aggressively
elsewhere. “If Communist Chinese demands for Taiwan and recognition
are accepted”, Spender asked fellow Australian diplomat Keith Officer
rhetorically on 11 December, “what guarantee is there that she [China]
will not press in Indochina or elsewhere?” Despite these concerns,
Spender thought that recognition should not be completely ruled out. He
told Officer that “on the question of ultimate recognition of Communist
29
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China, the door should not be barred.” In other words, Spender thought
that “if a reasonable settlement can be arranged regarding Korea, the
question of recognition will be reconsidered.”30
Meanwhile, as the Korean situation worsened, several UN countries
introduced a draft resolution in the First Committee of the General
Assembly on 12 December to form a separate committee that would
work towards reaching a ceasefire. This committee also decided to vote
upon whether the PRC should be admitted as a temporary UN member
to assist in reaching an immediate ceasefire. During these negotiations,
another tussle broke out between Australian and New Zealand
representatives after Australia tried to pressure New Zealand into
abstaining from voting. Berendsen, who was representing New Zealand,
was “infuriated” when Australian delegate Keith Officer told him that
“he (Officer) intended to vote for [Beijing’s] admission” temporarily to
work towards reaching a ceasefire, and “hoped that I (Berendsen) would
abstain.” “I could scarcely believe my ears”, Berendsen told McIntosh
after hearing that Australia wanted New Zealand to simply step aside
and not get in the way of its own decisions. “The long and short of it
is I don’t understand the Australians any more than I understand the
British” on Chinese matters, Berendsen complained.31
Although his reasons for wanting to New Zealand to abstain while
he voted for Beijing’s temporary seating are unclear, it is evident that
Officer questioned whether hardline US policies were a prudent means
of calming hostilities in Korea and subduing Chinese aggression. “My
own view is that the attitude of the United States at the moment is quite
unreal”, he wrote to Spender, “I can see few practical arguments against
a ceasefire.”32 It is possible that Officer’s demands on the committee
issue were part of a broader Australian concern that New Zealand,
with strong British ties and a demonstrated propensity to consider
PRC recognition, saw the committee as a partial step toward potential
recognition without consultation with Australia. Any such move would
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be disastrous for Australia, especially because, at the time, Spender was
working hard towards reaching a formal defence arrangement with the
United States.
The Korean War, the PRC and new conservative governments in
Canberra and Wellington meant that concluding some form of a defence
arrangement became more practical for Australia, New Zealand and
the United States. American policymakers began to view a treaty with
Australia and New Zealand as a means to reach a speedy settlement
regarding the Japanese Peace Treaty. In Australia, Spender accepted this
trade off and hoped to conclude as binding an arrangement as possible
with the United States. New Zealand, however, continued to favour a
limited understanding through a Presidential Declaration. There was
in fact significant apprehension amongst New Zealand diplomats
and military officers about concluding a binding arrangement with
the United States. Negotiations for some form of alliance nonetheless
played out in late 1950 and early 1951, and had a decisive impact on the
future of the relationship.

4. ANZUS Negotiations

The outbreak of the Korean War signalled to American policymakers that
Communism was a growing danger in the Asia-Pacific region and stronger
efforts must be made to prevent its spread. It could not, however, continue
to do so alone. The US was bearing the overwhelming brunt of the war
effort through both the financial cost of funding military equipment and the
loss of lives. In consideration of this heavy burden, the State Department
lauded Australia’s quick response to the Korean War. “The prompt
reaction of Australia to the invasion of Korea and the unanimous vote
of approval given by the Australian parliament to the military measures
taken by the Government”, a State Department memorandum noted on
24 July, “afforded a good indication of the close identity of views between
the United States and Australia on matters of fundamental importance.”1
It is interesting to note that little mention was made of New Zealand,
suggesting that perhaps Berendsen was correct in his previous concerns
that Wellington’s contributions in Korea would be overshadowed by the
Australian contribution.
In any event, the State Department quickly began manoeuvring for
discussions to conclude a formal defence treaty. Allen Brown, Australian
Secretary for the Prime Minister’s Department, reported this change in US
policy in early August 1950. While visiting Washington, he cabled Spender
on 3 August to say that in a meeting with Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern
Affairs Dean Rusk and other members of the US Far Eastern Bureau, Rusk
told him that the State Department’s views toward a pact were now “very

1
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fluid” and they were “willing to exchange ideas.”2 This willingness
stemmed from an increasing need to finalise a suitable peace settlement
in Japan as the situation in Korea worsened.
Australia and New Zealand were outspoken opponents of a soft
peace treaty without suitable assurances that Japan would not again
be a menace in Asia. In September 1950, the United States entered
discussions with other governments in the Far Eastern Committee
about the Japanese Peace Treaty. Dulles, charged with the primary
responsibility of reaching an agreement over Japan, made it clear that
the basic American aim was a treaty that restored Japanese sovereignty
and kept Japan as an American ally. American desire for a multilateral
peace treaty with Japan offered Australia an opportunity to achieve
its own objectives; namely, an American guarantee of its security in
exchange for Australian acquiescence to the Japanese Peace Treaty.
Spender was excited by the prospect that the United States was now
more open to discussions about a Pacific Pact. As a result, he worked
harder than ever to “sow the seeds” for a formal defence commitment
from the United States.3 Spender undoubtedly saw such a commitment
as vital to Australian security interests, but in his discussions with
American policymakers after the Korean War had begun, Spender also
stressed that Australia desperately needed a pact in order to be more
closely involved in the global planning and international decisionmaking processes among Western powers. Meeting with President
Truman on 15 September, Spender stressed that in the Japanese war
Australia had “thrown all she had into that conflict.” He added that
its recent commitment to Korea demonstrated further that Australia
“could be counted upon in an emergency to give the utmost of her
manpower and equipment to meet all new crises.” This, according to
Spender, “should merit a greater degree of consideration in matters of
consultation among the great powers.” “Australia did not have any say
in most of the important international decisions now being made by the
friendly powers”, Spender told Truman, suggesting that it was a “great
handicap to his country.”4
2

Cablegram from Embassy in Washington to Spender, 3 August 1950, NAA, A1838,
250/7/10 part I.

3

Jean Spender, Ambassador’s Wife, 21.

4

Notes of Meeting between Spender and Truman, 15 September 1950, NARA, RG 59,
611.43/9-1550.

4. ANZUS Negotiations



73

Truman sympathised with Spender and the Australian position, but
suggested that this was a matter that he should take up with Secretary of
State Dean Acheson. Disappointed by this response from the President,
Spender commented publicly at a UN General Assembly in New York
that Australia was keen for a regional defence pact and had clear ideas
about what scope it should take. He told Alan Watt on 15 September that
a Pacific Pact should be as wide as possible, “including the countries of
the Indian Ocean capable of entering into firm commitments, but that if
that were not possible, then an area generally including Australia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, North America and Great Britain.”5 He also
had no objection to including South American countries.

Figure 8. President Truman (second left) meeting with US Secretary of Defense George
Marshall (left), Secretary of State Dean Acheson (second from right) and Secretary of the
Treasury John Snyder (right), October 1950. Photo by Abbie Rowe (1950), US National
Archives Catalog, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/200235, unrestricted use.
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Spender soon received a clearer idea of US thinking towards Japan and
a regional pact. On 22 September, Dulles pulled Spender aside during
US negotiations with Far Eastern Commission nations for the peace
settlement in Japan. Dulles presented a seven-point memorandum which
outlined that the United States had plans to revitalise Japan as a military
power that was friendly to the United States. According to Dulles, this
was because Japan was no longer an isolated problem but part of a
broader struggle against Communism. It was in America’s self-interest
that “Japan should be denied to [Russia] and attracted to the side of the
Western democracies.” Spender was not pleased by this memorandum.
Recalling the meeting, John Allison, Director of Northeast Asian Affairs
in the State Department, penned that “[Spender’s] face grew more and
more suffused with colour. At one point, I thought he would burst a
vessel.”6 Spender told Dulles that Australia could not subscribe to a
Japanese treaty unless there were adequate assurances for Australia’s
protection. In other words, to “allay Australia’s fears”, he wanted a
“formal commitment by the United States.” In response, Dulles told
Spender that Australia’s security was assured through a continued US
presence in Japan. Nevertheless, he recognised Australian trepidations
and suggested “some compromise might have to be found.”7
At the same time, New Zealand Minister for External Affairs Frederick
Doidge surprisingly cooled towards the idea. Although Doidge had
initially been a strong supporter of a Pacific Pact, his enthusiasm
dropped once the war in Korea began. Again, unlike Spender, he also
had no clear idea of what form a pact should take. In September 1950
Doidge proclaimed in the New Zealand Parliament
My own view now, and I think the view of the government, is the pact is
not as necessary as we thought it was six months ago. It is unnecessary
now because of what is happening in Korea. Today the United States of
America is in the Pacific. I think she is there now as a permanent partner
in the policing of the Pacific.8
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There was equally little enthusiasm from the New Zealand Department
of External Affairs to collaborate with Australia on the matter. It was not
a surprise that Spender complained that “even New Zealand displayed
little active interest” in the pact proposals he made in late 1950.9
Doidge, nevertheless, left for Washington in October to discuss
a regional defence pact with the United States. While in Washington,
New Zealand-American talks appeared to reignite Doidge’s interest in a
pact but it did not take the shape he had advocated previously. Doidge
recalled that after the discussions in Washington, the US was still a
crucial signatory to any regional agreement but suggested different
treaty signatories than did Spender. He told Parliament on 2 November
that there can be “no satisfactory pact without the United States, Canada
and India”, and that the “Pacific pact should be the natural corollary
to an Atlantic Pact.”10 This was not the same view he had had several
months earlier when he thought such a pact was unnecessary. A pact
similar in scope to the Atlantic Pact would most likely entail a direct
New Zealand military commitment to defend US interests in the region.
This was also not the pact Spender was suggesting. A month earlier,
Spender had stressed to US Assistant Secretary of State John Hickerson
in a meeting on 12 October that Indian inclusion was “unlikely” and
that the United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and possibly
the Philippines were the only “essential” potential treaty signatories.
Spender also dismissed Canada because it had “heavy obligations in
Europe” and was “not deeply interested in the Pacific.”11 Disagreement
over the scope of membership aside, Spender’s desire to pursue a
regional pact had an additional layer that Doidge was not considering.
As well as seeking reassurance of support in the event of future Japanese
aggression, Spender wanted a Pacific Pact because Australia was not
associated with any “body of nations dealing with global strategy or
similar questions.” If there were a Pacific Pact with Australia as a member,
it could be “brought into consultation” with US military planning that
the Pentagon was currently unwilling to share with Canberra.12
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Dulles’s task to find a solution in Japan became even more urgent
once Chinese forces intervened in the Korean War in late November 1950.
With Chinese involvement in Korea and the situation fast deteriorating,
Dulles informed New Zealand that he hoped to devise “some satisfactory
means of assuring the government and people of New Zealand” as soon
as possible. At the same time, the State Department told Spender that
they were giving “active consideration” to his proposals for a Pacific
Pact.13 Further interest came from Undersecretary Dean Rusk, who
appeared more sympathetic to Australia’s and New Zealand’s desire
to secure US protection. As a means of enlisting Australian and New
Zealand support for the Japanese Peace Treaty, Rusk proposed a plan
for a Presidential Declaration that announced that both countries were
defensively tied to the United States. “There is merit in tightening
our relationship with Australia and New Zealand”, Rusk told Deputy
Under Secretary of Political Affairs Elbert Matthews on 9 October, and
the US should consider “a more formal statement of mutual security
commitments.”
This statement, Rusk thought, would be welcomed by Spender and the
Australian government. “It is unlikely that the Australians would press
for more than this”, Rusk added, “[Australia and New Zealand] appear
to be interested not so much in written assurances of military protection
as in an opportunity to participate more closely in military and political
planning.”14 Doidge and New Zealand would have been content with
such a statement, but Spender wanted a more binding commitment. He
later told Rusk that while he appreciated Rusk’s sincerity in his desire
to establish a closer Australian-American relationship, a Presidential
Statement was “not sufficient at all.” Australia, in Spender’s view,
required “something of more substance.”15
After Spender rejected a Presidential Statement, Allison suggested to
Dulles in early December that he and the US should consider a formal
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defence arrangement with Australia and New Zealand. For Allison,
a security treaty was a worthwhile commitment to ensure a speedy
Japanese settlement after the recent intervention of Chinese forces in
the Korean War. “In my opinion”, Allison told Dulles, the United States
should consider concluding “mutual defence arrangements with New
Zealand, Australia and the Philippines.”16 Five days later, Allison again
raised the pact idea with Dulles. Allison’s general proposal for a Pacific
collective security pact would “have the dual purpose of defending
Japan from Communist aggression and assuring our friends that
Japan would be on their side and not a menace to them.” After these
discussions, Dulles wrote to Acheson and stressed that the US must
consider all measures that might hasten an acceptable settlement. In
other words, Dulles thought that a Pacific Pact with Australia and New
Zealand might be necessary.

Figure 9. John Foster Dulles, US Negotiator to the ANZUS Treaty and US Secretary of State
(1953-1959). Photo by US Department of State (n. d.), Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/
statephotos/2358513061/, unrestricted use.
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Allison also told David McNicol, Australia’s Second Secretary in its
Washington Embassy, that discussions for a formal defence arrangement
were now being given greater consideration in the State Department.
“There was now considerably more support in the State Department for
a Pacific Island Pact”, he told McNicol confidentially on 9 December,
adding that Dulles had “come around to the support of a Pacific Pact.”17
In response, Spender and the Australian government increased their
demands for a pact with the United States in exchange for agreeing to
the Japanese Peace Treaty and remilitarisation plans. After Spender was
informed of Allison’s briefing, he announced publicly that the need for
a regional pact has become “more urgent.” Australia was “not satisfied
that Japan [could] be trusted with military power”, Spender said on
11 January 1951, because it was “too great a gamble for Australia to be
asked to take [without] effective regional security.”18
At the 1951 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in January,
Australia continued to take a noticeably hard line toward the Japanese
Peace Treaty. Australia was alarmed at the “tendency to slip into an easy
treaty” as Australian High Commissioner in London Eric Harrison said.
Australia objected to the possibility of Japan’s military resurgence and
distrusted Japan to remain a loyal ally. Australia, Harrison said, needed
security against future Japanese aggression.19 In London, New Zealand
Prime Minister Sidney Holland took a similar line but was more flexible
than the Australians. While he conceded that New Zealand interests
were “much the same” as Australia’s, its fear of Japanese aggression
was “slightly less.” In terms of opposing a soft peace treaty for Japan,
Holland was “not prepared to push this point too far.”20
Holland’s reluctance to follow the Australian line in London and
press hard for a comprehensive Pacific Pact reflected a growing belief
in the External Affairs Department that New Zealand’s political and
military interests would be best served by concluding an arrangement
with the United States that was as informal as possible. Shortly after
17
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the Prime Ministers’ Conference, an External Affairs Department
memorandum that was prepared for the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff
in late January considered three possible types of arrangement that
might be struck with the United States in exchange for agreeing to the
Japanese Peace Treaty. The report concluded that the disadvantages
of the comprehensive NATO-type pact that the Australians were
pursuing would outweigh any advantages for Wellington, citing that
it would “provide little reassurance against the long-term threat from
Asia […] and impair the ability of Australia and New Zealand to meet
that threat.”21 Alternatively, the usefulness of a “limited” pact similar
to the idea Berendsen proposed could not yet be determined because
New Zealand’s military capacity needed to be studied further, while
its commitments continued in the Middle East. Dismissing these two
possibilities, the report concluded that the best outcome was a declaration
from President Truman that the United States would defend New
Zealand, even though the Australian attitude to such an arrangement
would be unfavourable. “Such an undertaking”, the report conceded,
“would be insufficiently precise to afford Australia real assurance of
American assistance in the event of hostilities in the Pacific.”22
Meanwhile, the State Department proposed to the Australian and
New Zealand External Affairs Departments that Dulles visit in midFebruary to discuss the Japanese Peace Treaty and the question of a Pacific
security arrangement. Holland and his External Affairs Department
were unsure of whether Dulles would also stop in Wellington or
whether there would be joint talks in Canberra. When his visit was first
proposed, New Zealand got word that Dulles thought combined talks
in Canberra would be better in case “time did not allow him to visit both
countries.”23 As the weaker party, New Zealand thought joint talks were
best and proposed that Doidge and the New Zealand delegation would
meet Spender and Dulles in Canberra. From a New Zealand perspective,
joint talks potentially disposed of the possibility that major policy
differences between Australia and New Zealand would be noticeable to
Dulles. There was also a danger that if Dulles met with Doidge after he
21
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had seen Spender, Australia would make “impossible demands” and it
would be difficult for Doidge or anyone else in New Zealand to argue
against them.24 If the discussions proceeded independently in Canberra
and Wellington, New Zealand could be faced with an agreement it did
not like and one it would find difficult to change.25
For their part, the Australians feared that having Doidge at the
talks with Dulles would be inhibiting. While his presence might
project solidarity between Australia and New Zealand, it could also
prevent Spender from putting forward his point of view as forcefully.
New Zealand had not, after all, shown the same level of opposition
to Japanese rearmament at the recent Prime Ministers’ Conference in
London. In other words, New Zealand and Australia did not approach
the Dulles talks with the sense of solidarity and confidence in one
another that might have been expected from two neighbouring countries
importuning the United States.26
Allison drew up US plans for Dulles’s visit. These drafts were then
forwarded from Dulles to US Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup. So far as
membership of a pact was concerned, the draft proposed six signatories:
the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and New
Zealand. Dulles explained in early January that one major consideration
was to “give significant reassurance to Australia, New Zealand and
the Philippines so that they will consent to a peace treaty with Japan
which will not contain limitations upon rearmament.” To alleviate these
fears, Dulles raised the possibility of a defence council, where Australia
and New Zealand could be afforded a “voice in how Japan’s defence
forces progressed.” Above all else, however, Dulles stressed that it was
essential that the US “should not become committed to the Pact unless it
is assured that the other Parties will agree to the kind of Japanese Peace
Treaty the United States feels is necessary.”27
Allison forwarded Dulles’s plans to Australian Second Secretary
in Washington David McNicol on 21 January. The confidential brief
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emphasised strong US support for a Pacific Pact. The Department of
Defense “favoured” a pact and some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
were “very keen.” The Far Eastern sub-committees of the House and
Senate Foreign Relations Committee also both approved of the idea.
Allison stressed that Dulles had in mind “an arrangement not quite as
formal as [NATO].” In other words, US thinking did not necessarily
contemplate an “attack upon one, attack upon all provision” and an
“organic link” with NATO.28
Meanwhile, the New Zealand military reconsidered its preferred
structure and scope of a defence arrangement with Australia and
the United States. The New Zealand Defence Chiefs concluded that
an informal guarantee of New Zealand’s security in the form of a
Presidential announcement seemed to best suit its interests. In reaching
this conclusion, it was decided that a formal pact could never be confined
to the Southwest Pacific. Rather, a pact would only serve US interests
in Northeast Asia and commit Australian and New Zealand forces
there. “The United States cannot give a direct and precise guarantee
to New Zealand and Australia which are in any case remote from the
centre of the danger”, the Chiefs concluded, adding that it was “only in
connection with [American] arrangements in the Philippines and Japan
that sufficient Congressional and public support could be given for an
extension of American commitments to Australia and New Zealand.”29
As New Zealand policymakers decided that a formal defence
arrangement with the United States did not meet their strategic interests,
the External Affairs Department agreed that a Presidential declaration
announcing a US commitment to the defence of Australia and New
Zealand was the best course of action. The Department suggested that
Doidge should keep this possibility in mind during talks with Dulles
later in February. Since Wellington did not see “any immediate threat
to New Zealand or the Pacific”, no formal pact was required. Instead,
a “Presidential Statement would be useful.”30 Doidge left for Canberra
with the proposal for a Presidential guarantee as his first preference.
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Australia wanted no part in the Presidential Statement, nor could
it accept any arrangement other than a formal commitment from the
United States. In Spender’s view, any agreement short of a formal
guarantee of US protection in Asia and the Pacific would be worthless
to meet Australia’s security needs. Spender argued that the preferred
arrangement was a “treaty in solemn form.” Dulles’s visit might be
the “last opportunity” Australia and New Zealand had to secure an
American guarantee, he told Doidge, so it was imperative that they
cooperated and did not squander the opportunity.31 In the end, it was
agreed that it would be counterproductive to propose different things
to Dulles. Spender and Doidge finally agreed to push for the same
tripartite pact, after which Spender commented that New Zealand had
finally “seen the light.”32
After meeting with Japanese representatives in Tokyo to finalise
the arrangements for a peace treaty, Dulles flew to Canberra where
official talks began on 15 February. Dulles stressed immediately to
both Spender and Doidge the US plans for post-occupied Japan and
unlimited rearmament. He stated that a continued US military presence
in Japan should quell Australian and New Zealand concerns over
revived Japanese aggression. Moreover, any restrictions on Japanese
rearmament were counterproductive for American efforts to prevent
the spread of Communism. As he was concerned by the perception of a
“White Man’s Club” in Asia, Dulles also pushed for a broader security
treaty that included the Philippines. This echoed Acheson’s original
instructions to Dulles, which specified that the US was willing to enter
some sort of “mutual assistance arrangement” with countries including
Australia and New Zealand but also Japan, the Philippines and possibly
even Indonesia. The condition attached to these types of arrangement
was that these countries must support US objectives regarding the peace
settlement in Japan.33
For his part, Spender seemed unconvinced. Whether he truly
disagreed with Dulles or was cunningly using “the negotiating value
of Australia’s agreement to sign a peace treaty as a lever to obtain an
31
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effective security guarantee”, he told Dulles that Australia could not
so easily accept a soft policy toward Japan. He argued that Australia
needed adequate assurances that it was safe from any future Japanese
aggression. “[Australia] is not satisfied that in the long-run, it was
wholly unlikely that [Japan] would not […] present any menace to
peace” Spender replied.34 As for including the Philippines, Spender and
Doidge successfully resisted Dulles’s efforts even though Spender later
admitted he would have been prepared to accept the Philippines if the
alternative was no form of defence arrangement.
As Thomas K. Robb and David James Gill concluded, the reasons
for this resistance reflected a range of geopolitical, security, and racial
motivations.35 That said, there is certainly enough evidence from these
meetings to praise Spender’s and Doidge’s diplomacy, particularly
because it was likely they would have begrudgingly accepted the
Philippines into ANZUS if there was no other option. It is also worth
noting that these efforts were well received in London. The British were
keen to ensure that the Philippines were not included in ANZUS, because
such an inclusion would completely undermine British influence in the
region.
With respect to the Japanese Peace Treaty, New Zealand had always
been more pessimistic about Australia’s and New Zealand’s chances of
influencing its conclusion. For example, regarding Japan, McIntosh had
long thought “all [New Zealand] could do is to plug the old line and see
what, if anything can be salvaged.” For McIntosh, it seemed unrealistic
to hope for the demilitarisation of Japan based purely on Australian
and New Zealand objections. The only acceptable compromise was a
“guarantee against Japanese aggression.”36 In a similar spirit, Doidge
expressed New Zealand’s reservations about the long-term possibility
of revived Japanese aggression. Doidge told Dulles that his explanation
for the US plan for Japan in the short term was “highly convincing”, but
it “did not seem to cover the long term possibilities.”37 Australia and

34

Spender to Harrison, 21 February 1951, NAA, A6768, EATS 77 Annex A.

35

Robb and Gill, “The ANZUS Treaty during the Cold War”, 139.

36

McIntosh to Berendsen, 12 April 1950, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 225.

37

Notes on the Australian-New Zealand-United States Talks in Canberra, 15-17
February 1951, DNZER Vol. III, 599-606.

84

ANZUS and the Early Cold War

New Zealand needed some other guarantee to cover themselves against
the long-term prospects in Japan.
Doidge also raised concerns about New Zealand military
commitments elsewhere. Holland had told him that he was concerned
about what a Pacific Pact might mean for its obligations in the Middle
East if its provisions did not adequately protect New Zealand’s security
concerns closer to home. “We cannot do both”, Doidge said to Dulles,
passing on Holland’s reservations, “a Pacific Pact [cannot] lead us into
obligations which would conflict with those we undertook to fulfil in
the Middle East.” Doidge also pointed out the “folly of securing the
front door and leaving the back door open.” New Zealand’s military
commitment to global strategy could only be met, as Doidge stressed,
with a “guarantee from the United States” in New Zealand’s “back
door.”38
As a possible compromise, talks moved towards a trilateral regional
security pact. When Spender and Doidge argued for a pact on 16
February, Dulles spoke about the difficulties it would cause for the
Philippines, which only had an informal US guarantee. He also raised
Britain’s clear objections to a pact, as the British Foreign Office did not
want to see a US treaty with two Commonwealth nations that excluded
Britain as a signatory. Spender, who was unaware Britain had pressed
the United States to reconsider discussions for a pact with Australia and
New Zealand, protested vehemently. He pointed out that Britain was
no longer a major Pacific power and its objections were not relevant.
After lengthy discussions, Dulles agreed to examine possible draft
tripartite pacts. Ralph Harry, part of the Australian delegation during
the talks, prepared a possible treaty. Harry had studied the NATO
treaty and hoped to model his draft on its provisions, suggesting that
Dulles was more likely to accept its clauses if “every point […] [had a]
precedent in some other treaty to which the US was a party.”39 Harry’s
draft, although amended to meet Dulles’s more specific demands about
the scope of any commitment, provided a solid base for discussions
between Spender, Doidge and Dulles on 17 February. After the meeting,
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the three representatives agreed that the draft should be presented to
their respective governments for further consideration.
Even after a draft treaty was agreed upon, there were still three
potential issues that threatened to derail the entire project. The first
was getting the treaty through the US Senate. In the lead up to its
presentation to the Senate, Spender and Berendsen were still discussing
changes to the wording with Dulles. Berendsen was particularly
apprehensive about what these discussions might entail. “Here we have
been offered on a platter the greatest gift that the most powerful country
in the world could offer to a small and comparatively helpless group of
people and we persist in niggling and naggling about what seems to me
to be the most ridiculous trifles”, Berendsen told McIntosh on 25 June.
He added that this sort of “stupid pin-pricking” could “cost us very
dearly.” Berendsen feared that late objections to the treaty’s provisions
would prevent getting it through the Senate. “It is not Acheson, Rusk,
Dulles, the President and the State Department that we need to worry
about”, Berendsen suggested, “it is the Senate, and my mind is on the
Senate all the time.” Senate approval, according to Berendsen, was the
“most difficult hurdle”, and trying to get further assurances from Dulles
could “ruin the whole thing.”40 It certainly appeared that Berendsen had
come around to the idea of a more binding commitment with the United
States.
The second issue was British objections to the conclusion of the
ANZUS Treaty. From London’s perspective, ANZUS demonstrated
to the world that Britain was incapable of protecting Commonwealth
countries in the Pacific and potentially threatened its positions in Hong
Kong, Singapore and Malaya. While Whitehall was pleased that the
Philippines was not ultimately included in the draft treaty and British
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Kenneth Younger acknowledged
publicly that ANZUS was “a most useful contribution to Commonwealth
strategy”, the British Government deeply resented the conclusion of
ANZUS without being included as a signatory. “We are most certainly
a Pacific power”, British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison argued,
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and “it would not have been unwelcome to us if we were included in
the proposed pact.”41
British efforts to stifle and undermine ANZUS came well before the
treaty’s presentation to the Senate. While Dulles was in Tokyo finalising
the peace treaty and post-occupation plans, Political Representative
of the British Liaison Mission Sir Alvary Gascoigne told him that the
UK Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to accept the US as Australia’s and
New Zealand’s chief protector. “From the standpoint of the United
Kingdom’s position as a world power”, he told Dulles on 2 February, the
proposed Pacific Pact “would be interpreted in the Pacific and elsewhere
as a renunciation of [Britain’s] responsibilities and possibly as evidence
of [a] rift in policy between Britain and the United States.”42 He also
argued that excluding Asian countries would encourage aggression in
areas where Communist activity was highest.
Then, during ANZUS negotiations, Britain went to great lengths to
prevent the US signing a formal agreement with Australia and New
Zealand by voicing its strong discontent in Washington. London “hated”
the idea of the ANZUS Treaty and had been doing its best to “head the
Americans off and get them to substitute a Presidential Declaration”,
McIntosh suggested in March 1951. The British also played on Dulles’s
concerns over the inclusion of the Philippines. As McIntosh described
shortly after Dulles’s visit to Canberra,
The British are obviously doing their best to torpedo the whole thing and
they want to represent to the Americans the undesirability of including
the Philippines because of the adverse effect it would have on United
Kingdom prestige, more particularly in United Kingdom territories like
Borneo, Malaya, Hong Kong and so forth. The Australians are ropeable
about the British. They say they have been doing everything they can
before Dulles arrived and since he arrived to stop the treaty.43

Although New Zealand still considered itself tied firmly to the
Commonwealth and the British Empire, even the New Zealand External
Affairs Department was upset by British efforts to stifle conclusion of
the pact. Along with Britain’s sudden recognition of Communist China
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in January 1950, which caused a noticeable rift in Anglo-American
relations, Berendsen argued to McIntosh in early April that Britain were
“behaving like stupid children” and had done a “great deal of harm.”44
Another distraction was the development of a Middle East Command,
which was already being discussed in depth by US and British officials
to protect Western interests in the region. Britain contacted Australia and
New Zealand about the possibility of forming a Middle East Command
in mid-1951. Australia and New Zealand shared similar post-war
interests in the security of the Middle East. For both countries, the Suez
Canal was the major shipping route to Britain and the rest of Europe.
Access to the region’s oil reserves was also especially important for the
post-war industrial development schemes of both countries. However,
it was only after New Zealand protestations over how little opportunity
it had to influence policy and defence decisions that it accepted a formal
British invitation to participate in the Middle East Defence Command.
Australia, on the other hand, was far less forthcoming in its support
for a defence commitment to the Middle East. While Canberra “agreed
in principle” to the Command and was willing to participate in
discussions, the Australian External Affairs Department stressed that
its agreement “[did] not involve any commitment to provide forces
to the Middle East.” Its final position on the Command would be
“substantially affected by arrangements for higher political direction
and by views which are worked out as to the place of Southeast Asia
in those elements of strategy which are relevant to Australia.”45 For
Australian policymakers, ANZUS had to remain the priority.
Lastly, the final version and scope of the ANZUS Treaty had to be
approved by the US military. Spender was particularly anxious about
the military reaction to the ANZUS Treaty, as he hoped that it might
provide a means for Australia to access US strategic plans and influence
global strategy. After Dulles left Canberra in February, Spender wrote
to him on 8 March and said, “I know you won’t mind me saying directly
that we in this country are a metropolitan power in the Pacific and we
hope that our view will be predominate.” He also hoped that closer ties
with the United States might become a pretext for further US assistance
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in meeting Australia’s own defence production needs. In the same
letter to Dulles, Spender wrote that “our objective is to get into full
production, to increase our military forces and to take steps necessary
to ensure that defence needs have priority. The lead which the United
States has given on these matters is an inspiration”, Spender added,
but urged that Australia needed more assistance to deal with “serious
industrial troubles.”46
While the Department of Defense had already indicated in January
that the conclusion of the treaty was a favourable outcome for the
United States, many top-ranking US military officials now argued that
the scope of American military and strategic consultation obligations
should be as narrow as possible. In a combined State DepartmentJoint Chiefs of Staff meeting on 11 April, Chief of Naval Operations
Forrest Sherman stressed the “value of informality in establishing joint
planning” and indicated his preference for “leaving such arrangements
out of the treaty.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley
agreed with Sherman’s conclusions. In Bradley’s estimation, combined
planning was “theoretically all right but practically objectionable”
because too many countries would have access to US strategic plans
and could thereby complicate the policymaking process.47
Two days after this meeting, Secretary of Defense George Marshall
suggested even at this late stage that, from a military perspective, any
formal commitment to Australia and New Zealand’s defence was not
an ideal outcome for the United States. “Any trilateral agreement with
Australia and New Zealand should be made a simple understanding
or public declaration rather than a formal pact.” Marshall wrote to
Acheson on 13 April. At the very least, Marshall argued that “if political
considerations are so overriding that a formal pact must be made, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose the inclusion in the pact of any reference to
military plans, planning or organisations.” Recognising that a formal
treaty was necessary for Australian and New Zealand acquiescence to
the Japanese Peace Treaty, Dulles and Acheson refused to make a public
declaration rather than a formal commitment. However, they accepted
these military views and made sure to omit any reference to secret
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military planning under the ANZUS Treaty. “In the case of the trilateral
arrangement with Australia and New Zealand”, Dulles told Acheson,
“we can, I think, make it clear that any organisation thereunder will not
have the right to demand knowledge of and to participate in planning.”48

Figure 10. ANZUS logo. Archives New Zealand (n. d.), Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/
archivesnz/20921987801/, CC BY 2.0.

Despite these uncertainties, the US Senate approved the ANZUS
Treaty. Several days before the Japanese Peace Treaty was signed formally,
Acheson, along with Australian and New Zealand representatives Percy
Spender and Carl Berendsen, signed the ANZUS Treaty at a ceremony
at The Presidio in San Francisco on 1 September 1951. The treaty was
planned to enter into force on 29 April 1952. Australia, New Zealand
and the United States were now allied formally and agreed to respond to
mutual dangers in the Asia-Pacific region. After securing the agreement
with the Americans, Spender declared that ANZUS was a momentous
landmark in Australian history. In his view, ANZUS did more than
express formally the close ties of comradeship between the parties; it
48
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also marked “the first step in building of the ramparts of freedom in the
vast and increasingly important area of the Pacific Ocean.” He added
that the treaty was “directed to regional security in the Pacific” and took
the “first step towards what we hope will prove to be an ever widening
system of peaceful security in the vital area.”49
Spender’s New Zealand counterpart, Frederick Doidge, also
welcomed the conclusion of the treaty but appeared less convinced
about its significance. The treaty represented “nothing new in the
relationship of the three countries”, Doidge announced to the New
Zealand House of Representatives on 13 July, as there was already “a
deep and firm understanding on security between the United States and
ourselves.” Unlike the other ANZUS powers, Doidge also alluded to the
possibility of future British membership or consultation. In the same
address, Doidge announced that “the New Zealand Government looks
forward, in giving effect to the provisions of this treaty, to the closest
consultation with the United Kingdom and other powers concerned
with the security of the Pacific […] both New Zealand and Australia have
special obligations in defence as members of the British Commonwealth
of Nations.”50 The issue of British membership of ANZUS surfaced later
once the treaty came into effect.
Doidge’s comments aside, the ANZUS Treaty undoubtedly signalled
a crucial new era of Australian-New Zealand-American relations. In
finalising its conclusion, Spender achieved what most people thought
might be impossible. Given the circumstances, he could not have
secured a more binding commitment from the United States at the time.
Dulles certainly meant what he said when he told Spender’s wife Jean
that “there would have been no ANZUS without Percy.” Achieved in
the face of active opposition within the United States, Britain and most
of the Commonwealth, it was one of the most impressive achievements
by any Australian foreign affairs minister. If the ANZUS Treaty would
be effective in practice, however, remained to be seen.
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PART TWO: ANZUS IN FORCE

5. Post-Treaty Issues

Conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty was a watershed moment in
Australian and New Zealand history. After the 1944 Australia-New
Zealand Agreement, ANZUS was the first major international treaty
that Australia and New Zealand signed that did not include Britain as
a member. While policymakers in Canberra and Wellington stressed
that its conclusion would not weaken their country’s ties to the British
Commonwealth, ANZUS testified to Australia’s and New Zealand’s
newfound security reliance on the United States during the early Cold
War. Although it was a far less historic event in Washington, ANZUS
enabled the United States to finalise the Japanese Peace Treaty and
provide further support to its defence structure along the Pacific Rim.
Even allowing for this difference in significance, ANZUS was important
for all three countries.
Once ANZUS came into effect, however, there were still four key
post-treaty issues that the signatories needed to address. Firstly,
opinions were divided over the proposed machinery of the treaty.
While New Zealand had no issues with the ANZUS consultation
and discussion process, Australia wanted greater access to strategic
and military planning undertaken by NATO and the Pentagon. The
Americans, however, were unwilling to provide such access. Secondly,
opinions were also divided over the question of British membership.
New Zealand wanted Britain to be included as a member of ANZUS,
the United States opposed British inclusion, and Australia remained
ambivalent. Thirdly, once it was clear that Britain would not become a
treaty member, planning began for a separate defence arrangement for
Southeast Asia through the Five Power Staff Agency. Again, hoping to
include Britain, New Zealand thought that this new mechanism might
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be a means to merge ANZUS with Commonwealth defence planning
in Southeast Asia. Australia, on the other hand, remained aloof until its
diplomats received confirmation from Washington that ANZUS would
not be superseded by these new defence arrangements. Washington
did not intend to replace ANZUS with a broader defence mechanism in
Southeast Asia, but major US commitments were put on hold until after
the 1952 elections. Finally, uncertainty over the future of ANZUS ensued
after Dwight Eisenhower replaced Truman as US President in January
1953. In Australia and New Zealand, policymakers were concerned
by new US national security strategies and whether the Eisenhower
Administration viewed ANZUS as a serious commitment.

ANZUS Machinery and Membership
After the ANZUS Treaty was finalised and presented to the public,
Spender was replaced as Australian External Affairs Minister and
reassigned as Australian Ambassador to the United States in April 1951.
As he played an instrumental role in concluding the treaty, Spender
thought he was best placed to influence decision making in Washington
and look after Australian interests. “I believe the next two or three years
will be critical years in the history of civilisation”, Spender wrote to
former US Ambassador in Canberra Myron Cowen on 5 April, “and it is
in Washington that the decisions affecting the free world will be made.”
Spender added that “I believe I can serve my country and the cause of
peace in the world better in the USA than I can in any capacity at the
moment in Australia.”1 His replacement as External Affairs Minister,
Richard Casey, was tasked with ensuring Spender’s efforts to secure
the ANZUS Treaty were not in vain and worked to serve Australian
interests; namely, greater Australian-American strategic cooperation
and military information exchange with the Pentagon. He was a more
than capable successor to Spender. Serving previously as Australia’s
first Minister to Washington and a Cabinet Minister during the ANZUS
negotiations, Casey’s thirty years of experience in international affairs
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made his appointment as External Affairs Minister a role “for which his
whole life seemed to have prepared him.”2

Figure 11. Australian External Affairs Minister Richard Casey (1951-1960), 1951. Photo by
Australian News and Information Bureau (1951), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Richard_Casey_1951.jpg, Crown Copyright.

Even for Casey, it was not an easy assignment. ANZUS did not require
American policymakers to share their strategies with Australia and New
Zealand, nor did it specify that Canberra or Wellington must be informed
of US intentions before any decisions were made. Annual ANZUS
Council meetings between External Affairs and State Department
officers, as well as a small representation from the US military, became
the basic mechanism for trilateral discussions, yet these meetings were
designed mostly for the Americans to outline the plans they had already
made, rather than to consult with Australia and New Zealand over
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their perspectives, objections and interests. US Secretary of State Dean
Acheson later recalled:
Instead of starving the Australians and New Zealanders, we would give
them indigestion. For two days we went over the situation in the world,
political and military, with the utmost frankness and fullness. At the end
they were very happy with political liaison through the Council and
military planning through the Commander in Chief Pacific.3

United States military officials insisted that discussions should be
mostly political and should not offer Australia and New Zealand any
concrete information on military planning other than through the US
Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC).
Members of the New Zealand External Affairs Department generally
accepted this structure. As one adviser told Secretary McIntosh less than
two weeks before the first ANZUS meeting in Honolulu during early
August 1952, New Zealand “did not share the long-standing Australian
objective of infiltration into the world’s policy-making hierarchy.”4
Instead, Frank Corner suggested that all that New Zealand was seeking
from the United States was basic consultation in Far Eastern matters
rather than the high-level military and political discussions for which
Spender had hoped. “What in fact we are all seeking to establish”,
Corner told McIntosh, was ANZUS as a kind of “Dominion status with
the United States, [and] a right to be consulted in Pacific and Far Eastern
Affairs.”5
George Laking, another New Zealand External Affairs Officer, was
not even convinced that ANZUS was in any way useful for New Zealand.
“The plain fact is we are getting nothing at all from the Americans,
who have a childish faith in their ability to fox one and all”, Laking
complained to Secretary McIntosh on 25 June 1951. “The chances of our
knowing the right answers before the press are five to four against”, he
added, and “the secret of it all [was] that the Americans don’t know the
answers themselves until it happens.”6 McIntosh certainly sympathised
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with Laking’s reservations. Along with Foss Shanahan and Joseph
Wilson, two of New Zealand’s External Affairs Officers, McIntosh
conceded that New Zealand “never wanted the damn Pacific Pact in the
first place.”7
Before the first ANZUS meetings even began in August 1952, Casey
recognised the difficulties that ANZUS posed for Australia and New
Zealand. “ANZUS represents [two] difficulties: the fact that there is
one very strong partner and two others very much less strong, and that
any threat to which [Australia] may be exposed must come from the
southward expansionist ambitions of Communist China which must
come by land”, Casey penned in his diary on 1 August. He added that
“the fact that the US will not even consider any further land obligations
on the Asian mainland makes for an obviously anomalous position.”
Unfortunately for Casey, he knew that there was little Australia could
offer the United States in return for a greater commitment in Southeast
Asia. “There are a great many great things that we could ask the
Americans for”, Casey conceded, but “few things that we could offer
them in exchange.”8
Spender, the architect of ANZUS, was having similar problems in
Washington. “We need to put flesh on the bones of the Pacific Pact”,
Spender argued to Casey, suggesting that the powers needed to agree
on a “wide flung strategy” and not ignore the needs of home defence.9
Much to Spender’s frustration, as Australia was not a NATO member,
ANZUS was not allowing Australia to get its voice heard in any of
NATO discussions. For Spender, this was important for Australia’s
general strategic planning. “NATO decisions affect everyone and
Australia should have the right to be heard, not only with respect to
general strategic considerations but especially on matters directly
affecting Australia”, Spender said in a State Department meeting on 20
May 1952. Spender, in other words, was “not content to be the hair on
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the tail of the dog.” He felt that Australia should at least be “part of the
hide of the dog itself.”10
Acheson was unprepared to meet Spender’s demands. Brushing
off these concerns, Acheson proposed that “if the Australians wanted
real contact with the American Government and its thinking on world
problems, it was highly desirable that they keep in touch with the
Department of State and not continue to attempt to establish themselves
in liaison with the Pentagon.” He added that “with particular regard to
Pacific defence and its problems, the real planning was being done by
Admiral Arthur Radford (US Chief Commander in the Pacific) and his
staff in Hawaii. If the Australians and New Zealanders really wanted
contact with US military planning operations, this was the place for it.”11
In short, Acheson advised that the Australians and New Zealanders
should stick with their present contacts in the Department to obtain
information relating to global strategic plans. The ANZUS Council
meetings were Australia and New Zealand’s supposed “door of entry”
to information on US global planning, but not to NATO.12
It was simply not possible for Australia and New Zealand to expect
any greater access to the Pentagon through ANZUS. If the ANZUS
meetings got through the organisational steps in good order, however,
Acheson offered that he would present a total picture that would give
them “plenty to think about and work on.” It was certainly not the
consultation for which Australia had hoped. New Zealand diplomats, on
the other hand, believed this method of consultation was appropriate.
New Zealand delegates at the first ANZUS Council meeting in Hawaii
described the trilateral discussion as “a most successful one.”13
The US military did have one clear idea how Australia and New
Zealand could meaningfully contribute to the relationship. While ANZUS
was originally designed to protect against mutual security threats solely
in the Pacific theatre, US military planners began to suggest that Australia
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and New Zealand should also be prepared to commit their forces to
defending the Middle East. During another joint State Department-Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) meeting in late November, JCS Chairman Omar
Bradley concluded that it would be “good performance” for Australia
and New Zealand to commit infantry divisions to any future hostilities
in the Middle East.14 By JCS estimates, this trans-Tasman contribution
would assist in meeting the “ground force deficiencies” under current
American contingency plans for war with the Soviet Union in the region.
For Bradley, Australian and New Zealand military contributions to the
Middle East (as well as contributions from other countries) should still
come under the guise of a joint defence Command. There was a “need
for the early establishment” of the Middle East Defence Command,
Bradly concluded, as this organisation would undertake the joint
military planning required to defend the region from Soviet control.
By this stage, however, the Australians had cooled even further
towards the idea of the formation of a Command. Australian External
Affairs Secretary Alan Watt expressed serious reservations about
the Command because it offered Australia absolutely no method
of influencing the decision-making process. According to Watt, the
proposed Command structure did not give Australia “an adequate
political voice in [the] political direction of the Middle East Command.”15
There was also little Australian support for a commitment to the Middle
East because policymakers in Canberra believed that the security of the
Pacific region was far more important. As New Zealand External Affairs
Secretary Alister McIntosh reported from his trip to Canberra on 6 May
1952, “the Australians felt that there was a large element of unreality
about the Middle East Command.” He suggested that the Australians
“preferred a Pacific approach, and the construction of a relationship
with the Americans, through a Pacific Defence Council.”16
For different reasons, New Zealand began to reconsider the
usefulness of a Command. McIntosh and Shanahan conceded on 13
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June 1952 that “there will probably be some military secrets from which
we will be excluded”, but did not think this prevented New Zealand
from actively supporting the Command. According to McIntosh and
Shanahan, there were other more pressing issues about the arrangement
that brought its usefulness into question. For one, they both thought
that “serious differences in views between the United States and
Britain” in the Middle East—such as the make-up of the Command
personnel, US policies toward Egypt and the Suez Canal, and British
intentions for nearby Sudan—made the proposed Command a potential
disaster for Western interests in the region.17 They also concluded that
tense relations with Egypt over British bases near Suez presented a
complicated situation to address for the Command powers, especially
in the wake of Cairo’s refusal to participate.
ANZUS itself was complicated further by the question of British
membership. For the first time in Australian and New Zealand history,
the two former British colonies signed a major international defence
treaty that did not include Britain as a member. London argued that
its exclusion was a blow to its international prestige, signalled a
clear military weakness in the Commonwealth, and might cause a
serious rift in Anglo-American relations. On these grounds, British
policymakers ignored Australian and New Zealand representations
and strongly objected to ANZUS. After the Foreign Office was initially
unable to prevent the treaty’s conclusion in early to mid-1951, British
policy changed to press upon the ANZUS powers the need for British
membership either directly as a signatory to, or indirectly as an observer
of, Council meetings. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden argued on
19 April 1951 that Britain should be included in the alliance because “any
threat to either Australia or New Zealand must always be calculated
as a threat to [Britain].” He went on to suggest that British interests in
Malaya “make it essentially a Pacific Power.”18
Winston Churchill, who had returned to office in late 1951 for his
final stint as prime minister, also staunchly objected to British exclusion
from ANZUS. Believing that links between Britain and the Dominions
were still strong, Churchill saw the need for his government to play a
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larger role in Pacific defence planning to “guide” US strategy against
the Communist bloc. In short, without closer Anglo-American strategic
cooperation, British interests in the Pacific were likely to become
increasingly marginalised by US strategists when they considered
issues of concern in this region. Churchill pushed for British inclusion
on two fronts: lobbying in Washington on many occasions during
1951-1953, and appealing to Australia and New Zealand to convince
the Americans to include Britain in ANZUS.19 Finding support in
Canberra and Wellington would not have appeared too difficult to
Churchill, especially since pro-British sentiment in these countries was
particularly strong. However, the extent to which the Pacific Dominions
would be able to convince the Americans to include Britain in ANZUS
was certainly overstated.
The Australians were divided over British membership. Given
his well-established predisposition to support Britain and its policies
abroad, Menzies was receptive to Churchill’s reasoning and agreed that
London should be included in ANZUS in some capacity. He told British
officials on 5 June that he was “very much in favour” of closer association
with the United Kingdom through ANZUS.20 He then told Casey and
Spender that “[Australia] should not place any obstacle in United
Kingdom efforts” to join ANZUS Council meetings as an observer […]
provided the Americans are willing to play and provided the United
Kingdom request does not involve our acceptance of a string of other
countries in the same capacity.”21 These last two points were crucial for
Menzies. Firstly, Menzies recognised that American agreement to British
observer status was a key condition. This suggests that Menzies had in
fact moved away from the idea of British leadership and recognised the
need to prioritise the US position. Secondly, if the United States agreed,
Menzies was willing to consider British consultation but feared that this
might herald the expansion of ANZUS to include other Commonwealth
countries. He did not want Australia becoming responsible for defending
areas outside of its strategic interests.
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Spender was unconvinced. He feared British inclusion might
strain Anglo-American relations and Britain’s relations with other
Commonwealth countries. Most importantly for Australia, British
inclusion might dilute the usefulness of ANZUS meetings as a forum
to consult with the United States on matters of regional and global
strategy. If the United States and Britain were both present at ANZUS
meetings and squabbled over their own disagreements, Australia’s
voice might become increasingly marginalised. Before Britain could be
seriously considered as an observer, he told Eden that it was “absolutely
essential that the United States and United Kingdom get their lines
straightened out and agree upon a common approach” towards pressing
disagreements between Washington and London.22 Spender also told
Menzies on 6 June 1952 that “while I appreciate the strength of [your
observations] […] before any questions of ‘observers’ or any extension
of the Pact to include other nations should arise, the Council should be
first established.”23
Casey was more sympathetic to British concerns over exclusion from
ANZUS. He recognised that the British were “very concerned about their
being excluded from any official contact with the ANZUS Council.” He
was also determined not to pursue closer US consultation at the expense
of Australia’s relationship with Britain. Casey wrote at the outset of the
first ANZUS Council meeting that “Australian relations with the US are
close and confident, but I always have in mind the effect of any accord
on the British. It would be counter-productive if our good relations
with [the] US were at the expense of bad UK-US relations.” Along the
lines of Menzies’s suggestion, he thought he might be able to include
“UK people into the ANZUS Council as British Liaison Officers”, even
though he recognised that Australia must execute “caution in extending
‘observer’ rights to the United Kingdom or other countries.”24 Even
if Britain did not become associated with ANZUS, Casey went as far
as suggesting that Australia and New Zealand were already acting as
British representatives for Commonwealth interests in the Asia-Pacific
region through ANZUS. “ANZUS [was] only a local manifestation of
22
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closer British-American relations”, Casey told the Australian Parliament
in September 1952.”25 In other words, Australia and New Zealand would
retain their roles as British outposts in the Pacific.
While the Australians were divided over the question of British
membership, the New Zealanders agreed almost unanimously that
Britain must be included in some capacity. New Zealand External Affairs
Minister Thomas Clifton Webb thought that while “the Australians
saw great difficulty for the United Kingdom to be associated with the
Council”, New Zealand was “anxious to have the closest consultation
with the United Kingdom on operation of [ANZUS].”26 Wellington had
always been reluctant to adjust to American leadership in the Pacific
because of its sentimental ties to Britain. Britain’s inclusion, even as an
observer, was therefore greatly appealing.
Including Britain also countered concerns in New Zealand that
Australia and the US would dominate ANZUS discussions. “From New
Zealand’s point of view”, a brief for the New Zealand delegation to the
ANZUS Council meeting stated on 25 July 1952,
British participation would be a most useful counter-weight which would
help to guard against [ANZUS] being influenced too much by Australia
or the United States or both. United Kingdom would undoubtedly give a
stability to the Council which might otherwise be lacking.27

In short, while the Australians were primarily concerned that British
inclusion might prevent closer consultation with the United States
through ANZUS, the New Zealanders wanted British inclusion
precisely because it would prevent Australia and the United States from
dominating ANZUS discussions.
After the first ANZUS meeting in August, McIntosh and Corner
both expressed their concerns about British exclusion. On 3 October,
McIntosh told Corner that he had “always wanted to have the United
Kingdom in.” He even complained that during ANZUS meetings
External Affairs Minister Webb “did not put up any fight whatsoever to
have the United Kingdom in as observers.” In response, Corner replied
25
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that US objections to British inclusion were the real problem. “It seems
to me”, Corner wrote to McIntosh in December 1952, that
The American unwillingness to include Britain in ANZUS springs from
a refusal to share real power in the Pacific with any other country. They
will talk to Australia and New Zealand, and will be most forthcoming
with us, because we are so unequal and represent no real challenge to
their right of decision. But the British are a different proposition and if
they were admitted they would bring much greater weight and prestige
and would require that America shared its power of decision.28

Corner’s concerns about US opposition to admitting Britain into ANZUS
proved to be correct. Casey told Acheson in the first ANZUS meeting in
early August that he was under considerable pressure from the British to
have them brought into ANZUS planning. He said that British Foreign
Minister Anthony Eden “feels very deeply” on this question and had
pressed Casey to push the British case. Acheson, in response, said he felt
that this was “completely impossible.”29
The United States, preferring to “go it alone” in the Pacific rather
than including Britain, had no interest whatsoever in including it in
ANZUS in any capacity. While Acheson told Menzies that he thought
the ANZUS powers should “keep no secrets” from the United Kingdom,
he was not prepared to offer them “any special consideration” through
ANZUS.30 After informing Eden of his decision in August 1952,
Acheson’s stern comments ended any further serious discussion about
British membership. Acheson was determined to assert that the United
States was indeed the dominant power in the relationship and would
not accept changes to the treaty that did not suit US interests. Unable to
sway American opinion, British policymakers eventually conceded that
“Australia and New Zealand had grown up” and London would not be
directly associated with ANZUS in any capacity.31
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Another interesting element that has recently received greater
attention regarding the US response to British inclusion in ANZUS is the
issue of race. While Acheson privately stated that there was no capacity
for Britain to be involved in ANZUS, US public explanations suggested
that including Britain would increase anxieties in the Asia of an “AngloSaxon” or “White Man’s Club” in the region.32 This reasoning was
hardly convincing, especially since all three ANZUS signatories were
already predominantly Anglo-Saxon. It does, however, echo some of the
concerns Dulles originally had when conducting treaty discussions in
Canberra and explains why he was particularly interested in including
the Philippines in the pact. It was certainly not a primary consideration,
but perceptions over race did inform Dulles’s thinking and influenced
broader US concerns about its image in Asia. The US was mindful of
domestic race relations with African Americans and certainly wanted
to win the propaganda war against the Soviet Union in the developing
world. In this case, though, it seems that concerns over an exclusionary
defence treaty based on race were something of a convenient excuse for
not including Britain in ANZUS.

A Five-Power Staff Agency
After being rejected from ANZUS as an observer, Britain instead pushed
for the conclusion of a Five-Power Staff Agency between the United
States, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand for the collective
defence of Southeast Asia. In December 1952, British, American
and French representatives met in Paris and agreed in principle to a
coalition for liaison on intelligence and other defence matters in the
region. In a follow-up meeting in London, Churchill stressed that “it
was unreasonable for ANZUS staff planners to deal with the Pacific
and Southeast Asia without direct assistance from the British.”33 Then,
in a separate meeting with Dominion representatives, Churchill told
Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers Robert Menzies and
32
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Sidney Holland that the Agency would essentially be a revitalised
and widened version of previous ANZAM defence arrangements
between their three countries. He handed both Menzies and Holland
a newly revised British defence policy document called “The Future of
ANZAM”, which outlined Britain’s plans for the Agency as well as a
new focus on defending Malaya from Communist aggression.34 This
plan, in short, aimed to expand previous cooperation between Australia,
New Zealand and the British into a defence arrangement for Southeast
Asia that also included the United States and France. This arrangement
would effectively supersede ANZUS and enable Britain to be as closely
involved as possible in the defence planning for the region.
New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland was particularly
excited at the prospect of creating a Staff Agency. If the United States
agreed to take part, Holland thought it was a fantastic opportunity to
incorporate Britain in Pacific defence planning after their attempts to join
ANZUS were blocked by the State Department. It would be a “marriage
of ANZUS and ANZAM”, Holland said, adding that the Agency could
become a prelude to a joint machinery in the whole Pacific.35 In other
words, Holland hoped to reignite discussions over including Britain as
an ANZUS partner.
Support for the proposal was less forthcoming in Wellington. Frank
Corner considered that, given the proposition of French membership
coupled with the deteriorating situation in Indochina, the Agency
appeared to be intended primarily for multilateral defence discussions
about that region. As a result, he questioned whether a focus on
Indochina was in New Zealand’s best interests. The Agency aimed to
deal primarily with the “vital problems in Indochina” and “raise French
morale”, Corner told McIntosh, and he also thought the Pentagon was
only interested in the Agency for “considering practical problems
relating to Indochina.”36
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In the Australian External Affairs Department, however, Casey and
Spender were greatly concerned that the creation of a joint Staff Agency
for the defence of Southeast Asia would undermine the importance of
ANZUS. Similarly, they were also concerned that an Agency would
prevent Canberra from consulting directly with Washington on security
issues in the region. As Truman’s second term as US President was soon
scheduled to end, Casey and Spender thought that Australia should
push for an ANZUS Council meeting with the Americans shortly
after new President-elect Dwight Eisenhower took office to gauge his
Administration’s views on the subject. To “offset any danger” that the
Agency might undermine ANZUS military planning, Spender urged
Casey to call an ANZUS meeting shortly after Eisenhower took office.37
Fearing the political effect it would have in London, New Zealand
responded unfavourably to an ANZUS meeting. Webb told the
Australians shortly after the meeting was proposed that it was untimely
“to press for an early ANZUS meeting at least at this juncture”
because it might aggravate the British.38 Secretary in the Australian
Commissioner’s Office in Wellington J.S. Cumpston then tried to urge
New Zealand to reconsider. When meeting with Shanahan and McIntosh
in late February, Cumpston attempted to persuade both men of the
need for an early ANZUS meeting with the Americans. Their response,
however, was again quite negative due to concerns about the effect an
early ANZUS meeting would have in London. Wellington dismissed
subsequent Australian efforts to urge New Zealand to support an earlier
ANZUS meeting in March.
Meanwhile, after initial consultation with London, the United
States agreed in principle to the establishment of a Five-Power Staff
Agency for the defence of Southeast Asia. While the arrangement did
not specifically commit any country to military action, it did provide
a basic framework for joint-defence planning in the region. Delegates
agreed that each country would appoint a military representative to
coordinate defence plans with one another, as well as exchange all
available intelligence information useful to the defence of Southeast
Asia. As Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs John Allison advised
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Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in late January, “I cannot conceive
how we can engage in efficient planning for the military defence of
the Pacific without engaging in some form of joint planning with our
allies.”39
Allison argued that the Agency must take a different form to ANZUS
for two reasons. Firstly, he thought that an enlargement of ANZUS
would entail an unwanted US commitment to Hong Kong, Malaya
and Indochina. Secondly, he urged Dulles that the Agency would be
useful primarily because it would help prevent Chinese aggression in
the region. US policymakers such as Allison, in other words, had no
intention of expanding ANZUS or merely mollifying British concerns
about defence planning for the region. Instead, the Agency “offered the
best prospect of causing Communist China to cease an aggression”, the
State Department concluded on 17 February.40
In Australia, policymakers continued to be concerned that the
military function of ANZUS would be substantially absorbed by the
Staff Agency. Australian Defence Minister Philip McBride told Menzies
one week after the Conference that “the accent on planning for South
East Asia has been transferred from an ANZUS to a Five Power basis.”
He added that he was concerned that the Staff Agency might subsume
ANZUS and ANZAM in the long-term future.41 Members of the
Australian External Affairs Department were also anxious as to what
the Agency would mean for the future of ANZUS military discussions.
Assistant External Affairs Secretary Ralph Harry argued that the
development of the Agency would lead to “the suspension by ANZUS
of its military planning and concentration on political consultation”,
mainly because the Agency’s proposed plan of studies would “seem
to render redundant at least some of the current ANZUS military
planning.”42
Given New Zealand’s great reluctance to hold an ANZUS Council
meeting on the subject, Australia stepped up its own diplomatic efforts
to obtain US views. In late May, Minister of the Australian Embassy
in Washington Arthur Tange conferred with US Director of the Office
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of the British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Andrew
Foster. Foster made it clear that given the Pentagon’s reluctance to
underwrite the security of mainland Asia, the US did not think the Staff
Agency should be “a formal and elaborate organisation.” The Agency
should “rest on an ad hoc, on-call-need-to-know basis.” He assured
the Australians that there was no prospect that the Agency would
supplant ANZUS and ANZAM machineries. Regarding the concept of
an ANZUS-ANZAM linkage, Foster claimed the US could not establish
a firm position until it “learn[s] of any ideas that may come out of
conversations” among the Commonwealth states on the reformation of
ANZAM.”43 At least for now, Australian concerns about the future of
ANZUS had been allayed.

Eisenhower in the Oval Office
As discussions surrounding ANZUS and the Five-Power Staff Agency
took place in late 1952 and early 1953, major political changes in the
United States complicated the future of defence arrangements in the
Asia-Pacific region. President Truman’s second term as US President
was scheduled to end in January 1953 and an election was planned
for November 1952 to decide his replacement. After almost twenty
years of Democrat control of the White House, the Republican Party’s
Presidential candidate, Dwight “Ike” Eisenhower, won the election by
campaigning on major changes to US foreign policy. While Ike strongly
criticised Truman for plunging the United States into a costly and
protracted war, Eisenhower promised he would end the war in Korea
and reduce the financial deficit from overspending on the military.
On taking office, Eisenhower’s first major foreign policy initiative
was appointing John Foster Dulles as his Secretary of State. Given his
experience in international affairs, Eisenhower believed that Dulles was
an “obvious” choice for the position.44 In Australia and New Zealand,
Dulles’s appointment was especially important because both countries
had experience in dealing with him during the ANZUS negotiations in
early 1951.
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Figure 12. Eisenhower during the US Election Campaign in Baltimore, MD, September 1952.
Credit: Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:I_like_Ike.jpg, Public domain.

Eisenhower’s most immediate foreign policy problem was ending
a protracted and costly war in Korea. “Of the manifold problems
confronting me early in 1953”, Eisenhower penned in his memoirs,
“none required more urgent attention than the war in Korea.”45 He had
famously visited Korea in late 1952, but had no precise idea about how
to end the war. Fortunately for Eisenhower, in March US negotiators
achieved a breakthrough with their North Korean and Chinese
counterparts over an exchange of prisoners of war. After restraining
South Korean President Syngman Rhee from continuing the war and
accepting a compromise demarcation at the 38th parallel, an armistice
was signed on 27 July 1953 that brought the Korean War to an end.
While an end to the fighting in Korea was a welcome development,
Eisenhower continued to follow the previous Administration’s example
and refused to recognise the PRC. In Australia, however, Casey thought
that the end of the war made the prospect of recognising Beijing more
palatable. Within weeks of the signing of the Armistice, Casey discussed
with the Australian Cabinet how to approach China. He felt that it
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Figure 13. US President Dwight Eisenhower (1953-1961), 1952. Photo by Fabian Bachrach
(1952), US Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3c17123/, public domain.

was becoming increasingly important to open a dialogue with the
Communist regime to prevent Mao from moving “closer into the arms
of Moscow.”46
Across the Tasman, Webb also thought that the end of the Korean
War signalled a chance to reconsider the recognition of the PRC and
thereby reduce tensions in East Asia. On 6 July, Webb went one step
further and made his thoughts on recognising China public. Three days
after Webb’s address, New Zealand Ambassador in Washington Leslie
Munro reported that the speech had gravely concerned policymakers
in Washington. The remarks “caused distress” in the United States,
Munro told Webb on 9 July, and comments such as Webb’s “gravely
disturbed the Americans.”47 Munro was especially concerned that the
speech might affect New Zealand’s relationship with the United States
and suggested that, in the future, New Zealand should publicly support
the US position on China.
Webb had anticipated that Australia was “inclined to take the
American view” on China, and indeed McIntosh told Corner that his
comments caused a “dislocation of the eyebrows in American and
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Australian circles.” According to McIntosh, Australia’s major concern
was that Webb might push New Zealand towards recognising China
without prior consultation.48 This concern suggests that there was little
trans-Tasman communication or cooperation regarding the issue of
Chinese diplomatic recognition.
Outside of East Asia, another concern for the ANZUS countries
was reconsidering policy toward the Middle East. By the time of
Eisenhower’s inauguration in January 1953, Egyptian General Gamal
Abdel Nasser had already overthrown the Egyptian government led by
King Farouk and he declared Egypt a republic in June. These dramatic
events convinced the Eisenhower Administration that a Command
structure was no longer an appropriate means for the defence of the
Middle East. “We had decided to put the [Command] concept on the
shelf”, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
John Jernegan told Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington
Harold Beeley on 17 June, citing political instability in the region as
the major reason for US reluctance to participate.49 Beeley replied that
the British Foreign Office had a similar view and instead supported the
idea of working closely with individual countries that appeared willing
to defend Western interests in the region. At Beeley’s insistence, this
included Australia and New Zealand.
In an NSC meeting, American policymakers confirmed that in their
view a formal multilateral defence arrangement was no longer the best
way to protect US interests in the Middle East. The Command was “no
longer played up as a likely defense arrangement in the future”, US
National Security Advisor Robert Cutler told the NSC on 9 July, and
“Egypt was no longer considered to be the nucleus of an area defence
organisation.” Secretary of State John Foster Dulles agreed. “The
[Command] was too complicated, too much like NATO, and it obviously
would not work”, Dulles said to Cutler, adding that “something
less formal and grandiose was needed as a substitute.” The meeting
concluded by agreeing that the United States should support Britain “to
the greatest extent practical, but reserving the right to act with others or
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alone.”50 In other words, the United States remained committed to the
defence of the Middle East, but it wanted greater flexibility in a future
response if a crisis developed.
For their part, Australia and New Zealand certainly agreed with
abandoning the idea of a Middle East Command. In no uncertain
terms, New Zealand Deputy High Commissioner in London Frank
Corner argued that “the Middle East is of no direct importance to New
Zealand.” He concluded that it was completely unsatisfactory “to be
committed to fight in an area where we have no representation, no way
of making an independent appraisal of conditions in the country where
our troops will be placed [and] no way of influencing the governments.”
Australian military officials reached similar conclusions. In one report,
the Australian Defence Committee argued that “the threat to Southeast
Asia is greater than that to the Middle East […] Southeast Asia should
be given priority.”51
Looking more broadly, the Eisenhower Administration also needed
new national security strategies. After much deliberation, the National
Security Council produced the NSC 162/2 report in late 1953, a formal
statement that outlined Eisenhower’s “New Look” approach to foreign
policy.52 NSC 162/2 aimed to achieve the same goals as Truman’s
national defence policies, but would do so through more cost effective
means; namely, through a reliance on nuclear weapons, an apparent
willingness to use them and the subsequent deterrent effect on the
belligerent Soviet bloc. It also relied on forming a number of defence
pacts with Allied powers that aimed to ensure the United States would
not again have to shoulder the burden of an entire military effort as it
did in Korea.
Part of this plan encompassed a continued commitment to the
ANZUS treaty. In September, the second round of ANZUS Council
meetings were held in Washington. During these meetings JCS
Chairman Arthur Radford confirmed this sustained commitment
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to the ANZUS partners, emphasising both his “continued interest
in ANZUS” and the treaty’s overall “importance and value” to US
defence planning in the Pacific. Commander of the US Pacific Fleet
Admiral Felix Stump expressed similar sentiments. He stated that
ANZUS military discussions would be used as “background material
to national plans” in the Pacific theatre, particularly in relation to FivePower Agency defence discussions in Southeast Asia.53 ANZUS, in other
words, would provide one basis for US defence planning in the region.
The Australians and New Zealanders welcomed this arrangement, yet
similar issues re-emerged to those presented during the first Council
meetings one year earlier. Casey again raised the possibility of British
membership of ANZUS, asking whether “any link could be created” to
satisfy British membership demands. Spender also continued to express
his discontent at the “insufficient planning and coordination” between
the ANZUS partners in the event of a worldwide war and suggested the
smaller ANZUS partners should be privy to US global war plans. Both
suggestions, however, were dismissed by US representatives. In short,
the United States remained committed to ANZUS under Eisenhower,
but it was not prepared to change the membership or consultative
arrangements of the alliance.
Outside of these ANZUS discussions, Australian and New
Zealand policymakers were seriously concerned by the Eisenhower
Administration’s new national security policies. On the one hand, an
increased US commitment to its formal allies suggests Eisenhower and
Dulles were prepared to take ANZUS and the Five-Power Staff Agency
seriously and consult more closely with Canberra and Wellington.
On the other hand, a reliance on nuclear weapons opened further the
serious possibility of another world war in which Australia and New
Zealand would undoubtedly have been involved.
New Zealand Ambassador in Washington Leslie Munro suggested
that the new Administration would follow a “conservative line”,
meaning that Eisenhower was looking to cut military spending and
reduce direct US military involvement overseas during the 1950s. Such a
policy, according to Munro, was not ideal for New Zealand, particularly
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for Western defence positions in the Pacific.54 In terms of broader US
strategy, there were similar concerns in New Zealand that Eisenhower’s
proposed foreign-policy brinkmanship could be disastrous for the West.
Many New Zealand diplomats regarded these policies as “misguided”,
“misconceived” or “extreme.”55
While still concerned about the potential for global nuclear war,
policymakers in Canberra were more optimistic about Eisenhower’s
new national security strategies. Many officers within the Australian
External Affairs Department hoped that increased US reliance on its
defence pacts would heighten American involvement in Asia and the
Pacific. If used cautiously, they were also optimistic that US nuclear
diplomacy could prevent further Communist advances. Casey, for
one, was hopeful that the “major re-appraisal of US foreign policy”
would benefit Australia because it would create greater US interest in
defending a region close to Australian borders. He thought, in turn, that
Australia must capitalise on this unprecedented US interest in Southeast
Asia and demonstrate that Canberra was a reliable US ally. “It would
be bad value”, Casey later wrote in his diary, “to give Washington the
impression that it was “contemplating retreat from [its] obligations.”56
Testing the ANZUS powers’ commitment to defending Southeast Asia
soon proved crucial, as Communist forces in Indochina sparked a major
international crisis that tested the ANZUS commitment to Southeast
Asia.
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6. Crisis in Southeast Asia

As Australian and New Zealand diplomats contemplated the repercussions
of new US national security strategies during the early stages of the
Eisenhower Administration, a Communist offensive in North Indochina
threatened the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu and raised questions
about US involvement in Southeast Asia. Before the outbreak of fighting
in March 1954, Communist revolutionaries and the remnants of French
colonial forces had been locked in a power struggle over Indochina for
almost ten years. To a large extent, Eisenhower’s policy options toward
this struggle were constrained by the choices of his predecessor. Under
Truman, the United States had explicitly stated that France had a right to
retake control of Indochina after the Japanese occupation that took place
during World War II. From 1950 onwards, the Truman Administration
actively aided the French war effort after France’s position in the
region looked increasingly unstable. After promising an unwavering
commitment to stop the spread of Communist aggression during the 1952
election campaign, Eisenhower had little choice other than to continue
supporting the French cause in Indochina even if Paris could not continue
to hold its position alone.
Similarly, the Menzies and Holland governments had long been
concerned about the deteriorating situation in Indochina and outlined
a firm commitment to defending Communist aggression. In March
1950, Australian External Affairs Minister Percy Spender thought that
Indochina represented the “greatest present danger point” in Southeast
Asia.1 Policymakers in Wellington reached similar conclusions. By
1953, New Zealand High Commissioner in London Frank Corner was
1
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convinced Indochina was the “key” to Southeast Asia. He argued
that if the Communists were successful in Indochina, Malaya, Burma
and Siam would also fall under Communist control. Corner was also
hopeful that New Zealand might be able to work closely with Australia
on Southeast Asian issues, even though he complained that “the
Australians are often more interested in having a voice than solving
practical problems.”2

Siege at Dien Bien Phu
On 13 March 1954, tensions in Indochina reached a climax after
Vietminh forces led an assault against the French fortress at Dien Bien
Phu. The siege caused a major strain in Anglo-American relations,
prompting Australia and New Zealand to seriously reconsider how
closely, if at all, their respective External Affairs departments were
prepared to align their policies with Washington. Moreover, even
though the security of both countries rested on combating the spread of
Communism Southeast Asia, there was no certainty that Australia and
New Zealand could reach common ground as to the most appropriate
response. On the contrary, two days after the first day of the siege,
Frank Corner warned External Affairs Secretary Alister McIntosh that
New Zealand should not involve itself in the conflict purely to protect
Australian strategic interests. He also doubted whether the future of
Southeast Asia was in fact a vital interest for New Zealand. Predicting
that Australia would push for joint intervention in Southeast Asia,
Corner wrote on 15 March that New Zealand “should resist being
dragged by the Australians […] into premature involvement in
Southeast Asia.” He concluded that he felt “very dubious about
bustling into commitments in Southeast Asia […] there is no good
future for us there.”3
In Washington, JCS Chairman Arthur Radford warned Eisenhower
that the United States must be prepared to intervene militarily in order
to prevent the loss of all Indochina. In Radford’s own words, the United
States “must be prepared […] to act promptly and in force possibly to a
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Figure 14. Viet Minh soldiers capture French troops and escort them to a prisoner-of-war
camp, 1954. Photo by unknown (1954), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Dien_Bien_Phu_1954_French_prisoners.jpg, public domain.

frantic and belated request by the French for US intervention.”4 Dulles,
however, disagreed with Radford’s proposal. He feared that the United
States might get embroiled in another protracted and costly war. He
also thought that even if the Administration wanted to act unilaterally,
Congress would be unlikely to authorise such action. Dulles’s sharp
prediction proved correct; leaders from Republican and Democratic
parties told him in early April that they would only sanction the use of
US force if the Administration could obtain commitments from other
allies, particularly Britain.
At the time, political discussion about combatting Communism
and US defence was very heated. The Eisenhower Administration
was under constant attack from hardline senators such as Joseph
McCarthy who argued strongly that the United States was not doing
anywhere near enough to combat Communism at home and abroad.
Much to Eisenhower’s annoyance, these attacks separated the House
of Representatives and Senate on almost every issue and often froze
Congress so that it became an impractical and unmanageable sector
4
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of government. In short, Congressional backing for any short-term
policy in Indochina was close to impossible. “It is close to disgusting”,
Eisenhower wrote angrily, “it saddens me that I must feel ashamed for
the United States Senate.” Already in his own fight with Congress, the
President wrote in frustration several days later on 18 March that the
Indochina Crisis was “just another of the problems dumped on [his]
lap.”5
In an effort to alleviate any domestic criticisms of US inaction,
Eisenhower declared publicly that his government was committed
to preventing the spread of Communism. He warned that the loss of
French Indochina would have a domino effect that would leave the rest
of Southeast Asia vulnerable to Communist control. In order to respond
to this threat as well as curb domestic concerns of unilateral action,
Dulles then proposed that the United States should act jointly with its
allies in preventing the loss of Indochina to Communist forces. Advising
the NSC that “there was no need” for immediate unilateral action,
Dulles suggested making US intervention provisional on whether US
allies would be willing to support such action. After Eisenhower agreed
to this approach, Dulles followed up the “domino theory” speech with
his own public call for a multilateral response to Indochina. Privately,
plans were also made between Eisenhower and Dulles to use ANZUS
meetings to consult with Australia and New Zealand. Knowing
Canberra’s earnest desire for closer consultation with the United States,
Eisenhower commented that this plan would make the Australians
“terribly excited.”6
In order to convince Canberra and Wellington that their participation
in Indochina was important, Dulles made a decided effort to urge the
respective Australians and New Zealand Ambassadors in Washington,
Percy Spender and Leslie Munro, that the loss of Indochina would
directly threaten the security of both of their countries. “If Indochina
goes”, Dulles told Spender and Munro, “Australia and New Zealand
will be directly threatened.” Dulles had already built a strong reputation
as an astute diplomat with the Tasman countries following ANZUS
5
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negotiations several years earlier, which he surely hoped would work in
his favour when speaking directly about the importance of multilateral
participation with Australian and New Zealand representatives in
Washington.
Still concerned that London would not be willing to participate in
multilateral intervention, Dulles also requested that US Ambassador to
Australia Amos Peaslee make similar efforts to persuade policymakers
in Canberra to support the American plan rather than aligning with
British policy. “I hope you will take appropriate occasion to spell out
our views in discussions with top officials”, Dulles told the US Embassy
in Canberra, as he was concerned that the Australians would take a
“similar line to [the] British.” It is indeed telling that Dulles made a
point to stress directly that Peaslee should clearly outline US views on
this topic, since it would already fall well within the scope of expected
ambassadorial duties to share such views with top Australian officials.
It suggests how important he thought it was to secure their support.
Dulles, to be sure, remained hopeful that Australia and New Zealand
could convince policymakers in London to participate. Whilst predicting
there would be “great difficulties” in securing British support, Dulles
thought that Australia and New Zealand would be “willing to urge the
British in the right direction.”7
Dulles, who shrewdly assessed that the Britons were highly unlikely
to agree to his plan, highlighted the increasingly untenable position the
Americans found themselves in regarding Indochina. Indeed, while the
British were certainly keen for the French to retain control of Indochina,
they were not prepared to use force due to fears that this could escalate
into a larger war in the region. Even US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Arthur Radford, who visited London in April to convince the
British to support military action, could not sway Churchill or Eden
to back the American proposal. Instead of a military approach British
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden reasoned that a better course of action
was to pursue a negotiated settlement, particularly because there was a
conference in Geneva scheduled in a few weeks that would involve deep
discussions about the situation in Indochina. If there was any possibility
to steer British views toward a military solution before Geneva, Dulles
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saw Australia and New Zealand, two countries that still held strong ties
to the British Commonwealth, as key negotiators that might be able to
stress the value of a united military response in London.
On its surface, it was somewhat naïve of Dulles to think the two
small Tasman countries may succeed where the United States could
not in assuaging British concerns regarding Indochina. His initial
discussions with Australian and New Zealand diplomats did, however,
illustrate the increasingly important role that Canberra and Wellington
could play in mitigating tensions in the Anglo-American relationship.
It is also important to note that Dulles fully recognised the potentially
disastrous consequences of a unilateral military response and that the
American public had no appetite for another protracted war like the one
fought on the Korean peninsula. Conceding that British acquiescence
to the proposals of the United States would be extremely difficult
to obtain, it is fair to assess that Dulles had few other options at his
disposal to gather support for multilateral intervention. The stakes
were extremely high, especially since US military planners had been
seriously contemplating the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina while
simultaneously questioning the usefulness of their alliance with Great
Britain.8
In this light Dulles formally proposed “United Action” to Spender
and Munro in early April, a term that referred to the US plan for a
multilateral response in Indochina. Echoing Eisenhower’s earlier words,
Dulles said that if Australia and New Zealand were not prepared to be
“excited” by the coalition then the United States would not take action.9
Again, Dulles stressed that British participation in this plan was crucial.
He told both Spender and Dulles that a new military force was needed
in Indochina and it “had to include Britain.” That being the case, Dulles
asked both men to meet with diplomats in the British Embassy in
Washington and urge them that the United States, Britain, Australia and
New Zealand must all unite for the defence of Indochina to repel the
Communist advance in Southeast Asia.
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As far as the Australian position was concerned, Spender told Dulles
that he could not commit his government while it faced a general
election for the House of Representatives which was set for 29 May.
On the surface, Australian reservations about a multilateral response
appeared less about British inaction and more about domestic policy.
Another domestic concern was the recent development of the Petrov
Affair in early April, an event that saw Third Secretary of the Soviet
Embassy in Canberra Vladmir Petrov offer details of Soviet espionage
in Australia in exchange for political asylum. The Petrov Affair sparked
considerable public outcry in Australia that the Menzies Government
must do more to combat Communist threats domestically instead
of focusing solely on overseas developments in Indochina. As one
American report concluded, Petrov’s defection was the “biggest story
of its kind that has ever happened in Australia.” As a result, Indochina
had been “all but shoved of [the] front pages of newspapers by [the]
Petrov Affair.”10
Once Spender described his conversation with Dulles to Casey,
however, he urged that Australia should accept this proposal as a means
to increase US interest in defending Southeast Asia. As he told Casey,
One of the primary aims of our policy over recent years has been, as I
understand it, to achieve the acceptance by the USA of responsibility for
[South East] Asia. It is for consideration whether, if we fail to respond at
all to the opportunity now presented, what US reactions are likely to be
if and when areas closer to Australia are in jeopardy.11

Casey agreed it was crucial for Australia to support the US position in
Indochina. As he penned in his diary one day after receiving Spender’s
message, the United States “won’t go in alone” in Indochina and if
“Australia and others don’t respond they may change their SouthEast Asia attitude.”12 As the defence of Southeast Asia was crucial to
Australian security, any decline in US interest in the region was a very
10
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serious concern. Casey tried to urge the seriousness of the Indochina
situation to the Australian public in the event that Australia might have
to follow the United States into a war there. Gathering public support
was crucial, as a large segment of the Australian public were still
confused about what United Action entailed and what Australia’s role
would be in such a plan. “If Indochina were to fall to the Communists
the whole of Southeast Asia would be threatened”, Casey proclaimed
in the House of Representatives on 7 April.13 This statement mirrored
Eisenhower’s sentiments about the loss of Indochina having a potential
domino-like effect on the rest of Southeast Asia.
Yet despite how seriously Casey feared the deteriorating situation
in Indochina and any decline in US interest in Southeast Asia, he was
unsure whether the United Action proposal was the best course. After
speaking with British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden on 15 April,
it was clear to Casey that Britain would not participate in the plan
regardless of Australian efforts to encourage a military response. In any
case, Casey thought personally that were substantial risks involved if
Australia participated in joint military intervention without Britain.
Describing the American plan for mass intervention as “wrong”, Casey
stressed that United Action would not stop the fall of Dien Bien Phu and
risked putting Australia “in the wrong with world opinion particularly
in Asia.” He also thought such action could potentially risk war with
China.14
For these reasons, Casey thought that United Action should not be
pursued and probably did not push the importance of this plan to the
Britons as strongly as the Americans had hoped. This action—or lack
thereof—did little to foster closer Anglo-American relations, but Casey’s
mindfulness about the direct political and strategic consequences for
Australia was commendable. His recognition of the implications should
Asian countries develop a poor opinion of Australia also dovetailed
with his broader efforts for a strategic refocus toward Southeast Asia.
Casey aptly recognised that Australia’s future would depend on
peace and stability in this part of the world and took a keen interest
in cultivating closer relationships with Southeast Asian countries.
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He travelled regularly throughout the region and even published a
somewhat insipid yet purposeful book appropriately titled Friends
and Neighbours, in which he made a case for wanting Australia to live
peacefully with Asian countries amidst increasing nationalistic and
Communist-driven insurgencies.15 These efforts did little to convince
other Australian cabinet members of the importance of fostering
friendlier relationships with Asian countries, but at the very least
helped encourage more positive perceptions of Australia at a time when
Australian views about Asian people were often noticeably racist. Casey
even had to condemn Australian newspapers for using the term “White
Australia”—an immigration policy implemented in the early twentieth
century that aimed to exclude people from non-Anglo backgrounds—
due to concerns that it would be “most offensive to all Asian peoples”
even though a more relaxed form of the original immigration policy was
still in effect during the 1950s.16
Nevertheless, Casey’s arguments regarding Indochina were
successful and the Australian government agreed that it could not
commit to the United Action proposal in the current political climate.
While the Cabinet concluded that Australia should encourage the
French to continue fighting and support US military involvement in the
region, it could not commit to Dulles’s plan for multilateral intervention
because of the political pressures leading up to a general election in
May. The Cabinet also concluded that because Australia had defence
arrangements with Britain in the region it would be unfavourable to
join in a US military response if Britain did not participate. Overall,
the Cabinet decided Australia could not commit to the plan but still
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must somehow show the United States that it was “not lukewarm in
supporting proposals designed to ensure that Communism in Southeast
Asia is checked.”17 With regards to Indochina and US interest in
Southeast Asia, Australia simply wanted to have its cake and eat it too.
Meanwhile, policymakers in New Zealand wanted to know the
British response before they made any decision. Writing to the New
Zealand High Commission in London, McIntosh told Corner that his
personal preference was that New Zealand should “tell the Americans
we will join them on the understanding that the British […] come in
also.”18 In Washington, New Zealand Ambassador Leslie Munro
suggested that Dulles’s plea for United Action signalled a new course
of American policy in Indochina, indicating that the United States could
not accept under any circumstances that Indochina fall completely to the
Communists. As a result, Munro concluded that New Zealand “had little
alternative but to join the coalition” because New Zealand valued its close
relations with the United States especially due to Indochina’s proximity
to Australia and New Zealand. Munro, however, thought along similar
lines to McIntosh and attached one very important condition to New
Zealand participation: the United Kingdom “must also participate.”19
McIntosh also thought that New Zealand should encourage the French
to commit to the US plan for multilateral intervention. He reasoned that
this response would prevent New Zealand from falling out with the
Americans (who desperately wanted the French to continue fighting in
Indochina) while simultaneously meaning that New Zealand would not
commit without British support.
On 7 April, Australia and New Zealand exchanged some of their
defence policy conclusions with respect to Indochina. The Australian
position, which was developed by the Joint Intelligence Committee and
primarily focused on broader strategic and military considerations,
determined that every effort must be made to strengthen the will of the
French. It also determined that “Australia should also encourage Indochina
governments to reach agreements with the French in establishing their
independence and continue the Communist resistance.” In order to
17
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achieve this objective, the document even concluded that “Australia
should participate in United Action because doing otherwise might
compromise the present helpful trend of American policy towards the
security of the Pacific.”20 This was in glaring contrast to Casey’s views
on the untenability of United Action, highlighting that the Departments
of Defence and External Affairs held noticeably different views on the
strategic benefits of a military response. In short, military planners
instead proposed a two-fold objective in the Indochina Crisis: encourage
the French to continue fighting, and assure the Americans that Australia
was committed to the defence of Southeast Asia even though upcoming
elections delayed an immediate public response. British participation
was desirable for the Australians, but not essential.
In contrast, the equivalent New Zealand policy document on
Indochina revolved around British participation, UN involvement and
avoiding a confrontation with China. It determined that New Zealand
would only participate in United Action “under the condition that
Britain [was] also a participant” and such a coalition fell under the “aegis
of the United Nations.” Moreover, due to concerns that intervention
might escalate into a wider war, the document claimed that a Western
multilateral response must make “every effort to avoid confrontation
with China.”21 Much like British views, New Zealand prioritised a
diplomatic solution over a military response.
Australia and New Zealand greatly differed in their assessments
about the possibility of Chinese intervention. The Australians were
aware of New Zealand’s policy position that “armed intervention in
Indochina may lead to involvement with China and possibly even with
the Soviet Union itself”, as an Australian Joint Intelligence Committee
report concluded, adding that Wellington was “more doubtful whether
it could be possible to avoid conflict with China.” Australia predicted
instead that it “was not likely that the Chinese would abandon their
profitable policy for one of open intervention which carries the risk of
retaliation.”22
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Irrespective of whether China would act in Indochina after possible
Western intervention, the British strongly opposed the United Action
proposal. As part of his initial pursuit of United Action, Dulles met
with British Ambassador Roger Makins on 2 April. During the meeting,
Anglo-American differences over supporting French action in Indochina
were sharply exposed. While Dulles warned against the “dangers of a
French collapse” and that the “French accepting a settlement would be
disastrous for the free world”, Makins responded that his government
regarded “the deteriorating situation in Indochina in more pessimistic
terms” and was inclined to accept a settlement in Indochina.23
Shortly thereafter, Eisenhower wrote to British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill and declared that his Administration had no
intention of searching for a peaceful solution. Churchill, however, was
reluctant to commit to any action. Churchill told Eisenhower directly
that he feared multilateral intervention would lead to a wider war and
threaten British interests in Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore. In short,
Churchill said that the US plan for multilateral action simply “raised too
many problems” for Britain. Privately, Churchill confessed that he had
no interest in putting British troops “in the jungle” and thought that
Malaya could still be held even if Indochina fell.24
As the weeks passed and the US mustered little support for United
Action, the situation in Indochina worsened. Eisenhower again wrote
to Churchill, hoping that the British might reconsider their position
on Indochina as the Geneva Conference approached. “I am deeply
concerned by the seemingly wide differences in the conclusions
developed in our respective governments”, Eisenhower wrote to
Churchill on 26 April, “especially as these conclusions relate to such
events as the war in Indochina.”25 Even though France was quickly
losing control over Indochina, Eisenhower had problems convincing
the French to consider multilateral support for their position. “For more
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than three years I have been urging upon successive French governments
the advisability of finding some way of ‘internationalising’ the war”,
Eisenhower confessed, but:
The reply has always been vague, containing references to national
prestige, Constitutional limitations, inevitable effects upon the Moroccan
and Tunisian peoples, and dissertations on plain political difficulties
and battles within the French Parliament. The result has been that the
French have failed entirely to produce any enthusiasm on the part of the
Vietnamese for participation in the war.26

Eisenhower concluded that the situation in Indochina had gotten
to a point where “the French have used weasel words in promising
independence and through this one reason as much as anything else,
have suffered reverses that have really been inexcusable.”

Figure 15. French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault (left), British Foreign Secretary Anthony
Eden (centre), US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (right). Photo by unknown (n. d.),
Wikimedia,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Georges_Bidault,_Anthony_Eden_
and_John_Foster_Dulles.jpg, CC BY 3.0.

As American frustrations with British and French policies toward
Indochina increased, the possibility of unilateral action resurfaced
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in Washington. During an NSC meeting on 29 April, Vice President
Richard Nixon and Director of the Mutual Security Agency Harold
Stassen argued that the United States “should not let the British have a
veto over our freedom of action.” Eisenhower disagreed, believing that
the United States was not able to be the non-Communist world’s sole
policeman and would be looked upon unfavourably by the rest of the
world if it took unilateral action. “To go in unilaterally in Indochina”,
Eisenhower said, “amounted to an attempt to police the entire world.”
He added that if the United States attempted such a course of action,
“we should everywhere be accused of imperialistic ambitions.”27
Meanwhile, the Geneva Conference began on 26 April 1954. Two
weeks into the Conference, after the US refused to act unilaterally and
did not gather support for United Action, Dien Bien Phu fell to the
Communists on 7 May 1954. Although American delegates continued
to press the British for joint military action and urged the French to
continue fighting, by June the Eisenhower Administration abandoned
its plans for multilateral intervention and instead looked towards
finding a diplomatic solution in Indochina. As with the post-war
division of Korea, delegates at Geneva agreed that Indochina would be
divided into two regions, with the Vietminh occupying the North and
the French occupying the South. The decision awarded the Soviet bloc
a major diplomatic victory in the face of French defeat. Likewise, the
decision was a significant blow to Western prestige. After having failed
to defend Dien Bien Phu, the Eisenhower Administration then turned
its attention to the possibility of a collective defence arrangement in
Southeast Asia.

Formation of SEATO
Having to resort to reaching a diplomatic solution in Indochina was
disappointing for US policymakers. After sending the French $2.6 billion
in military assistance between 1950 and 1954, Washington’s failure
to prevent a Vietminh victory in Indochina damaged Eisenhower’s
credibility in fulfilling his promise to limit Communist expansion.
Nevertheless, the end of the fighting and the formalisation of a North
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Vietnamese Communist state enabled the Eisenhower Administration to
pursue a broader collective security pact for Southeast Asia, especially
because the Five-Power Staff Agency talks had produced few tangible
results since its inception a year earlier. Rather than dwell on the loss
of Indochina, the United States needed to seize the opportunity to
deter the expansion of Communism in Asia through a regional defence
arrangement.
Discussions for such an arrangement in Southeast Asia began in the
National Security Council. From a military point of view, questions
were raised about the desirability of a pact when few states in the region
were capable of defending themselves. At an NSC meeting on 23 July,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Arthur Radford said that “we
[the United States] are now talking about an area where there are no
developed military forces.” He added that the US could build military
power in the region, but “only at considerable cost.” Overall, he argued
that the United States “should take a good look at the idea of a defence
alliance for this area to be sure we are not making a mistake […] from a
military point of view a Southeast Asia defence pact seems undesirable
and unwise.”28
The State Department, however, saw clear advantages in concluding
a defence pact. Such a pact would signal an evident US willingness to
prevent the spread of Communism and ensure that countries at risk of
Communist subversion would be provided with American assistance.
At a follow-up meeting about American policy toward Southeast Asia
on 24 July, Dulles argued that a defence pact would have two significant
advantages: it would give Eisenhower discretionary authority (which he
did not already have) to use in the event of overt Chinese aggression in
the area, and it would ensure that Washington had the support of other
nations in any action it might be forced to take. Moreover, as a means to
offset Radford’s concerns about an undesirable military commitment,
Dulles suggested that the treaty would not be drafted in such a way
“so as to lead other signatories to expect large amounts of US military
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assistance.”29 In order for such a pact to be effective, it would require
support from other countries willing to enter into the agreement.
Most importantly for the prospects of concluding a regional defence
treaty, Britain quickly signalled its willingness to enter into a defence
pact despite sharp differences with the Americans over Indochina in
Geneva. Fearing that British bases in Malaya and Hong Kong were at
risk, Churchill wrote to Eisenhower on 21 June stating that Britain and
the United States should “establish a firm front against Communism
in the Pacific sphere.” More specifically, Churchill suggested that there
should be a Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) similar in
structure and purpose to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for
Europe.30 Concerned that the Communist diplomatic victory in Geneva
might spur further aggression in the region, there was a clear sense of
urgency about Churchill’s efforts to secure the treaty. New Zealand
Ambassador in Washington Leslie Munro reported to Wellington that
at a luncheon meeting in Washington a week later, Churchill said that
plans for the defence of Southeast Asia would be “pressed forward now,
immediately.”31
Meanwhile, an ANZUS meeting took place in Washington on 30
June. Dulles told Casey and Munro that as agreements for Indochina
took place in Geneva, the United States was “very deeply concerned”
about developments in the area. Moreover, he stressed that the United
States could not “fight their own way into the area, alone, and under
conditions by no means clear.” Dulles then suggested that it would be
especially useful for the United States to be briefed on Australian and
New Zealand views on Indochina, because France was “fading away”
and Britain was “badly overextended.”
In response, Casey suggested that reaching a SEATO-type
arrangement would be useful for Australia. However, he thought
that a temporary “ad-hoc SEATO” would be practical until a formal
multilateral agreement could be agreed upon by Washington and
London. He proposed a public non-aggression pact with as many
Asian countries as possible. “Such a document would have no teeth
29

Minutes of a Meeting on Southeast Asia, 24 July 1954, NARA RG 59, Lot 60, D 627,
CF 348.

30

Churchill to Eisenhower, 21 June 1954, FRUS 1954 Vol. XIII Part II, 1728.

31

Munro to Holland, 30 June 1954, Archives NZ, EA, 434/8/1 Part 4.

6. Crisis in Southeast Asia



133

and involve no obligations for its parties”, Casey conceded, but once a
more binding agreement could be reached, he thought that “the teeth of
an alliance would be in SEATO.”32 Casey, in short, was in favour of an
immediate defence structure for Southeast Asia that included countries
in that region and hoped both Britain and the United States would be
involved. “We could not be belligerent while the United Kingdom was
not”, Casey wrote in his diary after the meeting. He added, almost
excitedly, that since Australia was “poised rather delicately” between
the United States and Britain in international affairs, Canberra was “in a
position to exercise some influence on each.”33
Speaking on New Zealand’s behalf, Munro mirrored Casey’s
sentiments and suggested Wellington was in favour of an immediate
defence arrangement in Southeast Asia. He noted New Zealand’s
concerns about Communist aggression in the area and argued that his
country would “firmly resist” any further advances. However, he made
two unique points. Firstly, he thought that any immediate aggression
before SEATO could be established should be referred to the United
Nations rather than dealt with through Casey’s proposed temporary
non-aggression pact. Secondly, he reiterated that New Zealand would
only participate in SEATO if Britain was also a member. “It was a
principle of our policy and negotiation that [Britain] should be a party
to the SEATO arrangement.” Munro told Dulles on 30 June 1954.34
Dulles, however, made it clear that the United States would only
commit to an arrangement that specifically aimed to stop Communist
aggression. “The United States would be prepared to take positive
action if there were any substantial extension of Communist power”,
Dulles said to Casey and Munro, but he stressed “there would be
nothing in the nature of a blanket commitment.”35 He repeated these
views later on 28 July to US Ambassador to the United Kingdom
Roger Aldrich, requesting he make it clear to London that the United
States “did not envisage the Southeast Asia pact developing into a
NATO-type organisation with [a] large permanent machinery [and]
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substantial US financial support.”36 The US military supported this
limited commitment. The SEATO machinery “should be similar to
the ANZUS arrangements”, US Acting Secretary of Defense Robert
Anderson told the State Department, insofar as it should function more
as a “consultative arrangement” rather than representing definitive
American military commitments in Southeast Asia. Anderson went on
to suggest that these views reflected “the thinking of this Department
at this time.”37
While Australia and New Zealand reasoned that their influence on
US policy was perhaps greater than it had ever been, neither government
could convince Washington to sign anything other than a very limited
defence treaty. The United States, in short, would only commit to respond
to Communist aggression. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation was
subsequently signed into effect on the 8 September 1954 at the Manila
Conference between the ANZUS powers as well as Britain, France, the
Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. The three Associated States, South
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, were also awarded observer status and
included under the area protected. Its scope was very similar to ANZUS,
stating that all signatories would respond to meet a common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes.
Overall, SEATO’s conclusion was ultimately born out of Western
failure in Indochina and concerns about further Communist aggression
in the area. It had a number of weaknesses: its scope was limited, and
there was no clear machinery for intelligence cooperation or military
consultation between the signatories. Ultimately, even though the
siege at Dien Bien Phu and the conclusion of SEATO offered Australia
and New Zealand an opportunity to play more important roles in US
strategy, there were few positives that could be drawn from the ANZUS
response to the crisis.
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7. A Horrible Dilemma in the
Taiwan Straits

While Australian, New Zealand and American delegates met in Manila
to finalise SEATO in September 1954, another crisis broke out in the
Taiwan Straits after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began shelling
the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Even though
by sheer geographical size and position alone it would be unthinkable
that a global war might erupt over such small islands, there was a very
real possibility that any miscalculation by the United States could spark
a war with China, and by extension, the Soviet Union. America had long
established its determination to prevent Taiwan and the Pescadores falling
into Communist hands, but to achieve this, Eisenhower’s Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) thought it was important that these lesser offshore islands also
remain in Nationalist hands. Others, such as Australia, New Zealand,
Britain and most of the American public, were not convinced. US Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles, for one, described them as “a bunch of rocks.”1
Less than nine months before the PRC shelled Quemoy, Secretary of
Defence Charles Wilson approved a JCS recommendation to loan US naval
vessels to the Nationalists to assist in the defence of the offshore islands.
These loans included two destroyers, ten patrol crafts, two landing repair
ships, and less than one hundred small landing crafts. Approving these
loans meant that, at the very least, Eisenhower and his military staff hoped
that the Nationalists could hold these islands if hostilities broke out in the
immediate future.2 Yet once the crisis began, Eisenhower was certain that
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the offshore islands could not possibly be defended by the United
States. After Dulles presented the NSC with the “horrible dilemma” that
confronted the United States on 12 September, Eisenhower stressed that
“Quemoy is not our ship.” According to the former General, defending
Quemoy by force would lead to war with China. Public opinion seemed
to support this position. Eisenhower went on to tell the NSC that he
had constantly been receiving letters from the American public saying
“please do not send our boys to war” and “do we really care what
happens to those yellow people out there?”3
Political opinion aside, most US military planners argued that
the offshore islands were important to the defence of Taiwan. A JCS
report, submitted to the President on the afternoon of 3 September,
recommended that current American policy towards the Taiwan Strait
area be changed to assist in the defence of Quemoy as well as nine
other offshore islands. The JCS Chairman Arthur Radford, a strongminded former admiral with a wealth of experience in Pacific naval
planning, argued particularly strongly for the defence of the islands. He
recommended to the State Department that the United States commit
to defending Quemoy and Matsu even with the use of tactical nuclear
weapons. Not all of the Chiefs of Staff agreed with Radford’s radical
approach, but along with the Chief of the Air Force Nathan Twinning
and Chief of Naval Operations Robert Carney, the JCS majority
opinion concluded that defending the offshore islands was important
and any withdrawal would have a considerable psychological effect
on Nationalist morale.4 In opposition, Army Chief of Staff Matthew
Ridgeway and Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson thought that any
psychological effect did not outweigh the alarming consequences that
could ensue if the United States committed to defending these islands.
Ridgeway argued that defending Quemoy was “not substantially related
to the defence of Taiwan”, whereas Wilson simply saw no worthwhile
reason for the US to defend those “doggoned little islands.”5
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Figure 16. Map of the Taiwan Strait. Created by Andrew Kelly, adapted from map by
NordNordWest (2008), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Taiwan_
location_map.svg, CC BY 3.0.

In Canberra, opinion was unanimous that defending the offshore islands
was out of the question. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, Casey
drew a line between the defence of Taiwan and the offshore islands. On
25 August he told Spender that there was a “distinction” between the
two and “hoped that the US could see that.”6 Thomas Critchley, Head
of Australia’s East Asia Section in the Department of External Affairs,
echoed Casey’s concerns over American policy. According to Critchley,
“[the offshore islands] problem was critical […] because of the dangers
of US involvement.” He was particularly concerned that ANZUS
obliged Australia to respond if the United States was attacked in the
Taiwan Strait. In this event, any Australian failure to respond would be
catastrophic for its relationship with the United States, even if Canberra
was “left free” of any strict military obligation to defend the offshore
islands.7
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Casey and Critchley’s position did not change once the attacks
began. In fact, Australian policy closely matched British policy toward
the islands. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden told Dulles on
17 September that Quemoy and the other offshore islands had “no
conceivable strategic importance”, and he hoped to keep “as much water
as possible” between the PRC and ROC.8 To achieve this, Eden argued
that Chiang Kai-shek should evacuate Nationalist troops stationed on
the offshore islands. Although the Australians did not express their
disagreement as openly to the United States in mid-September, there
was a strong feeling in Canberra that Australian interests were best
served by following the British example. “We agree with the United
Kingdom”, Attorney General John Spicer told Casey on 16 September,
“with the proximity of the offshore islands to the Chinese mainland […]
fighting [for the islands] would be difficult to justify.”9
Although the United States and Britain did not agree on the
defensibility or otherwise of the offshore islands, they did agree that
war must be avoided at all costs. With this thought in mind, Eden and
Dulles met in London during September to plan for a potential UN
resolution that would call for a ceasefire in the strait. Eden felt that it
would be best if the United States did not itself initiate action in the
United Nations, fearing that the PRC might respond aggressively.
Instead, Eden suggested that New Zealand might propose the resolution
because at the time it was a temporary member of the Security Council.
Moreover, as New Zealand was a much smaller power than the United
States or Britain, a call for a ceasefire from Wellington was far less likely
to provoke a strong international backlash from China or the Soviet
Union. Dulles agreed with Eden’s recommendation, believing that
a UN resolution had substantial political benefits.10 He had told the
NSC before he left for London that if a joint US-UK resolution could
be reached in the Taiwan Straits, it may lead to a “coming together”
of Anglo-American policy in the Far East. In Dulles’s view, it had an
additional benefit. If the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution, it would
8
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demonstrate the aggressive and dangerous threat that Communism
posed and spur allied support. If Moscow supported the resolution, it
would mean the PRC was acting “against the will of the majority in the
UN.”11
Dulles and Eden proposed a UN resolution codenamed “Oracle” to
New Zealand’s Acting High Commissioner in London Richard Campbell
on 29 September. Interestingly, they both stressed the “extreme secrecy”
of the proposal. In other words, even with an ANZUS Council meeting
scheduled in less than a month, the Australians were not to be told.12
Upon hearing about the proposal, New Zealand policymakers were
excited by the opportunity to assist in an international crisis. They were
also hopeful that a resolution might encourage US-UK rapprochement
vis-à-vis China. New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland believed
that his government should accept responsibility and move ahead with
the UN resolution as it presented New Zealand with an “opportunity of
playing a constructive role” in joint US-UK policy regarding Far Eastern
matters.13 New Zealand External Affairs Minister Thomas Macdonald
agreed, but emphasised that New Zealand should not commit beyond
the introduction of the resolution to the United Nations unless the
United States and Britain were certain they could cooperate. As
Macdonald explained, New Zealand might be placed in an immensely
difficult position if the United States and British differences on China
were exposed publicly once the resolution was presented to the Security
Council. “We may find ourselves able to play a useful part”, Macdonald
told Munro on 1 October, “but my inclination is not to commit ourselves
to any particular course in the UN beyond initiation of the debate.”14
Nevertheless, these concerns were put aside and the next day New
Zealand notified the United States and Britain that it was prepared to
assist in the project and propose Oracle to the United Nations. All states
agreed to submit it under Article VI of the UN Charter, declaring that
the crisis threatened international peace and security. As for when the
resolution should be submitted, Under Secretary of State W. Bedell
11
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Smith told New Zealand Ambassador in Washington Leslie Munro
that the submission must wait until after the US mid-term elections
in November. Macdonald also asked Munro to find out whether the
United States would object to briefing the Australians on the resolution.
Macdonald suggested that it would be “highly embarrassing” if Casey
found out at the upcoming ANZUS Council meeting in October that
discussions had been taking place between America and New Zealand
without Australia even knowing about them. Macdonald, in short,
thought that it might be best to include Australia in these plans before
proceeding to the Security Council.15 When asked about informing the
Australians, Dulles told Munro that he preferred that Australia not yet
be told but would not object if New Zealand thought it essential. On
further reflection, Munro seemed to agree with Dulles that Australia
should not be told until the last possible moment. “There is always the
risk of Australian intervention at an inappropriate stage and pursued
by Spender in his own peculiar style”, Munro told Macdonald, “I do not
like the risks that involves.”16
Despite reservations from Munro and Dulles, Casey was told
about the Oracle project in mid-October as part of preparations for the
ANZUS Council meeting in Washington. Upon being briefed by New
Zealand, Casey had immediate objections. He did not understand
why his American and New Zealand counterparts could not see that
potentially serious issues could occur if a UN resolution was pursued.
For one, Casey thought the prospects of a successful UN submission
would be “so remote as to throw in doubt [the] value of [the] exercise.”
Even in the unlikely event that a resolution was passed, it was clear
neither how the full cooperation of the Nationalists in neutralising the
islands could be obtained nor how this would be implemented. So far
as Casey was concerned, there was also a disconcerting possibility that
a Soviet veto could “stimulate pressure” in the United States to defend
the offshore islands.17 In short, although Casey wanted a ceasefire in
the Taiwan Straits as soon as possible, he did not agree that the New
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Zealand-American-British UN resolution was the most appropriate
action to achieve that objective.

A Mutual Defence Treaty
By late 1954, the United States was also moving ahead with the
conclusion of a binding commitment to defend Taiwan and the nearby
Pescadores. Due to the close cooperation between the US and New
Zealand in the service of the Oracle project, the Americans told the
New Zealanders about this plan before the Australians and left it to
New Zealand to “keep Australia adequately informed if and when a
decision seemed likely.” Once the Australians were briefed about this
plan, Spender immediately called a meeting with Dulles on 31 October
to express his dissatisfaction with the proposed treaty and the lack of
consultation with Australia. During the meeting Spender “expressed
some annoyance that the Australians had not been brought into these
talks” for the mutual defence pact with Taiwan. He also suggested that
a pact would be “unwise” because it would “compel a clarification of
the situation with reference to the offshore islands and that a somewhat
indeterminate status was preferable.”18 In other words, Spender thought
that the United States should avoid a clear-cut commitment and instead
keep the PRC guessing as to American intentions in the Taiwan Straits.
Nonetheless, a mutual security treaty between the United States and
the Nationalist Government was eventually signed on 2 December 1954.
This treaty guaranteed that the United States would defend Taiwan,
potentially even with the use of nuclear weapons. It also required
Chiang to consult with the United States before launching any attack
on the Chinese mainland. This provision ensured that the Nationalists
could not drag the United States into an unwanted war over mainland
China. As Dulles had hoped, the wording over the commitment to
defend the offshore islands was left unclear. Eisenhower stressed later
that the decision to defend Taiwan’s “closely related territories” would
be made by the President.19
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Once the treaty was put into force, Dulles hoped to clear up
this fuzziness with American allies. He spoke with New Zealand
Ambassador Leslie Munro and British Ambassador Roger Makins
about US willingness to commit privately to defending Quemoy and
Matsu even with the use of nuclear weapons. To be sure, neither Munro
nor Makins were pleased with this new American policy. Determined
to sway allied opinion, Eisenhower went one step further and wrote to
Churchill directly to stress the strategic usefulness of using these types
of catastrophic weapons. Believing that the British were not properly
seeing how effective a nuclear response could be, Eisenhower argued
that even the tactical deployment of a dozen atomic bombs on critical
defence infrastructure could effectively paralyse the PRC and award the
Western powers a decisive upper hand in the Northeast Asian region.20
It was quite a startling suggestion from the former US Chief of the Army,
particularly because the use of nuclear weapons could provoke a Soviet
retaliation and escalate a regional crisis into a much larger international
war.
Despite his vast military experience, Eisenhower failed to convince
the Britons of the feasibility of a nuclear approach. Churchill, Eden and
the British Foreign Office were not just concerned by the escalation of
war in the Taiwan Straits; a nuclear attack might have provoked the
Soviets to launch their own nuclear warheads in Europe, much closer to
Britain and its critical strategic interests. Upon hearing about the policy,
Eden asserted that Oracle should not be pursued until the United States
gave up its proposal to defend Quemoy. He simply refused to entertain
the idea of using nuclear weapons, going so far as to insist that the search
for diplomatic solutions through the UN could not continue until the
US abandoned these reckless ideas. Eden was also particularly critical
of any of his own policymakers who even hinted that Britain would
support US policy in the Taiwan Straits. After British Ambassador to the
United Nations Anthony Nutting made several comments about Britain
supporting the United States over Quemoy and Matsu, Eden wrote
scornfully to Nutting that:
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Criticism of your interview is principally directed against implications
that United Kingdom will necessarily be involved in hostilities if China
attacks Formosa. It is by no means certain that an attack on Formosa
‘would no doubt call for collective action of the United Nations’ […] they
seem cumulatively to create the impression that it was your intention to
declare that the United Kingdom would answer the war on the side of
the United States if the Chinese launched an attack. “Times” Washington
correspondent in his full account of your interview today states that you
have in fact created the impression in America, and imply that we have
undertaken something new […] I rely on you to say as little as possible
on this thorny subject and to limit your pubic interviews to the utmost.21

In Australia, once Eisenhower announced publicly his intention to
defend Taiwan—and, if he thought it necessary for Taiwan’s defence,
its “closely related territories”—Casey grew similarly concerned that a
war over the offshore islands may eventuate. For the mindful External
Affairs Minister, it was just as dangerous as a possible UN resolution.
“We are considerably concerned”, Casey told Spender, “it seems equally
foolish and dangerous to contemplate [war] in the defence of islands
whose security value is, to say the least, doubtful.” In summation,
he “[did] not regard these islands as worth the risk of war.”22 Casey,
a long-time advocate of a more realistic approach to China, explored
the alternative possibility of recognising the PRC in an effort to reduce
tensions. He wrote to Menzies on 10 December suggesting that on
balance, the “majority of the Australian press seemed to be in favour for
recognition” of the PRC. He also stressed that even though free world
nations should not condone Communist aggression, current relations
with Beijing were not on a satisfactory basis.23
Casey continued to make a connection between recognizing the
PRC and reducing the tensions in the Taiwan Strait. When drafting an
announcement about the current situation in East Asia, Casey reasoned
that “the conduct of international affairs is made more difficult so long
as the PRC is not recognised and so it would be logical to change this
situation.”24 Although Casey concluded that the offshore island crisis

21

Eden to Nutting, 14 December 1954, as cited in Watry, Diplomacy at the Brink, 78.

22

Casey to Spender, 21 January 1955, NAA. A5954, 1415/3.

23

Letter from Casey to Menzies, 10 December 1954, DAFP: China, 87.

24

Letter from Brown to Menzies, 28 December 1954, DAFP: China, 91.

144

ANZUS and the Early Cold War

should be settled first before considering “recognition later”, he clearly
thought that recognising the PRC might in some way reduce tensions
or prevent future Chinese aggression. This part of his statement was
never publicised, as Menzies opposed any suggestion that Australia was
at the time considering changing its public opposition to recognition
of the PRC. Nevertheless, policymakers such as Casey appeared
willing to consider the possibility of recognition far more openly than
policymakers in the United States.
There was strong support in Australia for Casey’s suggestion. Casey
was encouraged by both the public and the federal opposition to pursue
recognition in exchange for a ceasefire in the straits. For example, an
article written by journalist John Bennetts published in the Sunday Times
in early 1955 suggested that Australia, the United States and Nationalist
China should abandon any interest in the offshore islands as a quid pro
quo for recognition of the PRC. For “assurances and demonstrations of
goodwill and peaceful intentions” in the Taiwan Straits, Bennetts wrote
that Communist China should be “offered eventual membership of
the United Nations and general recognition as the lawful Government
of mainland China in return.”25 Reports emerged later that Labor
backbencher Allan Fraser accused Casey of not “seeking to exploit
every opportunity for negotiation with Red China” while the offshore
island crisis remained unresolved. Casey should be “prompting the
recognition of the Chinese mainland Government”, Fraser told the
press, “as a means to pave the way for a long-term settlement.”26
On mainland China, Mao’s response to the recent US-ROC defence
treaty was particularly aggressive. On 10 January 1955, he ordered an
attack on the Tachen Islands. Eight days later, PRC forces also attacked
and captured nearby Ichiang Island. The Tachens themselves were
approximately 320 kilometres north of Taiwan, far outside the original
area the US considered strategically important for defending the island.
Nonetheless, Eisenhower and Radford thought these attacks indicated
the PRC’s “clear intent” to capture all offshore islands, with the ultimate
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purpose of taking Taiwan and the Pescadores.27 To combat this, the
US convinced a reluctant Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate the Tachens in
exchange for a private commitment to defend Quemoy and Matsu in
the event of a full scale attack. This drastic change in American policy
confirmed that Dulles’s original plans had “backfired.” As Wilson told
the NSC on 20 January, US “diplomatic efforts […] had failed.”28
Given this failure, military options were revisited. Earlier on 20
January, a meeting was held between the State Department, Joint
Chiefs of Staff and several Congressmen to brief Capitol Hill on new
developments in the Taiwan Straits. Dulles said that the situation in the
Taiwan area was developing “in an acute way which seems to call for
a sounder defensive concept. There is no doubt in [my] mind that the
ultimate purpose of the Communist Chinese is to try and take Taiwan
and the Pescadores”, Dulles stressed, “the problem had reached such
magnitude that it had to be dealt with in a comprehensive way.” On
the advice of Admiral Radford, Dulles said that there would be a
regrouping of Nationalists forces and with help from the United States
they would hold the remaining islands (Quemoy and Matsu). Hoping
to secure Congressional support for such action, Dulles argued that “it
would be criminal folly on our part to sit and watch these islands be
taken which could be held with minor help on our part.” Most of the
Congressmen agreed with this approach, but they wanted Eisenhower
to make it extremely clear that US military action was limited only to
reorganising Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu and defending
these islands in the possibility that they were attacked. As Senator
Earle Clements told Dulles, the President must make clear “what we
are willing to defend, where we will draw the line, and where we will
retreat no further.”29
In Canberra, the Tachen attacks presented an increasingly dangerous
and uncertain period for Australian policymakers. Yet instead of making
any immediate public statement, the Australian Department of External
Affairs kept their policies behind closed doors in the belief that the State
27
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Department was best placed to handle the crisis. The ever-tactful Casey
reasoned that his Government’s interests were best served by simply
staying quiet, because announcing that Australia saw a clear distinction
between Taiwan and the offshore islands could only complicate the
situation for the United States. “The attitude I have been taking”, Casey
penned in his diary on 28 January, “is not to talk unless it would do more
good than harm.” He also recommended against an ANZUS meeting on
the crisis, thinking that at that time Australia had “nothing positive to
suggest that had not already been considered by the US.”30
Escalating tensions, however, forced him to outline Australian
policy publicly. In an address given almost a month after the Tachens
were first shelled, Casey stated the Australian Government’s desire for
“disengagement” from the offshore islands as these were clearly part of
Chinese territory. This position sat uneasily with his US counterparts,
who had determined so recently to hold Quemoy and Matsu. It was also
no coincidence that Casey’s statement came after Eisenhower’s address
to Congress on 24 January that outlined only the President had the
power to decide whether the US would defend Taiwan’s “closely related
territories.” Though Casey recognized in his statement that the situation
was “in the hands of President Eisenhower more than anyone else”, his
timing affirmed Australian discontent over defending the islands.31
Although New Zealand shared Australian concerns over the Tachen
attacks and recent changes to American policy in the Taiwan Straits,
the New Zealand External Affairs Department still believed that
Oracle should be pursued rather than defending the offshore islands
or pursuing recognition as a quid pro quo for the cessation of PRC
aggression. “The Government has no intention of entering into any
sort of commitment involving New Zealand in developments around
Taiwan”, New Zealand External Affairs Minister Thomas Macdonald
announced on 27 January. Instead, Macdonald suggested that New
Zealand was “anxious that the threat to peace which appears to be
developing in that area should be dealt with by the normal machinery
of the United Nations.”32
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In Washington, Munro agreed wholeheartedly with Macdonald’s
announcement. He certainly did not agree with the US decision to secure
a formal defence treaty for Taiwan and its efforts to create uncertainty
over the potential American reaction to attacks on the offshore islands,
describing both responses as the “two worst courses of action.” “I must
say I am seriously disturbed by the American course of conduct”, he
told Macdonald on 21 January 1955.33 Munro still believed Oracle could
serve a useful purpose, but it could only proceed if the US and UK could
agree to support the resolution. This seemed increasingly unlikely once
Britain signalled its complete opposition to America’s commitment to
defend Taiwan and possibly the offshore islands. After Dulles informed
British Ambassador in Washington Roger Makins on 19 January that the
United States would assist in the defence of Quemoy, Makins responded
a day later with British views on the subject. Its message was clear: “the
British government is disturbed by developments”, Makins told Dulles
on 20 January, and “the Cabinet did not like the idea of a ‘provisional
guarantee’ of Quemoy.34
Upon receiving word that Britain was unlikely to support a UN
resolution while the United States committed privately to the defence
of Quemoy and Matsu, Dulles backed down and agreed to reconsider
presenting Oracle to the UN instead of committing to defend Quemoy
and Matsu. American, British and New Zealand delegates met on
23 January to decide how the resolution might be proposed. It was
decided that Britain should inform Beijing and Moscow of Oracle, then
New Zealand would invite the PRC to attend UN discussions after the
presentation of the resolution. On 31 January the United Nations invited
China to attend the debate on the offshore islands, but Chinese Premier
Zhou Enlai rejected the invitation. He stated that Oracle opened the
door to the possibility of “two China’s” and was an illegal intervention
into Chinese internal affairs.35
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Commonwealth Discussions for a Ceasefire
Once the PRC declared that it was unwilling to discuss the offshore
island problem in the United Nations, Commonwealth countries grew
further concerned that the United States would defend the islands if an
invasion took place. These issues were discussed at length during the
Prime Ministers’ Conference in London from 31 January to 8 February
1955. Aside from discussions over the insurgence of Communist forces
in Malaya, delegates discussed reaching an agreement on the QuemoyMatsu Crisis. Menzies was especially determined to influence British
opinion when relaying at the conference that his Cabinet agreed
unanimously that the Nationalists should disengage from the offshore
islands. Eden agreed firmly with this policy, in line with what he
had said to Dulles previously about the offshore islands holding “no
conceivable strategic importance.” Feeling that this summarised neatly
the “consensus of opinion” from the conference, Eden asked Menzies to
write to Dulles and outline the position of the Commonwealth nations.
The letter stressed that delegates at the Prime Ministers’ Conference
were convinced that “further resolutions and debate in the Security
Council at present would do harm” and that “Australia and Britain were
very much opposed to the risk of war over the offshore islands.”36
Menzies’s letter provided the State Department with a clear warning
that Britain and Australia were moving away from supporting a UN
solution to the crisis. Even New Zealand Prime Minister Holland,
who had been a strong supporter of Oracle and was concerned by
American action in the Taiwan Straits, pledged his support to Australian
and British efforts to at least delay Oracle.37 In response, Eisenhower
wrote to Churchill and noted that while he appreciated British efforts
to avoid a rift in Anglo-American relations, in his view the British did
not understand fully the Communist’s “constant pressing on the Asian
frontier.”38 Churchill, however, remained steadfast on his government’s
position on China and later informed Washington that Whitehall
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no longer supported Oracle. As a result, the United States could not
realistically hope to find a long-term solution or even a temporary
ceasefire through the UN.
During the Prime Ministers’ Conference, Spender cabled Menzies
on 6 February to offer a more detailed assessment of the situation
as it stood in the Taiwan Strait. Even though he was unaware of the
importance the American JCS attached to holding the offshore islands,
he told Menzies the problem was because of a continued Nationalist
military presence on the islands rather than American insistence that
protecting the islands was essential. Believing that Chiang would be
a difficult man to convince, he proposed that in return for Nationalist
withdrawal from the islands, Australia and other Commonwealth
countries should declare their intention to defend Taiwan if attacked.
Although Menzies did not take up Spender’s suggestion immediately—
like many Australians, Menzies was reluctant to commit to Chiang’s
defence and only considered doing so in the hope that it might prevent
a wider war with the PRC—it did form the basis for a proposal that
Menzies submitted to the United States after the crisis came to an end.39
In any event, Spender had more pressing matters on his agenda.
Following the Prime Ministers’ Conference, Dulles held an important
meeting with Spender on 11 February to discuss the Australian and
Commonwealth position on Taiwan and the offshore islands. Spender
opened the meeting by first relaying the consensus of opinion reached
in London. In outlining the Australian position, he stressed that:
It is causing us deep concern […] we cannot see that [the offshore islands]
are either vital, or even important, to Taiwan-Pescadores defence. It is,
therefore, hard for us to see why they are made a policy issue. Our view
is that the correct aim is disengagement from the islands […] these views
are not dissimilar to those already expressed by Canada, the United
Kingdom and New Zealand.40

Dulles appreciated Spender’s open yet firm expression of Australian and
Commonwealth policy. He told Spender that “none of his colleagues
39
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had so clearly or so categorically” been as helpful on the offshore island
issue. Australia was “more engaged in the area than others”, Dulles
added, “Australia is not a country on the sidelines.”
Dulles was not surprised by the Australian position. It was, as he
pointed out, not too dissimilar from the views reached in the NSC
meeting in mid-September 1954. Nevertheless, he told Spender that the
US now considered that withdrawing from the offshore islands would
have a substantial psychological effect on Taiwan and nearby areas.
Dulles also shared with Spender that the JCS thought the islands held
strategic importance because (1) they blocked two natural harbours
and (2) their proximity to the Chinese mainland made them a useful
staging area for potential counterattacks. In short, Dulles stressed that
the United States had been “reluctantly compelled” to move from its
original position (which generally coincided with current Australian
policy) to its present position.
Neither Spender nor Dulles wanted war in the strait. They both
agreed on the strategic necessity of keeping Taiwan and the Pescadores
out of Communist hands, but disagreed on the way that it should be
done. For Dulles, it was important to highlight that although the US had
determined Quemoy and Matsu be defended, there was considerable
flexibility in any decision to do so. In his view, the decision “was entirely
ours.” Spender—and, for that matter, almost all other Commonwealth
nations—seemed unconvinced by this reasoning. Though Spender well
understood Dulles’s arguments for the defence of the offshore islands
and sympathised with his awkward position, Menzies’s recent letter
to Washington best captured the majority of Australian opinion over
American involvement in the strait. American Ambassador to the United
Kingdom Winthrop Aldrich also informed Washington that Australia
and Britain were deeply concerned that they might be dragged into an
unwanted and unnecessary war. He told the State Department that a
recent Walter Lippman article called “Towards a Ceasefire”—based on
the agreements reached at the Prime Ministers’ Conference—argued
that “sound American policy would be to do what is being done in the
Tachens to Quemoy and Matsu.” In other words, Australia and Britain
believed the ROC and US should evacuate all offshore islands. This,
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according to Aldrich, summarised the Commonwealth position to an
“extraordinarily exact degree.”41
Consistent with the summary Aldrich gave to the State Department,
Eden rejected flatly Dulles’s view that evacuating the offshore islands
would seriously affect Nationalist morale. Even if it did, he told Dulles
on 26 February that “further deterioration in morale is preferable to
breaking up the [Anglo-American] alliance.” This presumably meant
that if push came to shove, London would not support Washington on
the offshore island issue.42 Fearing further rifts between Washington
and its allies, Dulles took the opportunity to remind Casey and New
Zealand External Affairs Minister Macdonald that “if fighting broke out
in the future over Taiwan […] Australia and New Zealand would be
concerned as partners of ANZUS.”43 It was a disconcerting situation for
Australia to be in. If Canberra supported Washington, it risked isolating
itself from Britain and the Commonwealth. It also risked placing itself on
the frontlines of a nuclear war over islands that Australians policymakers
had consistently determined to be strategically insignificant. However, if
Canberra supported London, it would both marginalise its relationship
with Washington and call into question the usefulness of ANZUS.
Prompted by these Australian-American-British divisions, Menzies
visited Washington to discuss possibilities for bringing the crisis to
an end. In a meeting with Dulles on 14 March, his first agenda item
was to gather US financial and military support for the defence of
Malaya, one of Australia’s most important strategic interests. As part
of Australia’s forward defence policy in Southeast Asia, Australian and
British defence talks had been moving recently towards creating a Far
East Strategic Reserve (which came into effect later in April) that would
entail a joint military force stationed in the region to protect Malaya
and other Commonwealth interests. Unfortunately for Menzies, he
convinced neither Dulles nor the American JCS to commit to Malaya’s
defence or a broader defence scheme outside of SEATO.
Next, talks moved to the escalating situation in the Taiwan Straits.
He first asked Dulles to explain the difference between his position and
41
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that of Casey and Eden’s. According to Dulles, there were two elements
informing these differences: a misunderstanding of the US approach and
questions of judgment as to the best way to achieve the same objective.
Dulles stressed that the British House of Commons did not understand
that psychological and political factors were just as important as
military considerations and that these factors were shaping the US
position. He also suggested that there could be no categorical assertion
whether the US would or would not defend the islands.44 Menzies
sympathised with Dulles’s difficult position. However, American
ambiguity ultimately sat uneasily with Australian policy. Menzies, who
believed that the “unconditional surrender of offshore islands would
intensify Communist truculence”, asked Dulles about the possibility of
a ROC withdrawal from the islands in exchange for a group of nations
guaranteeing the defence of Taiwan (Australia, Britain, New Zealand,
and any other Commonwealth nation willing to commit to this scheme).
Dulles quite liked this idea. He thought the suggestion had “merit” and
would “give further thought” to the proposition. He even told Menzies
that he had proposed a similar idea to Eden previously, but had received
no response.45 The unfortunate reality was that Chiang was unlikely to
agree. The Generalissimo had already secured a guarantee from the
United States, and any offshore island evacuation would work against
his plans to recover the Chinese mainland.
Even if a Commonwealth guarantee could not be reached, Menzies
wanted to make sure that Dulles understood how the Australian
public viewed the situation. While the Australian public might support
holding Taiwan if a broader war broke out, he told Dulles that there
would be no support whatsoever for a war fought over the offshore
islands. In Menzies’s view, there was only support for larger efforts
to prevent aggressive Communist behaviour. “The Australian public
would support a war in the defence of freedom”, Menzies stated,
“but not of Governments per se (such as Chiang’s regime) or offshore
islands.”46 Dulles could at least be certain of Australia’s commitment
44
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if war eventuated, but did not find the agreement on offshore island
policy he was looking for.
While Spender and Menzies met with Dulles in an attempt to find a
resolution to the crisis, New Zealand policymakers continued to debate
whether pursuing Oracle might still serve a useful purpose despite
Zhou’s rejection in late January. In March, Ambassador Munro wrote
to Macdonald and explained his thoughts on the project. In his mind,
New Zealand could either introduce the Oracle resolution on its own
or jettison the idea entirely. Munro appeared to favour the first option,
fearing that if New Zealand postponed Oracle and then the United States
went ahead with the resolution it would make New Zealand’s “position
in the operation […] very invidious.”47 Concerned by this prospect,
Munro suggested to Dulles that while New Zealand was not prepared
to abandon the Oracle project, it made sense to delay a decision to see
whether tensions could be relieved on their own accord.
In response, Dulles suggested to Munro on 23 March that New
Zealand’s role in the Oracle project was still important and that its
presentation to the United Nations should not be delayed. He argued
that while tensions had calmed in recent weeks there was no telling
when the PRC might mount another attack. Moreover, in April the
Soviet Union would assume the Security Council presidency, making it
even more difficult to proceed with Oracle. However, this pressure from
Dulles to introduce the resolution concerned Munro. He believed that it
forced New Zealand to “choose between the British and American points
of view in an area where action by the United States, our chief bulwark
in the Pacific, might not be supported by the United Kingdom.”48
Fortunately for the Oracle sponsors, tensions eased on 23 April 1955
when PRC Premier Zhou Enlai announced that China did not want
war with the United States and was willing to enter into negotiations.
Zhou’s announcement meant that Oracle would not have to be
introduced in the United Nations in order to resolve the crisis. Though
sceptical of Chinese intentions, the Americans agreed and entered into
ambassadorial talks in Geneva from August 1955. Realising the weight
of domestic and international opinion against any American action in
47
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the defence of the offshore islands, President Eisenhower was surely
relieved that he never had to decide between whether to intervene
militarily or concede defeat to a Communist government. At least for
now, the United States had avoided the “inevitable moment of decision
between two unacceptable choices” in the Taiwan Straits.49
Alongside American trepidations, Menzies could not be certain
whether Zhou’s offer to negotiate was genuine or not. Either way, he
thought that future hostilities with the PRC were still likely. Menzies
thought future tensions in the Taiwan Strait could be settled if the PRC
was part of an international discussion to achieve its recognition, just as
Casey had believed that this approach might reduce the bellicosity of
the PRC. Menzies took this idea one step further, proposing to the State
Department that the PRC attend a Four-Power Conference to address
current Sino-American differences. Menzies’s proposal outlined that
there was a clear “danger of fighting over the offshore islands [because
it] could develop into a major war.” Recognition of the PRC should be
reconsidered due to “the difficulty of doing anything about the offshore
islands while an atmosphere existed of Communist threats to attack
the offshore islands and Taiwan.”50 Washington, however, was not
convinced that Menzies’s proposal addressed its own interests. Dulles
first told Spender on 3 May that the idea was “unfavourable” and the
American public would be very much opposed.51 US Ambassador to
Australia Amos Peaslee was even more vocal about his dislike for the
plan, stating that he was “astonished” and “disturbed.” According to
Peaslee, the Australian Government was “180° off course” with this
idea.52
After Menzies’s failed proposal, the Australian Joint Planning
Committee (JPC) formally reconsidered Taiwan’s strategic importance
for future defence planning. Offshore island policy was not in question: as
late as May, the Australian Government continued to draw a distinction
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between Taiwan and the offshore islands, claiming that the latter were
“not regarded as important.”53 Yet as far as Taiwan was concerned, the
JPC report concluded it was now more strategically important because
of its proximity to China and the control it afforded over the Taiwan
Straits. More importantly for Australian strategy, the report reasoned
that the PRC could only “concentrate their military effort at one point
at a time.” In other words, as long as the PRC’s attention was drawn to
Taiwan, it acted as a “constant deterrent to further Chinese Communist
adventure in Southeast Asia.”54 These JPC findings laid out several
reasons why Taiwan was, in fact, an important regional base that had
to be kept out of Communist hands, but its strategic importance was
considered only in light of Australian interests in Southeast Asia rather
than with the intention of coordinating defence policy with the United
States.
Moreover, the Department of External Affairs agreed neither with
American policy nor that continuing to defend Taiwan was in Australia’s
best interests. Casey, for one, told Plimsoll on 13 April that “we’re not as
convinced as the Americans are of Chiang and his forces.” He suggested
further that American policy was based on a “lie” and that they were
“prisoners of their past attitudes.” “For Chiang and his Taiwan forces”,
Casey stated bluntly, “common-sense prompts one to believe that they
must be a factor of declining importance in the scheme of things […] as
time goes on, Taiwan will decline.”55 Convinced that the External Affairs
Department should reconsider its China policy, Casey commissioned
a major study for the Cabinet in June 1955 titled “The Situation in East
Asia: Taiwan and Recognition of China.” Although the report concluded
that Australia was not yet in a position to recognise the PRC due to the
US position, it stated that the prospects of finding long term peace in
the Far East through potential recognition were now greater than they
had ever been. This was due at least in part to Beijing’s recent softer
diplomacy, which suggested a “genuine [Chinese] desire for a policy
of live and let live.” In other words, Casey thought that despite the
PRC’s initiation of the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, Mao’s Government was
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beginning to act more responsibly and Western powers should award
recognition accordingly in the short-term future. “So far as recognition
and representation in the United Nations is concerned”, Casey’s report
concluded, the issue was “perhaps now one of timing rather than of
principle.”56
In the immediate aftermath of the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,
Australian, New Zealand and American policymakers were certainly
relieved that the crisis did not escalate into a wider war. Nevertheless,
there were heightened concerns in these countries that their respective
relationships with Beijing were not working and that opposing
recognition might in fact be encouraging further aggression in East
Asia. This was especially true in Canberra and Wellington, where
recognition was discussed before, during and after the Quemoy-Matsu
Crisis despite much stronger opposition to recognising the PRC in the
United States. Even then, trans-Tasman views vis-à-vis China were by
no means identical. Policy differences between the ANZUS powers,
however, soon manifested elsewhere. In the Middle East, the trilateral
relationship was seriously strained amidst major British strategic
miscalculations in the region.
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8. Suez

Shortly after an uneasy peace settlement was reached in the Taiwan Straits,
longstanding tensions in the Middle East erupted into open conflict during
the 1956 Suez Crisis. Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser—who had
already overthrown the Farouk government in 1952, declared Egypt a
republic and publicly advocated a Pan-Arab movement against the West—
nationalised the Suez Canal after Britain and the United States removed its
support for the construction of the Aswan Dam. The canal had previously
been under British control since the late nineteenth century and was an
important shipping route to countries in Southern Africa and the South
Pacific.
Before the crisis reached a climax in late 1956, the Britons and Americans
discussed different options for subduing Nasser. Eisenhower hoped to
encourage local and international political resistance against him through
a secret operation called Operation Omega, which aimed to use both
diplomacy and covert action to thwart his ambitions in the Arab world.
Anthony Eden—who had succeeded Churchill as British Prime Minister in
1955—instead wanted to take a much more direct approach. In conjunction
with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Eden worked on plans to
assassinate Nasser either covertly or through a large-scale invasion. In his
eyes, Nasser was comparable to Hitler and needed to be eliminated as soon
as possible. In letters to Eisenhower and in discussions with the SIS, he made
frequent comparisons between Nasser, Hitler and Mussolini.1 “I feel myself
that we can no longer safely wait on Nasser”, Eden wrote to Eisenhower in
1
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early March, “a policy of appeasement will bring us nothing in Egypt.”2
Eden was particularly convinced of the ineffectiveness of appeasement,
as he had previously resigned as foreign secretary during the Neville
Chamberlain government in 1938 due in part to growing dissatisfaction
over British efforts to appease Nazi Germany in the lead up to World
War II.
Resorting to force, however, had much deeper implications in the
context of the larger battle between East and West during the Cold War.
Eisenhower told Eden that he feared Nasser might work closely with
the Soviets if Western powers pushed too aggressively in Egypt. “I share
your current concerns over the current developments in the Middle
East”, Eisenhower wrote on 9 March, “we face a broad challenge to our
position in the Near East […] [as] the Soviets have made it abundantly
clear even in their public statements their intentions toward the Near
East.” He added that “some moves by Nasser have assisted the Soviets”,
and under these circumstances, “it may well be that [the United States
and Britain] shall be driven to conclude that it is impossible to do
business with Nasser. Yet for all of his concerns, Eisenhower was not
willing to completely dismiss finding a peaceful solution with Nasser.
“I do not think that we should close the door yet on the possibility of
working with him”, he argued in a letter to Eden.3 Eisenhower, in short,
wanted to explore all options to maintain the US position in the Middle
East in order to stop Soviet expansionism in the region and protect
American access to regional oil reserves.

Prelude to Crisis
By mid-1956, the prospect of finding a peaceful solution with Nasser
evaporated quickly. On 19 July, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
announced that the United States was formally withdrawing aid for
the Aswan Dam Project. In a meeting with Egyptian Ambassador in
Washington Ahmed Hussein, Dulles suggested that there was “little
goodwill toward Egypt on the part of the American public”, so much
so that Dulles doubted whether the Administration could obtain the
funds from Congress. “For the time being”, Dulles told Hussein, “the
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Dam project should be put on the shelf while we try to develop a better
atmosphere and better relations.”4
One week later, Nasser announced Egyptian plans to nationalise
the Suez Canal. Nasser declared that this was the “answer to American
and British conspiracies against Egypt” and a response to “imperialistic
efforts to thwart Egyptian independence.”5 Nasser’s decision greatly
concerned Eden, who immediately began plans to intervene militarily
in Egypt. He believed that Nasser’s action was not only a threat to
Britain’s economic interests but it was also a provocative attack on
British power and authority. Eden immediately established an Egypt
Committee (an inner circle of British Cabinet members that planned for
a Suez operation) and warned Eisenhower that Britain was prepared to
use force in Egypt. “My colleagues and I are convinced that we must be
ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses”, Eden
told Eisenhower on 27 July.6

Figure 17. Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser cheered in Cairo after nationalising
the Suez Canal. Photo by unknown (1956), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Nasser_cheered_by_supporters_in_1956.jpg, public domain.
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The surprising extent to which Eden was determined to retain control in
Suez reveals much about his character and influence in British politics.
After building an international name for himself as British foreign
secretary during World War II, Eden worked largely in Churchill’s
shadow during the post-war years, first as deputy opposition leader
between 1945 and 1951, and then as his deputy prime minister during
Churchill’s final term in office between 1951 to 1955. He did, however,
exercise considerable influence over the conduct of British foreign
policy—so much so that one biographer claimed he bullied Churchill
into retreating on commitments regarding Europe and the Middle East
that the Conservatives had made while in opposition.7
As prime minister, Suez became Eden’s pivotal issue. He became
fixated on Nasser and was determined not to let events in Egypt
undermine British prestige. To be sure, while Eden did have some
support for his actions in Suez, it was a far cry from what he told
Eisenhower about his colleagues being convinced that force would be
necessary as a last resort. In fact, his Egypt Committee excluded many
top British policymakers and aimed to keep plans for an invasion secret.
Indeed, most officials knew nothing about British plans and were
astonished when they heard that Eden was potentially planning for an
Anglo-French ultimatum and invasion. For one, Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh,
who had been responsible for Middle Eastern policy, was not alone in
the Foreign Office in thinking that Eden had “gone off his head.”8
For their part, the Americans were not willing to consider the use
of force. Instead, policymakers in Washington preferred a peaceful
diplomatic approach. US Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr.
urged Eisenhower not to consider military action as there were “grave
dangers” in such a response. “While [a] strong position should be taken
in order to preserve Western status in [the] Middle East”, Hoover told
Eisenhower on 28 July, the “confiscation of the Suez company was not
sufficient reason for military intervention.” Hoover added that “unless
we (the United States) can introduce an element of restraint, Eden will
tend to move much too rapidly and without adequate cause for armed
7
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intervention.”9 Eisenhower agreed with Hoover’s assessment. “I cannot
over-emphasise the strength of my conviction”, Eisenhower wrote to
Eden on 31 July, that all diplomatic routes must be explored “before
action such as you contemplate should be undertaken.”10 Hoover and
Eisenhower certainly held deep-seated concerns in Washington about
Eden’s temperament regarding the use of force in Suez, and needed to
garner additional diplomatic support from American allies to persuade
Eden not to use this course of action.
To this end, four days later Eisenhower met with Australian Prime
Minister Robert Menzies and Australian Ambassador Percy Spender
in Washington. Eisenhower hoped that the two Australians—both of
whom had considerable experience in dealing with Eden—might assist
US efforts in advising London against the use of force in the Middle
East. As Eisenhower told Menzies, he “hoped that the United Kingdom
and France would continue to exercise restraint.” He added that London
should be careful not to succumb to the “tyranny of the weak”, a term
he used to describe “the difficulty that arises when weak nations are
in a position to challenge great powers by taking advantage of certain
situations.”11
Attempts to talk to Menzies about the repercussions of Eden’s views
on Egypt fell on deaf ears. Even though Australia had withdrawn from
its defence commitments in the Middle East, Nasser’s nationalisation
of the canal prompted Menzies to pledge his support for British efforts
in the region. On 30 July, Menzies suggested to the External Affairs
Department that military action might be necessary in order to ensure
that Nasser did not “get away with such an act of brigandage.”12 One
day later, Menzies made similar comments in a meeting with British
Ambassador in Washington Roger Makins and US Under Secretary
of State Herbert Hoover. “I made it clear [to Makins and Hoover] that
in my opinion Nasser’s action was illegal”, Menzies recalled, “and
unless his prestige could be materially diminished, [the United States
9
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and Britain] would be exposed to trouble after trouble in the Middle
East.”13 Like Eden, Menzies saw developments in Egypt as an affront
to British prestige and steadfastly urged the Commonwealth to defend
its economic and strategic interests in the canal region. In this instance,
Menzies’s British “boot heels” were on clear display.
This view, however, was challenged by several policymakers in
Canberra. Australian External Affairs Minister Richard Casey, Defence
Minister Philip McBride and Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Fadden
all urged Menzies against military action, suggesting that they all saw
“substantial arguments against the use of force.” If force was used,
they claimed that trading vessels in the region would be in danger, the
participating powers would be brought before the UN Security Council,
and relations with Arab and Asian countries would be jeopardised.14
Adding to these concerns was the complete lack of consultation between
Australia and Britain especially in relation to the possibility of resorting
to force. “We have had nothing from the UK about their intentions in
respect of the use of force nor their appreciation of its military and
political effects”, Casey penned in his diary on 7 August.15
Although Casey, Fadden and McBride did not advocate the use
of force to retain international control of the Canal, the military
recommended that Canberra should support London if a decision was
made to intervene. The Australian Defence Committee produced a
report on 9 August that concluded that Western control of Suez was
of “major importance” because Australia relied heavily on regional
oil reserves and free access to the shipping route. The report also
concluded that total Egyptian control of the canal would affect “the
flow of reinforcements and supplies from the United Kingdom to the
Far East in an emergency.”16 In this regard, Australian defence interests
in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region became intertwined.
From a military standpoint, Australia fully supported British
intervention despite its limited potential to contribute to military action.
The “immediate military objective should be to seize and occupy the
13
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canal”, the Defence Committee report advised Menzies, even though
it conceded that only a token Australian force might be available for
deployment while most of its troops were stationed in Malaya. The
report outlined that “if the situation was to deteriorate in Southeast Asia
or the Far East, it may be necessary to bring back any Australian forces
deployed in the Suez Canal area.” In short, Australia was prepared to
support Anglo-French military action in Suez. However, an Australian
commitment to the region should “be small and limited to the navy and
air force.”17
New Zealand reached similar conclusions. Like Australia, Wellington
was unable to proffer any significant number of defence forces in the
event of an armed intervention (although a New Zealand warship aptly
called the Royalist was stationed in the Mediterranean). Diplomatically,
Wellington was fully behind any British action in the region to protect
Commonwealth interests. As New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney
Holland told British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd on 30 July, “you
may be assured that New Zealand will as always fully support any
steps which the United Kingdom feels obliged to take to ensure that
vital British rights are fully protected.”18 Holland’s conviction that New
Zealand should stand fully behind Britain was no secret. He made very
similar comments in the New Zealand Parliament eight days later.
“Where Britain stands, we stand; where she goes we go, in good times
and bad”, Holland announced on 7 August. In his estimation, that was
the “mood of the New Zealand people” on the topic.19 After Holland’s
speech, External Affairs Minister Thomas Macdonald made a similar
speech that was particularly scathing of Egyptian action in the canal:
The manner in which the Egyptian government has acted […] has given
Britain and other European countries no ground for comfort at all.
Egypt has waged over the air against the United Kingdom a constant
propaganda campaign which has at times been vicious and virulent. She
has endeavoured to create trouble by turning neighbouring countries
against the countries of Europe […] Egypt gives us no reassurance at
all concerning Egyptian intentions, and the unheralded and arbitrary
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method of this latest seizure gives no promise of future harmony and
can only be deplored.

For these reasons, Macdonald argued that New Zealand must stand
wholeheartedly behind British action against Egypt, even with the
potential use of force. “Britain has every justification for preparing to
meet any eventuality”, Macdonald declared. “As to mobilisation”, he
added, “I think it has been overlooked, and it should not be.”20 New
Zealand support for the use of force, however, was not unanimous.
Much as Casey, Fadden and McBride urged Menzies to renounce the
use of force as a means to respond to Nasser’s nationalisation, New
Zealand High Commissioner in London Thomas Clifton Webb hoped
Britain would not respond with military action. “Let us hope they have
not committed themselves to something which […] cannot be carried
out”, Webb wrote to Macdonald on 31 July, “either because of lack of
support from [the] USA […] or even from their own public here.”21
While Britain and France contemplated the use of force in Egypt,
an international conference was held in London during mid-August
in the hope that a diplomatic solution might be found to return the
canal to international control. Before the conference, Menzies made a
television address to the British public on 13 August to outline his views
toward the developing crisis. Menzies, in no uncertain terms, placed
the blame for the crisis squarely on Nasser. “Nasser’s actions in respect
of the Suez Canal Company have created a crisis more grave [sic] than
any since the Second World War”, Menzies concluded. Menzies did
not trust Nasser at all and was convinced that it would be “suicidal”
to leave the Commonwealth’s vital trading interests in Suez solely in
his hands. Moreover, he stressed that Nasser’s nationalisation of the
canal was illegal under international law and would encourage further
aggression if left unchecked. By nationalising the canal and rejecting the
1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Menzies argued that “Nasser violated the
first principle of international law” and this grievance “will encourage
other acts of lawlessness if not resisted.”22
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At the conference, Menzies maintained that his country was
unprepared to accept anything less than a return to international control
of the Suez Canal. “Australia has a great interest in freedom of transit”
in Suez, Menzies said in a speech in London. According to Menzies, the
“essential factor” was the establishment of an efficient administrative
body in the canal so that all nations could benefit from its free
operation.23 New Zealand External Affairs Minister Thomas Macdonald
made a similar statement in London. The organisation of the Suez Canal,
Macdonald argued, “must, in our view, be on an international basis […]
it should be able to assure free transit of the Canal, it should be efficient,
and it should not be subject to financial instability.”24 In other words,
both Australian and New Zealand representatives in London thought
that international management of the canal was essential.
Even though Menzies announced that his government completely
supported British action in Egypt, Australian External Affairs Minister
Casey continued to urge him to renounce the use of force as an
appropriate solution. “I recommended to Menzies that he should
speak against the use of force to Anthony Eden, [as] it would put us
completely in the wrong with public opinion in practically every part of
the world”, Casey penned in his diary on 17 August. He added that “I
recommended that he should seek to get an appreciation from the UK
of the military side, of which we were entirely in the dark. I failed to see
what could be achieved by action of this sort.”25
Casey’s New Zealand counterpart, Thomas Macdonald, was
suspicious that Australia and New Zealand were purposefully “left in
the dark” at the conference in order to prepare for Anglo-French military
action. Suspecting a secret invasion plot, Macdonald now thought that
military action would be disastrous for Britain and Western interests
in the region. Writing to the New Zealand Prime Minister on 23
August, Macdonald advised against supporting British military action.
He suggested that the entire conference was designed to prepare an
unacceptable proposal to offer to Nasser, which he would reject, in order
to make the use of force appear more reasonable. This, in Macdonald’s
23
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view, was “one of the main reasons for the conference.”26 Macdonald’s
suspicions proved to be correct. Eden had planned to take back the
canal regardless of the outcome of negotiations. As one British Foreign
Service Officer Anthony Nutting recalled later about the crisis, “Eden
hoped that the conference would produce a solution unacceptable to
Nasser.”27 In other words, the outcome of the Suez Conference was
destined to fail. Eden had already authorised that French troops were
to be stationed in Cyprus and asked British subjects to leave the Middle
East area on 29 August, days before any diplomatic approach was made
to Nasser.
Nonetheless a committee was appointed in London, comprised of
representatives from Australia, Ethiopia, Iran, Sweden and the United
States, in order to present a number of proposals to Nasser that were
agreed upon by eighteen of the twenty-two participating powers at
the conference. These proposals revolved around returning the canal
to international control. On strong insistence from Dulles and Eden,
Prime Minister Menzies agreed to lead this committee and present the
agreed proposals to Nasser. Menzies surely felt it as a compliment that
he might play an instrumental role in resolving a complex international
situation. Unaware of Eden’s actual plans, Menzies was especially
enthusiastic about leading the committee because he was concerned
that the outbreak of war in Egypt was “an even money chance.” There
was a “very distinct prospect”, Menzies feared, that Britain and France
would use military force should a diplomatic solution not be reached.28
Menzies and the Suez Committee met with Nasser in Cairo on 3
and 4 September to present the agreements reached in London. While
making clear that there was “no spirit of hostility” about the agreements
being proposed, Menzies emphasised to Nasser that the use of force
was a realistic possibility should he choose to reject the proposals. As he
warned Nasser, it would be “a mistake for you to exclude the possible
use of force from your reckoning.” Nasser, however, did not budge in the
face of this possibility. “President Nasser took our proposals apart, tore
them up, and metaphorically consigned them to the wastepaper basket”,
26
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Menzies recalled. Nasser then rejected the proposals formally on 9
September, claiming that they were a form of “collective colonialism.”29
Menzies returned to Australia disappointed and frustrated by
Nasser’s stubbornness. Fending off media criticism that he had failed
in his efforts to convince Nasser to agree to the committee’s proposals,
he stressed that Nasser was uncooperative and entirely to blame for
the crisis. “This repudiation by the President of Egypt was committed
without notice, without consent, and in fact, by force”, Menzies said at
a press conference in Sydney on 18 September, “those things are worth
remembering.” “It is quite true that I was appointed as chief spokesman
for presenting these matters to the President of Egypt”, Menzies added,
but “I don’t think anyone could challenge the fairness or indeed the
generosity of one item in the proposals.” He also rejected Nasser’s
claim that the Suez Committee’s proposals were a form of collective
colonialism. “I hope it will be remembered that under the proposals
put forward Egypt’s position as landlord was recognised completely”,
Menzies argued, stressing that “Egypt was to be the only nation deriving
any profit from the Canal at all.”30
Since it paved the way for military action, Eden was surely pleased
by Nasser’s rejection of the committee’s proposals. Eden, however,
placed the committee’s failure squarely on Eisenhower, who during
the conference told the media that he hoped for a peaceful solution
to the crisis while the British were threatening Nasser with the use of
force. This, in London’s view, completely undermined their negotiating
position with Egypt. “We must […] show that Nasser is not going to
get his way”, Eden urged in a letter to Eisenhower on 6 September.31
Meanwhile, Eisenhower continued to stress publicly that he would not
use force in order to find a resolution to the crisis. “This country will
not got go war ever while I am occupying my present post unless the
Congress declares such a war”, Eisenhower said at a press conference
on 11 September. Dulles made similar remarks in a press conference
the next day, suggesting that even if the United States had a right to
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intervene militarily “we (the United States) did not intend to shoot our
way through.”32
Many policymakers in New Zealand, who continued to be very
supportive of the British during negotiations over Suez, similarly placed
blame on Eisenhower and the Americans for doing little to support
British diplomatic efforts. As New Zealand External Affairs Secretary
Alister McIntosh told his former Deputy Foss Shanahan on 24 August,
How infuriating the British must find the Americans over Suez […]
when it comes to ostriches I am sure that bigger birds never stuck their
heads into a bigger expanse of sand than Dulles is now doing in the
undignified spectacle they present near the Pyramids.33

In reality, there were no major differences with respect to US and British
views about the threat Nasser posed. Anglo-American tensions were
rather a result of differences about how they should respond to this
threat. As Eisenhower described in a letter to Eden on 8 September, the
United States and Britain had a “grave problem confronting Nasser’s
reckless adventure with the Canal” and did not differ in their “estimates
of his intentions and purposes.” The main point of Anglo-American
disagreement, according to Eisenhower, was resorting to force and “the
probable effects in the Arab world of the various possible reactions by the
Western world.” The possibility of a Western military response clearly
concerned Eisenhower, which in his estimation would be a disaster and
hurt US prestige in the Arab world. According to Eisenhower resorting
to war “when the world believes there are other means available for
resolving the dispute would set in motion forces that could lead, in the
years to come, to the most distressing results.”34
Eisenhower and Dulles were especially fearful that after the failed
Menzies mission, Eden was even more likely to pursue military options
in Egypt. On 6 September, Dulles held a Congressional meeting with
Senators Hubert Humphrey, Mike Mansfield and William Langer to
brief them on the Suez situation and gather bipartisan approval for
renouncing the use of force in Egypt. Dulles warned that the British and
the French thought that it was necessary to “begin military operations to
32
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curb Nasser.” “The British feel that if Nasser gets away with it”, Dulles
said, “it will start a chain of events in the Near East that will reduce
the UK to another Netherlands or Portugal in a very few years.” Dulles
told the Senators that he and Eisenhower were doing everything in their
power to “strongly discourage” the use of force, as they felt it would
be “disastrous for the French and the UK militarily to intervene at this
point.”35 There were no criticisms or partisanship injected during the
meeting. All three Senators agreed with Dulles’s efforts to prevent the
use of force in Egypt.
Meanwhile, Eisenhower sent several letters directly to Eden in the
hope he might convince him to reconsider military action. Eden was,
however, unconvinced by Eisenhower’s reasoning. Instead, Eden argued
that anything other than the use of force would be appeasement, a policy
that could lead to catastrophic results. “There is no doubt in our minds
that Nasser, whether he likes it or not, is now effectively in Russian
hands, just as Mussolini was in Hitler’s”, Eden said to Eisenhower. He
argued that “it would be as ineffective to show weakness to Nasser now
in order to placate him as it was to show weakness to Mussolini […]
that is why we must do everything we can.”36 Seemingly out of touch
with British thinking on the matter, Dulles also turned to Australia to
express his concerns. “I am beginning to feel concerned”, Dulles wrote
to Menzies and Casey on 27 October, “I am not myself in close touch
with recent British-French thinking but in view of [the] leading role
Australia has played, I feel it appropriate to express my concern.”37

Israel Invades Egypt
Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s messages to London and Canberra could not
prevent the escalation of the crisis in the Suez Canal. Despite American
efforts, Eden remained inclined to use military action to topple Nasser
and re-internationalise the Suez Canal. Tensions in Suez reached a
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climax on 29 October when Israeli forces, in collusion with Britain and
France, invaded the Sinai Peninsula. None of the ANZUS powers, nor
other Commonwealth countries, were informed beforehand of this
secret Anglo-French plan. “For a long time the Middle East has been
simmering”, Eden said in a message to all Commonwealth Prime
Ministers a day later, “now it is boiling over.”38 In the message, Eden
detailed plans for an Anglo-French response, omitting entirely that
London and Paris secretly supported the Israeli invasion in the first
place. He explained that unless the Israelis and Egyptians withdrew
within twelve hours, Anglo-French forces would seize the canal and
overthrow Nasser. Nasser predictably rejected the ultimatum, which
ultimately led to an Anglo-French invasion of Egypt on 5 November.

Figure 18. British Naval Carriers during the 1956 Suez Crisis. Photo by British Royal Navy
official photographer (1956), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:British_
carriers_during_Suez_Crisis_1956.jpg, public domain.

In Washington, the Eisenhower Administration was shocked and
angered by Anglo-French action without American consultation. “I
think the British made a bad error”, Eisenhower told Senator William
Knowland on 31 October, “I think it is the biggest error of our time.” In
a meeting with Dulles, Eisenhower said he was “astonished” that Eden
avoided informing Washington of its decision. “They are our friends
and allies [Britain and France]”, Eisenhower said, “and suddenly they
put us in a hole and expect us to rescue them.”39 At an NSC meeting on
38
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1 November, Eisenhower and Dulles argued that the United States must
do all it could to push for a peaceful resolution by exerting the greatest
possible pressure on Britain and France. “Recent events are close to
marking a death knell for Britain and France”, Dulles described, and the
United States had to decide whether it would side with its oldest allies
or the Arab world. Eisenhower made his choice clear: in his eyes, the
action Eden had taken was “nothing short of disastrous.” “How could
we possibly support Britain and France if in so doing we lose the whole
Arab world”, Eisenhower asked rhetorically.40
In discussing the international reaction, Dulles specified that there
was so far very little support for British-French action in Egypt. He
stressed that the “verdict of the rest of the world [was] altogether
unanimous” in its opposition to the use of force in Egypt. There were,
however, two exceptions to this opposition to British-French action:
as Secretary Dulles told the NSC, approval for the attacks had only
come from Australia and New Zealand. However, as explained, there
were extenuating factors in their cases. In Australia there was “much
unhappiness” amongst the public about British action. Moreover, at the
political level, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Allen Dulles
(John Foster Dulles’s younger brother) suggested that there was “a wide
split of opinion between Menzies and Casey.” In New Zealand’s case,
John Foster Dulles simply suggested that “it was virtually a colony and
almost invariably followed the lead of the United Kingdom.”41
Meanwhile, angered by Eden’s betrayal, Eisenhower wrote to the
British Prime Minister to express his concern about the Anglo-French
ultimatum. “I feel I must urgently express to you my deep concern at
the prospect of this drastic action”, he wrote, “even at the very time
when the matter is under consideration in the United Nations Security
Council.”42 Privately, Eisenhower followed the decisions reached at the
NSC meeting on 1 November and put severe economic and military
pressure on the British, hoping this would sway London to agree to a UN
ceasefire and withdraw from the Canal area. The US Sixth Fleet harassed
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the Anglo-French invasion fleet in the Mediterranean and delayed its
arrival into Egypt, while in Washington, Eisenhower approved a series
of economic sanctions against Britain to compel the British to withdraw.
Eisenhower likewise put diplomatic pressure on Britain and France
through the introduction of a UN ceasefire resolution. After consultation
with Dulles and the NSC, Eisenhower argued that the United States must
present a ceasefire resolution to the United Nations as soon as possible.
In his estimation, the United States must lead this ceasefire resolution
before the Soviet Union presented its own resolution in order to prevent
Moscow from “seizing a mantle of world leadership through a false but
convincing exhibition of concern for smaller nations.” Overall, in an
effort not to embarrass the British and French by specifically naming
them, US action in the UN aimed to avoid “singling out or condemning
any one nation, but should serve to emphasise to the world our hope
for a quick ceasefire.”43 An emergency United Nations session was
then called on 1 November. Dulles introduced a ceasefire resolution
that passed by a margin of 64-5. Along with Britain, France and Israel,
Australia and New Zealand were the only other countries to oppose the
resolution.
As Dulles predicted, then, Australia and New Zealand both publicly
supported British action in the Suez Canal. While disturbed by conflict
in the Middle East, New Zealand Prime Minister Holland believed
that the British response protected Commonwealth interests and was
necessary to preserve Britain’s vital interests in the region. “We are
naturally gravely concerned”, Holland wrote to the New Zealand High
Commission in London, yet he added that “there is no need for me
to stress New Zealand’s ties of blood and empire and our traditional
attitude of standing by Britain in her difficulties. He added that “I can
assure you of our deepest sympathy for the United Kingdom in the
situation now confronting her. It is our desire, as always, to be of the
most utmost assistance.” Holland also shared these thoughts to the New
Zealand public. In a statement on 1 November, Holland announced
that “I have the full confidence in the United Kingdom’s intentions in
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moving forces into the Canal area” and declared New Zealand would
do all it could to assist Eden and the Britons in their hour of need.44
In Canberra, Menzies pledged similar public support for British
action. Writing to Dulles, he stated that his government supported
Anglo-French action. “Quite frankly I do not believe that it would be
in the interests of any of us to have [the] Canal closed for weeks and
possibly months”, Menzies said; “from this point of view my colleagues
and I see considerable merit in police action which is involved in
the Anglo-French ultimatum.”45 He made a similar statement to the
Australian public on 3 November, stressing his opinion that AngloFrench action was necessary. “The action taken by the United Kingdom
and France was the only quick and practical means of separating the
belligerents and protecting the Canal”, Menzies announced. He also
argued that it was “wrong and absurd” to consider Nasser, the “author
of the Canal confiscation and promoter of anti-British activities in the
Middle East”, as an “innocent victim of unprovoked aggression.”46 Put
another way, Menzies clearly thought that Nasser’s actions had caused
military action against Egypt and on some level Nasser deserved it.
Privately, however, policymakers in the Tasman countries expressed
grave concerns about British action. Canberra and Wellington were also
concerned that pledging public support for Britain compromised their
security relationship with the United States. New Zealand reports from
Washington confirmed these concerns shortly after the Israeli invasion
on 29 October. As the crisis escalated, New Zealand Ambassador in
Washington Leslie Munro met with US Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs William Rountree in Washington to discuss
the American reaction to the crisis. He reported to Wellington on 31
October that the situation was of the “utmost gravity, both from [the]
point of view of [an] Anglo-American breach and in terms of general
security in the Middle East.” Munro warned that the situation could
develop to a point where the Western position in the Middle East
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became “irretrievable.”47 In a subsequent cablegram to Prime Minister
Holland later that day, Munro stressed that Anglo-French action “put
New Zealand in a difficult position vis-à-vis its ANZUS partner, the
United States, and confronts us with a critical choice between British
and American policies in the Middle East.”48
Australia was caught in a similarly difficult position. In Canberra,
Menzies stressed that a rift in Anglo-American relations was deeply
concerning to Australia. “I have myself urged upon both British
and American leaders that consultations should speedily occur to
reconcile any differences of opinion”, Menzies said to the House of
Representatives on 1 November. He added that “it is a great misfortune
that there have been public differences between those great democracies
whose friendly cooperation is so vital to us all.” Nonetheless, despite
this rift in Anglo-American relations, Menzies remained supportive of
British action. Menzies echoed this belief in an address to Parliament
on 3 November, stating that Anglo-French action was “the only quick
and practical means of separating the belligerents and protecting the
Canal.”49 He then wrote to Eden, reassuring the British Prime Minister
that he had Australia’s full support:
You have indeed had a difficult decision to take but I am sure that you
are right. Under these circumstances, an abandonment of operations by
[Britain] and France would have left the Canal unprotected, would have
given fresh heart to Egypt and would have meant a lot of destructive
fighting around and over the Canal itself […] our support remains
undiminished and that we think that you were and are right. It is tragic
at a time like this you should have to encounter such intemperate and
stupid attack.50

It is indeed telling that, even without any consultation from London,
Australia chose to place its support behind British action. As far as
Canberra was concerned, Britain’s vital interests came before any
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possible diplomatic backlash in Washington. “I believe that AngloFrench action was correct”, Menzies later told Eisenhower, “in Australia
I believe that approval of the British action is widespread.”51
Even then, choosing sides between the United States and Britain
was quite difficult for Australian policymakers. Casey, fearing the effect
this crisis would have on Australian-American relations, did not stand
completely beside Menzies in his support for British action. For Casey,
it was greatly concerning that a rift in Anglo-American relations was
so publicly exposed. During discussions for a ceasefire in the United
Nations, Casey reported to Menzies that “I was greatly distressed by
[the] atmosphere at [the] United Nations.” He added that “the almost
physical cleavage between United Kingdom and United States was one
of the most distressing things I had [sic] ever experienced.”52
Casey was not alone. Many Australian and New Zealand diplomats
were privately concerned by an Anglo-American rift over Suez because
it put Canberra and Wellington in a very difficult position between its
two most important allies. To this end, Australian and New Zealand
diplomats agreed that they faced the same dire situation. Writing about
a meeting he had with New Zealand High Commissioner in London
Clifton Webb as well as other British Ministers on 2 November, Casey
recalled that:
There is a great deal of doubt, to put it mildly, in most people’s minds,
about the wisdom of the enterprise on which the UK has launched. The
fact is that I have met no-one (apart from senior Ministers) amongst the
many friends with whom I have been in contact, who are in favour of it,
and many of them are genuinely and greatly distressed. Their fears are
not on account of the outcome of the military operation, but for the effect
on the position and prestige of Britain and as to whether the operation
will not have a longstanding effect the reverse of what is intended.53

In Wellington, the New Zealand External Affairs Department expressed
deep concern about London’s decision to intervene. In a letter to Foss
Shanahan, External Affairs Secretary Alister McIntosh compared the
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Suez Crisis to the outbreak of the Second World War. “The last few days
have been all too reminiscent of 1939”, McIntosh told Shanahan; “we in
the Department have been horrified at the implications of British action,
but Cabinet as a whole and the Prime Minister have been thoroughly in
favour of backing the United Kingdom.”54
McIntosh was particularly alarmed by British action. Writing to
New Zealand’s Deputy High Commissioner in London Frank Corner,
McIntosh described Eden’s decision to intervene in the Suez area as
“criminal.” “In my view”, McIntosh concluded, “he [Eden] ought
to be impeached.” He was particularly concerned that the crisis had
developed so suddenly and without any consultation with Wellington.
In another letter to Corner, McIntosh wrote that “one of the features
about this Middle East Crisis that has shaken me most is not only the
lack of consultation between the United Kingdom and the Dominions
but also the slackening flow of information as the crisis has proceeded.”
Corner agreed with McIntosh’s grim assessment of the deteriorating
situation and criticised the lack of information that came from London,
suggesting that Eden must be quite mad. “It is said that the Arabs have
enormous respect for madmen”, Corner said memorably, “because
Allah is supposed to reveal himself through them. If only the doctors
would confirm the diagnosis of Whitehall and certify Eden.”55 Corner’s
comments were particularly intriguing because rumours about Eden’s
health and its impact on his decision-making had been circulating for
quite some time. Many historical studies have also raised this concern
in analyses of British policy during the Suez Crisis.56
In the end, enormous diplomatic, economic and military pressure
eventually forced Britain and France to agree to another UN ceasefire
and an emergency peacekeeping operation on 6 November, enabling
an Anglo-French withdraw from the canal. London and Paris
had nothing to show for all their efforts in Suez except failure and
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embarrassment. As the US Embassy in Cairo reported to Washington,
the British and French “gained nothing except loss of prestige and
increased hatred of Arabs.”57 Shouldering the brunt of the blame and
embarrassment for the crisis—as well as struggling with several health
issues—Eden resigned as Prime Minister on 9 January 1957. For all
the shock and surprise surrounding events in Suez, his resignation
was predicted. “Eden has had a physical breakdown and will have
to go on vacation immediately […] this will lead to his retirement”,
the US Embassy in London cabled Washington on 19 November. His
replacement, Harold Macmillan, quickly asked the United States to
provide a “fig leaf to cover our nakedness” in early January so that
British troops could finally withdraw from Egypt.58 As Anglo-French
forces withdrew, even those in Australia and New Zealand who
wholeheartedly supported British policy recognised that the crisis
signalled the end of Britain’s claim to major power status. As New
Zealand External Affairs Officer Frank Corner told Secretary Alister
McIntosh “the centre of effective power and decision has, I think,
passed away from London. Washington and New York are likely to be
the most interesting places from now on.”59
Since the invasion of the Sinai Peninsula failed due to American
diplomatic, economic and military pressure, the end of the 1956 Suez
Crisis publicly exposed a bitter rift in Anglo-American relations and
essentially confirmed the end of British world leadership. It also exposed
noticeable differences between Australia, New Zealand and the United
States over the control of the Suez Canal, defence policy in the region,
and Britain’s role in world affairs. While each of the ANZUS powers
had defence interests in the Middle East, both the Australian and New
Zealand prime ministers declared their support for British action during
the 1956 Suez Crisis despite strong private reservations in their respective
Cabinets and External Affairs Ministries. The United States, in contrast,
bitterly opposed British action and forced their withdrawal from Egypt.
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Defence interests in the Middle East and responses to the Suez Crisis
demonstrated clear policy differences between the ANZUS powers that
stemmed from trans-Tasman British ties and views surrounding US
leadership. It also demonstrated a critical point in alliance diplomacy
for both Canberra and Wellington. During the Suez Crisis, Australia and
New Zealand held similar views and were not prepared to defer to US
leadership when vital British interests were at stake. In short, five years
after the conclusion of ANZUS, Australia and New Zealand were still
prepared to pledge support for vital British interests instead of aligning
all strategic policies with their chief protector, the United States. For
Canberra and Wellington, Suez starkly exposed the limitations of British
power when London’s views were at odds with those in Washington.

Conclusion

The eleven years between the end of World War II and the end of the Suez
Crisis wrought many changes in how Australia, New Zealand and the
United States worked with one another in response to issues of mutual
concern. After their wartime alliance during World War II, these countries
shared common interests in defending themselves against Communist
expansion, preventing a revival of Japanese aggression and broadly
preserving the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region. In practice,
however, the ANZUS countries struggled to act in a united fashion during
the early years of the Cold War.
For Australia, the alliance provided formal protection and was viewed
as a necessary security measure to offset Britain’s inability to meet
Australian defence requirements. Policymakers in Canberra also hoped
ANZUS would be a gateway to access information on US global strategic
planning and influence world affairs. Across the Tasman, New Zealand also
accepted that their country must rely on US protection but policymakers in
Wellington wanted a less formal arrangement. A non-binding agreement
with the United States, in short, was less likely to jeopardise New Zealand’s
relationship with Britain; a critical issue for policymakers in Wellington.
For the United States, the conclusion of ANZUS was a trade-off to ensure
Australian and New Zealand acquiescence to the Japanese Peace Treaty. It
also served as further support for the American position in Northeast Asia.
After Eisenhower entered the White House, the alliance began to evolve
into a more complex and meaningful relationship, despite continued
strategic disagreement. The alliance became especially important once a
series of crises broke out in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions, such
as those in Indochina, the Taiwan Straits, and the Suez Canal. Each response
by Australia, New Zealand and the US provides interesting insights into the
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contrasting views of the ANZUS powers as well as their differing ideas
about Britain’s post-war role in world affairs. The United States saw no
major role for Britain without American cooperation, whereas Australia
and New Zealand tended to favour the British position in these conflicts
and erroneously thought that Britain was still capable of wielding
enough influence to act without American support (particularly during
the Suez Crisis). By 1956, events in Egypt ultimately demonstrated
a critical point in alliance diplomacy in Canberra and Wellington:
Australia and New Zealand were still prepared to pledge support for
vital British interests instead of aligning all strategic policies with their
chief protector, the United States.
As with any alliance, the extent to which a treaty such as ANZUS
comes into fruition and works in practice often depends on the impact of
individuals. Regardless of whether their impact was ultimately positive
or negative, many diplomats played a critical role in the development
of the ANZUS relationship. For instance, Australian External Affairs
Minister Herbert Evatt loomed as a large yet divisive figure in trilateral
relations during the late 1940s. Evatt caused more problems than he
solved in regard to managing Australia’s relationships with New Zealand
and the United States, especially when it came to his abrasive and nonconsultative diplomatic style about matters relating to the Japanese
occupation and the post-war control of the Pacific islands. Percy Spender,
Evatt’s replacement as External Affairs Minister, then led the way in
arguing for the conclusion of a mutual defence arrangement, despite
pushback from his pro-British Prime Minister, Robert Menzies. Once
Spender moved on to serve as Australian Ambassador in Washington,
he and his replacement as External Affairs Minister, Richard Casey,
charted a more active role for Australia during consultations with their
US, New Zealand and British counterparts during the international
crises of the 1950s.
Across the Tasman, Alister McIntosh—Head of the joint New
Zealand Prime Minister’s and External Affairs Departments—was
instrumental in shaping New Zealand’s post-war foreign policy with
Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Britain, at the same
time as steering a slow but noticeable movement toward establishing
closer relations with the United States. In this endeavour, McIntosh was
supported by other key New Zealand diplomats such as Carl Berendsen,
Walter Nash, and Frank Corner, all of whom provided unique insights
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into their frequent distaste for Australian diplomats and their respective
foreign policy agendas, the usefulness of ANZUS, and a continued
affinity toward creating international policies through the lens of the
British Commonwealth.
More well-known figures also played key roles, but not always to the
benefit of establishing a closer trilateral relationship. John Foster Dulles,
who served as chief US negotiator for the ANZUS Treaty in 1951, had
a somewhat chequered record of dealing with the British Dominions.
While he successfully negotiated an ANZUS Treaty draft that was
acceptable for US plans in Japan and the wider region, he was unable
to secure the inclusion of the Philippines to avoid negative perceptions
of a “White Man’s Club” in Asia. Then, during his term as Secretary of
State in the Eisenhower Administration, he consulted frequently with
the Australians and New Zealanders to garner multilateral support
for US policy vis-à-vis Indochina, the Taiwan Straits and Suez. Despite
his wealth of experience in international affairs, Dulles was largely
unsuccessful in securing trans-Tasman support in the face of contrasting
British and American views on the most appropriate course of action.
In an episode that epitomised the challenge Dulles faced in securing
Australian and New Zealand support for US policies, Robert Menzies
and his New Zealand counterpart Sidney Holland severely strained
their countries’ relations with the US when they both publicly declared
support for British efforts in Suez despite widespread international
condemnation (as well as private criticism from inside their respective
Cabinets and External Affairs Departments). A mention must also go to
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, whose push for the use of force
in Suez made him a chief instigator of frosty Anglo-American relations,
and by extension, Australian-New Zealand-American-British relations.
The early Cold War period was certainly one of great change and
consequence for the future of relations between Australia, New Zealand
and the United States. For instance, Australia and New Zealand began
to agree more consistently over defence and foreign policies in their
region, highlighted by their joint participation in the Vietnam War
during the 1960s and 1970s despite British non-participation. Later,
after New Zealand formally adopted a nuclear-free policy in response
to protestations over harbouring American nuclear vessels during the
mid-1980s, the United States suspended its security guarantee to New
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Zealand in 1985. There were complicated reasons for this suspension,
yet it was perhaps fitting that New Zealand, the country that often
questioned its close relationship with the United States during the
early Cold War, was later suspended from the treaty that neither
country had initially wanted. Meanwhile Australia, the country that
had been most eager to conclude a security arrangement in the first
place, became the first signatory to formally invoke ANZUS in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New
York on 11 September 2001. Taking future developments into account,
major strategic and diplomatic issues between Australia, New Zealand
and the United States throughout the following decades can certainly
be traced to the post-war period. The early ANZUS Alliance, in short,
had a decisive impact on the future of the relationship between these
countries and their interactions with the wider world.
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